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ABSTRACT 
This thesis offers a philosophical interpretation of the way in which the idea of 
essentialism is contested in feminist theologies. It explores the relationship between 
women's experience, which theologians such as Mary Daly and Elisabeth Schussler 
Fiorenza hold is foundational to feminist theologies, and concepts of the Divine. I agree 
with the rejection of essentialist concepts of women, thus the notion that 'woman' has a 
fixed meaning across history and in all cultural and socio-political contexts. However, I 
also challenge the way in which essentialism and social constructionism have been cast 
as alternative and mutually exclusive theories. 
The polarity between essentialism and social constructionism, I argue, has its 
origins in John Locke's work. Locke's theory that essence is related to language practice, 
and should be thought of as nominal essence, is a forerunner of the concept of social 
construction as it is used today. The debate about essentialism in feminist theory has 
appropriated Locke's distinction between real and nominal essence and provided a 
theoretical underpinning for an analysis of the idea of woman. I argue, following Diana 
Fuss and Elizabeth Grosz, that the polarity between real and nominal essence is 
contentious and reinscribes dualistic thinking. 
Daly and Schussler Fiorenza reject real essentialism. However, they operate 
within complex dualistic frameworks which separate language and reality and which they 
simultaneously disavow. Daly's account relies on privileging language to such an extent 
that it carries the burden of responsibility in constituting 'reality' and the Divine in so far 
as the Divine mirrors women's experience. If it can be argued that the Divine is the mirror 
of women and women are socially constructed, then the Divine mirrors socially 
constructed women. I argue that one interpretation of the relation between women's 
experience and the Divine can be derived from Feuerbachian projection theory. 
In my view, Daly's ontological-linguistic strategy implies that an 'independently real' 
body underlies language. I argue that Daly accepts that there is a 'natural' body. 
Schussler Fiorenza also employs projection theory, but her elucidation is tempered by her 
belief that G*d is not constituted by discursive practice. I maintain that in repudiating 
naturalism and privileging discursive practice as she does, Schussler Fiorenza posits 
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reality both in terms of that which is within language, and that which is separable from 
language (G*d). Her interpretation of the idea of reality is therefore disquietingly 
ambiguous. 
Such conceptualisations are untenable because they do not account for female 
embodiment. This is a perplexing omission from their feminist theologies. Without some 
account of embodiment, feminist theologies valorise conceptions of women's experience 
which continue to be dualistic. In each case, discourse is ontologically privileged in order 
to avoid courting essentialist constructions of women's experience. I argue that the idea 
of divinity which is commensurate with women's experience(s) implies both that women 
construct, and are concurrently constructed by, their embodiment and language. 
Therefore, an account of female embodiment is imperative for the successful elucidation 
of feminist theologies. 
As an alternative to their dualistic accounts, I explore the work of French 
philosopher/psychoanalyst Luce lrigaray, who has been branded an essentialist. She 
offers a different model which does not rely on the purported separability of language and 
'reality'. Her work is of particular interest because she claims that women need a Divine 
of their own. She proposes refiguring divinity in terms which exploit the male symbolic and 
'the feminine' as 'it' is interpreted within that symbolic. I argue that her notion, the sensible 
transcendent, can be used as an interpretative device for some conceptions of social 
constructionism. I also argue that her use of the sensible transcendent as that which 
transgresses dualistic conceptions implicit in feminist theologies, provides a way of 
thinking about these issues which neither depends on essentialist assumptions, nor 
assumptions about language conceived of as independent of 'reality'. Most importantly, 
female embodiment is an explicit part of her articulation of the Divine. 
Frances Gray 
Department of Philosophy 
The Faculties 
Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 
Australia, 0200 
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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY 
WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF FEMINIST THEOLOGIES1 
It is accepted by many feminist theologians that there is a strong relation between 
men's conceptions of themselves and their conceptions of God and what they value most 
highly. Mary Daly and Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza are among the feminist theologians 
who hold this view. They argue that as theology has been the domain of men, the God 
postulated by men reflects male assumptions, male socio-politics and male theorising. 
In Christian theology, for example, the Nicene Creed, the Creed of orthodoxy of the 
Christian Church, proclaims: 
We believe in One God, the Father Almighty, creator of Heaven and Earth 
Creator of all things visible and invisible; 
And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only, begotten Son of God, begotten 
from the Father before all time ... 2 
Not only does God become embodied as a man, this God-made-man is begotten 
from a Father from eternity, pre-existing his mother. The girl-woman Mary becomes his 
1 There are two points to note here. Firstly, I use the expression 'theologies' rather than 'theology' 
throughout this thesis to acknowledge the variety of positions and theories found in works of 
different feminist theologians, thealogians and feminists interested in the Divine. For a sample of 
this diversity see Valerie Saiving, "The Human Situation: A Feminine View" and "Introduction: 
Womanspirit Rising" , in Carol P. Christ & Judith Plaskow (eds.), Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist 
Reader in Religion (Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1979); Carol P. Christ, Diving Deep and 
Surfacing: Women Writers on Spiritual Quest (Beacon Press, Boston, 1980) ; Judith Plaskow, ~ 
Sin and Grace: Women's Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich 
(University Press of America, Lanham MD, 1980) ; Naomi Goldenberg, Returning Words to Flesh: 
Feminism. Psychoanalysis, and the Resurrection of the Body (Beacon Press, Boston MA, 1990); 
Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said; Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation (Beacon 
Press, Boston, 1992); the collection Judith Plaskow & Carol P. Christ (eds.), Weaving the Visions: 
New Patterns in Feminist Spirituality (Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1989) ; Anne Pattel-Gray, "Not 
Yet Tiddas: An Aboriginal Womanist Critique of Australian Church Feminism" in Maryanne Confoy, 
Dorothy A. Lee, and Joan Nowotny, Freedom and Entrapment: Women Thinking Theology (Dove 
Publications, Melbourne, 1995). 
Secondly, all of these feminists refer to , imply, or use, the idea of women's experience(s), the 
idea with which I am concerned in this thesis, as fundamental to the development of feminist 
theologies. See also Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a Feminist 
Theology (SCM Press, London, 1983); Rebecca S . Chopp, "Feminism's Theological Pragmatics: 
A Social Naturalism of Women's Experience" in Journal of Religious Studies, 67 (2) (1987), pp. 239 
- 256. 
2 John Leith (ed .), "The Constantinopolitan Creed", in Creeds of the Churches: A Reader in 
Christian Doctrine from the Bible to the Present (rev. ed .) (John Knox Press , Richmond VA, 1973). 
p. 33 . 
..... 
mother but as an instrument who consents to the Father's intentions and in so doing 
becomes the model for all women. ("You see before you the Lord's servant, let it happen 
to me as you have said." 3) In Trinitarian theology, this masculine-paternal God is self-
subsistent, the original single parent, who substantially remains one while manifesting 
himself as three (male) persons: Father, Son and Spirit. 
Feminists theologians have interrogated the notion of a 'male' gendered God 
because they regard the 'male' gendering of God as inappropriate. Daly and Schussler 
Fiorenza, amongst others, have attempted to dislodge the 'maleness' of the transcendent 
divinity, claiming His genesis in the socio-political and metaphysical machinations of 
men.4 This God, they argue, is a product of androcentric understandings, interpretations 
and symbolics which are taken as normative and disregard the experiences of women.5 
This God, many feminist theologians have claimed, is the God of men and not the God 
of women. 
Given that feminist theologians read theology and conceptions of divinity as male 
gendered, women's experience, not men's, has become enormously important to them. 
They argue that women's experience is negated and neglected in conceptualisations of 
divinity, resulting in a politics which oppresses and undervalues women.6 So, in what is 
undoubtedly the most fundamental intervention of feminist theologians, women's 
experience has been highlighted as the key category for articulating feminist theologies. 
This has meant that feminist theologians have openly questioned the images and 
language associated with the idea of God and what it means to be a woman. In 
interrogating the concept of women, the idea of God has become destabilised and so a 
connection between women and divinity has been posited. Theorists like Daly and 
Schussler Fiorenza have used both religious and secular theory in the development of 
3 Luke 1 :38, The New Jerusalem Bible, (Doubleday, New York, 1985). 
4 See for example, Sally McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Fortress Press, 
Minneapolis, 1993). 
5 See for example, Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, lo Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological 
Reconstruction of Christian Origins (SCM Press, London, 1983), pp. 58-60. 
6 See for example, Mary Daly, The Church and the Second Sex (with a new Feminist Post 
Christian Introduction by the Author) (Harper & Row, New York, 1975); op. cit., Radford Ruether, 
Sexism and God-Talk. 
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their own theologies. Not withstanding the influence of theologians like Daly, secular 
theory has undoubtedly had a strong influence on feminist theologies, resulting in the 
blurring of the distinction between the worldly and the religious. In part, this blurring could 
be seen as an attempt to overcome the supposedly binary oppositional nature of the 
secular and the religious.7 American feminist theologian Carol Christ for example writes: 
I do not intend to separate reality into the spiritual and the mundane, as 
has been typical in Western philosophy. . . . I believe women's quest 
seeks a wholeness that unites the dualisms of spirit and body, rational 
and irrational, nature and freedom, spiritual and social, life and death. . 
.. I believe that women's spiritual and social quests are two dimensions 
of a single struggle ... 8 
Sentiments like those of Christ could be used, in part, to explain the disillusion 
with theology of feminist theologian Daphne Hampson. Hampson has written: 
What strikes me then about much modern theology - and this is not least 
true of feminist theology - is how profoundly secular it is. It is as though 
theology has lost its moorings. In the case of feminist theology, what 
seems to have replaced talk of God is largely talk of women's experience. 
It is not even women's experience of God it is simply women's experience. 
Thus Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza tells of the community of women in the 
early church, celebrating their courage in adversity and their egalitarian 
politics ... Mary Daly advocates the self realisation of women and the 
overcoming of oppression in a new age. . .. In all this, what I mrss is 
'theology': talk of God.9 
Hampson's comments are echoed by Luce lrigaray's remark that "sociology 
quickly bores me when I'm expecting the divine".10 This is an interesting twist because the 
point seems to be that the theological, once conceived in terms of transcendent and the 
7 Elizabeth Grosz [formerly 'Gross'] reads binarism in terms of setting up two categories, one of 
which is privileged over, and opposed to, the Other. In Cartesian metaphysics, for example, mind 
and body are two terms which form a binary opposition. Mind is privileged over body and the two 
terms are seen as oppositional: either body or mind, but not both. Hence, body and mind are 
separable substances which co-exist at opposite ends of an imagined schema. I use, and defer to 
Grosz's characterisation of dualism throughout this thesis. See Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: 
Towards a Corporeal Feminism (Allen & Unwin, St. Leonard'~ 1994), pp. 3 - 1 o. 
8 
op. cit., Christ, Diving Deep and Surfacing. pp. a & 9. 
9 Daphne Hampson, Theology and Feminism, Signposts in Theology Series (Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, UK & Cambridge, MA, 1990), p. 170. 
10 Luce lrigaray, "Equal To Whom?", in Naomi Schor, & Elizabeth Weed (eds.) The Essential 
Difference, Books from Differences Series (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994), p. 80. 
3 
'other worldly', now takes on the characteristics of the secular: immanent, and firmly 
grounded in human experience.11 This also might explain lrigaray's ennui: feminist 
religious sociology or at least socio-politics which reflects immanence, the world at large 
and the world of women which denies them transcendence. In feminist theologies this 
translates as the articulation of women's experience, as if women's experience holds 
some clue to the Divine which men's experience does not. A consequence of valorising 
the importance of women's experience, then, is that talk of transcendence is devalued in 
favour of talk of immanence. But a further consequence is that the problems associated 
with the relation and tension between transcendence and immanence are revisited. As 
well as this, the unsettling question of embodiment, conceived of in terms of immanence, 
emerges. 
Let me stay with the idea of women's experience as immanent. The assumption 
of feminist theologians has been that women's experience ought to inform theology. 
Therefore, acceptance of the representations of women's experience as immanent 
potentially forces a refiguring of the Divine which not only devalorises the idea of 
transcendence but problematises embodiment as well. The quandary with the idea of 
embodiment is that feminists have claimed that women's embodiment p·rovides the site 
for essentialising discourses about what it means to be a woman. This means that 
images of the Divine which come out of women's experience are very much embedded 
in the concerns of embodied women: maternity in particular. But how such concerns are 
to be theorised is contentious because the spectre of essentialism looms large. By this 
I mean that one of the difficulties facing feminist theologians and feminist theorists in 
general is how to talk about biology and female bodies without courting essentialist 
assumptions. This latter is precisely why Schussler Fiorenza, as we shall see in chapter 
11 The tension between immanence and transcendence has a long philosophical and theological 
history. The Hebrew Scriptures have Yahweh present (he gives Moses the Tablets on which is 
written the Law) and operating in the history of the Hebrew people while being the Other which men 
cannot see and survive. The theme of God's presence in the world, and His difference from the 
world, survives in Aquinas' Proofs for God's existence, to Spinoza's Ethics, up to current discussions 
such as Elizabeth A. Johnson's in She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological 
Discourse (Crossroad, New York, 1993), Ch. 6, pp. 104 - 120; and Frank Burch Brown's 
''Theology's Dialogue with Culture" in Peter Byrne and Leslie Houlden, Companion Encyclopedia 
of Theology (Routledge, London & New York, 1995), pp.325 - 326. For philosophical treatment of 
transcendence in the work of de Beauvoir, see Karen Green, "Femininity and Transcendence", in 
Australian Feminist Studies, 1 o (Summer 1989), pp. 85 - 96. 
4 
3, is so aggrieved at the operation of normative concepts (for example the maternal 
feminine) relating to women. It is also why women need to develop some understandings 
of what they mean when they talk about 'women'. It seems paradoxical that some feminist 
theorists might talk about women's experience without talking about female embodiment 
for fear of essentialism. The trope of the body is suppressed in favour of the trope of 
social construction because embodiment is invariably associated with ideas of 
essential ism. 
One of my major concerns in this thesis, is to argue that a good version of social 
constructionism would allow talk of embodiment without being essentialist. I will not be 
questioning the assumption that women need to develop their own account of the Divine. 
My concern is to characterise what one might mean by the term 'woman' and then to 
explore its relation to the Divine. This is because the assumption that women's 
experience should be the foundation for feminist theologies suggests a moment when 
masculine paternal figurings of the Divine must be problematised and reformulated in 
terms more amenable to women. 
In contrast to Schussler Fiorenza's denunciation of the maternal feminine, I argue 
in my final chapter that Luce lrigaray's idea ·of the sensible transcendent12 preserves the 
transcendent and associates it with the immanent in an interdependent relation. lrigaray's 
own account of the Divine is not sociological, although it takes cognisance of social 
factors. She articulates divinity in a formulation which 'combines' two ambiguous 
expressions, the transcendent (discourse) and the immanent (embodiment). But for now 
the questions which need to be asked are, What does women's experience say about the 
Divine? and What is meant by 'women's experience'? 
However spelt out, that women's experience in relation to the Divine has its origins 
in men's theology is undeniable. Men's theology has provided the content of theological 
belief and determined how women ought to behave if they are to be pleasing to God. The 
girl-woman Mary, with her unquestioning assent to the Angel's request has provided the 
model of womanhood to which all women ought aspire. 
12 Many commentators and translators prefer 'transcendental' rather than 'transcendent' in 
translating lr~aray's term "transcendental sensible". See Luce lrigaray "Ethique de la Difference 
Sexuelle" inthiQue de la Difference Sexuelle (Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1984), p. 124. I prefer 
'transcendent' to avoid associating the term with Kant's transcendental. 
5 
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But the proposition that human experience and the Divine are linked is not new 
to philosophy and theology, even if it is expressed in terms of the implicitly inclusive 
generic 'Man'. Xenophanes proposed: 
But mortals think that the gods are born, 
and have clothes and speech like their own. 
But if cows and horses or lions had hands 
or could draw with their hands and make the things men make, 
then horses would draw the forms of gods like horses, 
cows like cows, and they would make their bodies 
similar in shape to those which each had themselves. 13 
Yet Plato in the Theaetetus offers what might be thought of as a 'reverse' 
projection theory in which men should aim to model themselves on the Divine: 
Socr. [sic] Evils, Theodorus, can never be done away with , for the good 
must always have its contrary; nor have they any place in the divine world; 
but they must needs haunt this region of our mortal nature. That is why we 
should make all speed to take flight from this world to the other; and that 
means becoming like the divine as far as we can, and that again is to 
become righteous with the help of wisdom.14 
Instead of the Divine being imaged as man would ideally image himself, Plato's 
idea seems rather that man should strive towards modelling himself after the perfection 
of the Divine. I will argue later that Schussler Fiorenza employs both of these projectionist 
perspectives in the development of her idea of ekklesia. Fauerbach, in developing his 
anthropological theology claimed that God is the mirror of man.15 As with Xenophanes, 
Feuerbach's 'God' becomes the projection of the best of all human qualities. The idea of 
God is dependent upon the existence of human consciousness. 
Reviewing an essay by Amy Hollywood, Nancy Frankenberry observes that 
"Among other things, she signals the complex ambiguities that attend the Feuerbachian 
13 
"Xenophanes" in Jonathon Barnes (trans. & ed.), Early Greek Philosophy (Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1987), p. 95. 
14 
''Theaetetus" in Francis Macdonald Cornford (trans. & commentary), Plato's Theory of 
Knowledge (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, New York, 1935), 179c - 186e. 
15 Feuerbach develops this mirror/projection theory at length. See Ludwig Feuerbach, The 
Essence of Christianity (trans. Marian Evans) (John Chapman, London, 1854), p . 62, and in 
particular, "The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion", Part 1, ch. 11, but his claims are 
clearly set out throughout his book. 
6 
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gesture of viewing religion as nothing but an alienated projection of creative human 
potential. This is especially important in the light of the conspicuous reliance of many 
feminist critiques on Feuerbachian projection theories".16 We will see that this formulation 
of God/the Divine is echoed by Daly's, Schussler Fiorenza's and lrigaray's complex 
theorising of the Divine, albeit in different ways. For Feuerbach, there is nothing 
'independent' and 'objectively real' about God thought of as separable from human 
consciousness. 
At this stage it is important to emphasise that feminist theologians have not 
rejected talk of a 'male' God because God might be perceived as a projection per se. 
They do not argue that God does not exist because God might be a projection of 
(idealised) Man. Their moves are more subtle, arguing instead that God should also be 
conceived of in such a way as to reflect women's experiences.17 It could be argued then 
that the feminist enterprise has in part been to replace the 'God is the mirror of man' 
discourse with 'God is the mirror of woman'. lrigaray, for example, reads Feuerbach 
literally and refuses to admit that the Divine projected by man can be a God for women. 
'Man', on this reading is not to be thought of as a generic term. Quite literally men project 
their own images - sexed and situated in their own experiences - to constitute the kind of 
God they would like themselves to be. lrigaray has argued that women need their own 
Divine because women need a projection of what is ideal for women, morally and 
psychologically. On lrigaray's argument, given the differences between women and men, 
the Divine of women and the Divine of men will be different. 
Like lrigaray, Daly and Schussler Fiorenza acknowledge the importance of 
destabilising androcentric discourse in the development of feminist theory. Discourse, 
language in use, as we shall see, is a very important aspect of feminist theologies, just 
as it has been in men's theology where the Word is paramount. 
16 Nancy Frankenberry, "Introduction: Prolegomenon to Future Feminist Philosophies of 
Religions" in Hypatia. Special Issue: "Feminist Philosophy of Religion" [Nancy Frankenberry & 
Marilyn Thie (eds.)] 9 (4) (Fall 1994), pp. 1 - 14. See that volume also for Amy M . Hollywood, 
"Beauvoir, lrigaray, and the Mystical" , pp. 158 - 185. 
17 See, for example, Catherine La Cugna (ed.), Freeing Theology: The Essentials of Theology 
io Feminist Perspective (Harper, San Francisco, 1993). 
7 
If the undertaking has been for women to displace, subvert and ultimately replace 
masculinist discourse, then Hampson's comments could be read as a too hasty appraisal: 
talk about God/the Divine is talk about women's experience. On this view, one's 
experience as woman (or man) is the very ground of theological understanding. 
'Experience' and the idea of the Divine are not separable. One might ask of Hampson, 'Is 
it possible to talk about God without talking about experiences of either women and men 
(or both)? What kind of God is one positing if one believes that experience is not a 
primary category in the articulation of theology?' 
On the other hand, it is odd to think that feminist theologians should devote so 
much time to developing feminist theory which can be read as merely sociology - or 
psychology - as lrigaray suggests. I have argued that this is a result of devalorising the 
idea of the transcendent and opting instead for the immanence of women's experience. 
That, at least, seems to be implied in both lrigaray's and Hampson's comments: that to 
speak of the Divine in terms of women's experience is to delimit the idea of the Divine as 
a transcendent concept. 
Two problems should be highlighted here: firstly, the semantic one to which I 
referred earlier, which interrogates the meaning of women's experience; and secondly, 
the idea of experience as a fundamental category for theology. In turn, these two 
questions suggest others which are relevant for feminist theologies: Just what is the 
relation between God and women's experience? If women make a Divine in their own 
image, does that not gender God as masculinist theology has and does? What precisely 
does one mean by 'God', 'the Divine'? 
In a preliminary response to this last question recall a distinction made by Pascal 
between the God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.18 
Pascal's distinction between the (masculine) paternal God and how 'God' functions in 
philosophical and theological systems might be usefully employed in a discussion of 
women's experience and theology. In the context of women's experience Christian 
18 
Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction. Theology and Philosophy (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK & Sydney, 1989), ip . 29. Hart is discussing the work of Derrida 
and points out that "Derrida is more concerned with the former than the latter. It is not that Derrida 
addresses himself to a being that is posited rather than to a Father who is trusted, but that he is 
concerned with how God has been made to function in philosophical and theological systems". 
8 
feminist theologians for example, appear to be concerned primarily with the God of 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Their worries revolve around the issues of God's gender, 
God's Fatherhood, God's relation to women and the socio-political implications of such 
issues.19 In other words, theirs are existential concerns relating to the object of one's 
belief, for example to bring about a just and liberated society. The work of Schussler 
Fiorenza focuses on socio-politics to this end. 
But there are also concerns about the God of the philosophers, the God/the Divine 
to whom/which lrigaray and Hampson allude. The way in which 'God' has been made to 
function in philosophical and theological systems, many feminists would argue, is 
anathema to women because in these systems everything is conceived of as a unified 
whole. 20 This means that recognition of difference: sex/gender, class, race has been 
eradicated or has never been acknowledged, in an attempt to privilege one view of the 
world (male, white, European, middle class) which reflects an ultimate and objective truth. 
In this scheme, woman as subject has been ignored or silenced and man as subject has 
been taken to be normative. Thus the whole of theology has revealed itself through the 
eyes of a particular privileged class of men as true for all. 
Feminist theologians such as Schussler Fiorenza and Elizabeth· Johnson have 
addressed what we might think of as the functional usage of 'God', 21 existentially. In so 
doing, they have eroded the boundaries between the God of belief and faith and the God 
of the philosophers. An account of being in terms of God/the Divine refigured from an 
existentially informed woman-centred perspective, dominates feminist theologies. 22 Such 
19 See, tor example, op. cit. Daly, The Church and the Second Sex; op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, 
But She Said. 
20 See op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said: Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, "Experience in 
White Feminist Theory", in Sex. Race and God: Christian Feminisms in Black and White 
(Crossroad, New York, 1989) ; and bell hooks, feminist theory from margin to center (South End 
Press, Boston.,1987). 
21 See Schussler Fiorenza's use of 'G-d' and 'G*d', in op. cit., But She Said and op. cit., 
Jesus: Miriam's Child. Sophia's Prophet: Critical Issues in Feminist Christology (Continuum, New 
York, 1994) , and op. cit., Johnson, She Who Is. 
22 This is so especially in the case of Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethjcs of Radical 
Feminism (The Women's Press, London, 1979), and Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy 
(The Women's Press, London, 1984) , and Carol Christ's work on the Goddess "Why Women Need 
the Goddess", in op. cit., Christ and Plaskow, Womanspirit Rising. 
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an account always invokes the notion of women's experience and accentuates the 
importance of what Pascal called the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. One might infer 
from this that the task of feminist theologians in articulating women's experience is to 
address the problems associated with theorising the paternal God. Note that this can be 
thought of as another example of feminist theologians' attempts to disavow distinctions 
which are taken for granted in the orthodox canon. On this reading, Pascal's distinction 
is not one that feminist theologians would want to maintain. If the God of the philosophers 
is anything they might argue, He is a God of Reason, the God of Men. And it is this God 
they seek to repudiate. So in concentrating on existential concerns, feminist theologians 
in effect disavow the God of the philosophers as a product of Reason. 
The feminist insistence on women's experience as a fundamental category for 
feminist theologies would seem, then, to be justified. It serves the dual function of 
inserting women's experience into articulations of the Divine and breaking down the 
distinction between the God of faith and the God of Reason. 
However, as I noted above, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is a God of 
experience, the experience of men. Tradition has it that this God is also the God of 
women because 'men' should be read generically and therefore includes 'women'. Herein 
lies the problem. If the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is the God of men's experience 
what does it mean to say that this God is also the God of women's ·experience when the 
term 'men' should not be read generically according to feminist theory?23 Why should 
'men's experience' be read inclusively especially when the experience(s) of men and the 
experience(s) of women would not seem to be co-extensive. What would it mean to say 
that this God is the God of both women and men? 
So far I have argued not that feminist theologians deny the existence of a relation 
between experience and concepts of the Divine, but that women's experience is missing 
from (what is largely) men's theological conceptualising. A major problem in any 
theoretical stance which posits a close, and perhaps inextricable, relation between 
experience, theology and the Divine - and without exploring that relation - is the semantic 
question of what meaning one can give to the expression 'experience'. As many feminists 
23 See any of Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza's works where she discusses this problem very well. 
10 
have pointed out, all subjects are gendered. On their view, supposedly neutral theory, 
which assumes a supposedly neutral subject, is 'male' theory which operates at the level 
of the suppressed idea of a 'male' subject. Women are automatically included in men's 
theorising. 24 Not only is there a problem with working out what is meant by 'experience' 
and 'its' various relations, but the idea of 'women's experience' as it relates to theology 
and conceptions of the Divine, needs some attention. 
'Women's experience' is not a carefully elucidated term. Its lack of clarity revolves 
around questions like: Which women do you mean when you speak of 'women's 
experience'? Do all women experience the same, have the same experiences? If they do 
what is the basis for their similarities? If they do not, what are the differences? If women 
experience differently, can one ever legitimately use the expression, 'women's experience' 
universally (speaking for all women everywhere)? What role does experience play with 
respect to women? Do women in some sense, pre-exist their experiences, so that women 
have experiences? Or are women created or constructed as a result of, or constituted by, 
their experiences? How is one to view the relation between women's experience(s) and 
the Divine when the last two questions might yield very different answers? What is meant 
by 'God'/'the Divine'? Is divinity separable or distinct from any human experiences, 
women's or men's?25 
Such questions warn that the problematic of women's experience might be 
something of a three dimensional jigsaw puzzle in which putting together the top layer 
does not insure the solving of the rest of the puzzle. Grappling with problems like these, 
American feminist historian Joan Scott argues: 
History has been largely a foundationalist discourse. By this I mean that 
its explanations seem to be unthinkable if they do not take for granted 
some primary premises, categories, or presumptions. These foundations 
(however varied, whatever they are at a particular moment) are 
24 See, for example, op. cit., Daly, Gyn/Ecology: and Luce lrigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One 
(trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke) (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1985). 
25 For a good review of feminist conceptions of 'woman' see Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Thought: 
A Comprehensive Introduction (Routledge, London, 1993). 
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unquestioned and unquestionable; they are considered permanent and 
transcendent. 26 
Scott points out that experience is what is in need of explanation, and is not what 
ought to be counted as the source of our explanations.27 According to her, there is danger 
in thinking of experience as something which is had by autonomous agents. Rather than 
reifying experience, making experience into an object or thing of which a subject, the 
agent, is the origin, Scott suggests that experience should be thought of as that which 
constructs,not that which is constructed by an agent. This would mean that ideas like that 
of autonomous agency in which a subject pre-exists her experience, should be re-read 
so as to give prominence to the roles culture and language play in the making of subject 
positions: as woman and/or worker and/or homosexual and/or black. That is to say, the 
appearance of there being autonomous agency emerges as a result of experience, rather 
than autonomous agency being its pre-condition. 
Now if it is the case that women's experience should be explained rather than that 
which does the explaining, perhaps it might also be the case that women's experience 
engenders, or constructs a unique women's understanding of the Divine. This Feuerbach 
inspired thesis is a strong one: that as women are constructed through their experiences, 
so might the Divin~ insofar as divinity is the mirror of women. The complexity of the idea 
of women's experience is testament to the complexity of the idea of divinity. Divinity is not 
disembodied and abstracted from women's lives. Divinity for women reflects their sexed 
embodiment, their incompleteness and their becoming, their possibilities. In their attempts 
to refigure their negatively figured status, women's difference from men and from each 
other necessitates a Divine constructed differently. Thus how one characterises the 
Divine will not be closed, but will be constructed around difference(s), possibilities and 
ideals. 
Scott's suggestion picks up on a debate which has become very important to 
feminist theorising: the question of essential ism (that there is something timeless, 
universal and unchanging which makes a woman a woman) and social constructionism 
26 Joan Scott, "Experience", in Judith P. Butler and Joan W. Scott (eds.), Feminist Theorise the 
Political (Routledge, New York, 1992), p. 26. 
27 'b'd I I ., p. 38. 
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(that women are for example, cultural productions or artifacts28 , who are constituted by 
various socio-cultural and political discursive practices and positionings). On these two 
accounts, women either have experiences or are the result of experiences. If experience 
constructs (woman), if experience is to be explained and is not that to which one can 
appeal in speaking about women, then the question of women's experience is thrown 
wide open. 'Woman'/women' speaks to social practices and accordingly can have many 
meanings. Those meanings should be seen within the complexities of social practice 
which individuate women and constitute their differences from men. On this account, 
because women, are constructed through their experiences, women will be constructed 
differently. This will mean that the ground of feminist theologies is not women's 
experience, but women's experiences. Women's experiences produce women, not 
'woman'. The universal term fails to refer because there is no universal woman to whom 
one can refer except in terms of an idealised projection, which feminist theologians and 
feminists generally, reject as untenable. On such an account not only are women different 
from men, but they are different from each other. 
As women are different, their differences constituted through diverse cultures, 
ethnic, race, sex/gender and class factors, it follows that the use of women's experiences 
as foundational in feminist theologies, should reflect that diversity. However, if it is the 
case that women are constituted by their experiences, is one obliged to abandon 
universal ascriptions like 'All Australian women are of the female sex because they have 
two x chromosomes', or 'All women can bear children'? These are after all, questions 
about female bodies, the bodies of women. How is one to account for female embodiment 
if women are socially constructed? Supposing that one does give an account of female 
embodiment which is consonant with the idea that women are socially constructed, how 
will that be reflected in women's conceptualising the Divine? Should the concept of the 
Divine mirror women's bodies for example? What would it mean to make a claim such as 
that? 
28 See for example Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance: A Study of Women in Contemporary 
Philosophy (trans. Elizabeth Guild) (Polity Press, Oxford, 1991) ; op. cit., Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile 
Bodies; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge, 
London & New York, 1990). 
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Given these questions, a shift in understanding must take place if one is seriously 
to countenance women's experience as foundational to feminist theologies. It seems that 
there might be competing claims about women as constructed, the role of embodiment 
and how that might relate to the social construction of women. The argument would be 
that if it is unacceptable to think of experience as a consequence of subject positioning 
rather than as constituting that positioning, and if the idea of women's experience is 
retained as a foundational discourse for feminist theologies, this social constructionist 
perspective not only presents one with a reinterpretation of 'experience', but of 'woman' 
as well. But women are embodied and this 'fact' should be taken into consideration when 
one develops one's account of a Divine for women. If one acknowledges that women are 
embodied, what does this acknowledgement do for a feminist concept of the Divine? Is 
one committed to an essentialist stance if one acknowledges women's embodiment and 
if that is so, how is one to conceive of divinity in relation to the idea of an essential 
women? Can one claim that women are embodied and at the same time argue that 
women are socially constructed? If one makes a claim like the latter, what kinds of things 
can be said about women, their experiences and their relation to the Divine? In this thesis 
I attempt to come to terms with these apparently competing claims. 
The problem is that the two apparently competing views (essentialism and social 
constructionism) offer two different understandings of women's experience 
('universalisable/essential woman' and 'socially constructed women') while retaining the 
centrality and foundational nature of experience. The competing views can be summed 
up in the phrase 'essentialist debate'. Put simply, the debate revolves around whether or 
not there is something timeless, universal and unchanging which makes a woman a 
woman. The opposing view, that women are discursively produced through cultural and 
other socio-political factors, says that there is nothing timeless, universal and unchanging 
about women. Discourse, not a timeless essence, is responsible for constituting women. 
Since discourse constitutes the idea of women and women's experience is the ground for 
feminist theologies, one might think that discourse and the object of feminist theologies -
the Divine - are linked. 
I have been arguing that this is the case if the Divine is construed as the mirror 
of women. One might argue that there is nothing essential (in the sense in which I am 
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using the term) about the Divine either, that the Divine mirrors the best projections of 
society/culture just as Feuerbach suggested. The idea that God/the Divine stands outside 
time, ahistorical, and immutable is false: there is no essential God, just as there is no 
essential woman. On this reading, the idea of God/the Divine and the idea of woman is 
closely linked in a mirrored projection constituted by social construction. Given that 
feminist theologians opt for social constructionist over essentialist stances, I will argue 
that they must subscribe to some version of this thesis. But what is really meant when 
one uses the terms 'essentialist' and 'social constructionist'? 
The term 'essentialist' and its cognates is widely used and often with limited 
understanding; likewise with 'social constructionist' - the meaning of which is often taken 
to be transparent. In this thesis, I am concerned to elucidate essentialism and social 
constructionism by addressing the essentialist debate in the context of feminist 
theologies. I will be addressing a number of problems which raise concerns about other 
philosophical issues like particulars and universals, realism and dualism, language and 
'reality'. The language of feminist theologies develops whilst using these contested 
concepts. Hence one repeatedly finds references to 'woman' as an apparently universal 
term and the role language plays in the construction of 'reality' which is a social 
constructionist perspective. This is especially true of Mary Daly's and Elisabeth Schussler 
Fiorenza's work. 
It is not clear that one should immediately accept the social constructionist stance. 
While it is the case that feminist theologians have repeatedly argued that women are 
socially constructed, a passionate debate about essentialism has developed in the 
feminist academy. American feminist theologian Mary Daly, who was amongst the first 
to contend that women are tied culturally to their socio-political and cultural contexts,29 
seems in her later writings, to use what many regard as essentialising notions of 
woman.30 lrigaray has been accused of adopting an essentialist stance because of her 
deliberate use of 'feminine' imagery and her apparent valorising of the feminine as 'it' has 
29 
op. cit., Daly, The Church and the Second Sex, passim. 
30 See for example, op. cit., Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance and op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, .6.u1 
She Said, p. 106. 
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been traditionally conceived.31 I will argue that it is not clear that either Daly or lrigaray is 
essentialist, in a pejorative sense, even though they use language which Schussler 
Fiorenza argues revalorises the maternal feminine. 32 
I will argue that social constructionism offers a way of thinking about women which 
acknowledges that they are constituted by their experiences. I will also argue that social 
constructionism might provide some ways of thinking about the Divine as that which 
mirrors women's experience(s). But I will also insist that women's embodiment must be 
taken into consideration when one attempts to theorise women and that this is an 
important aspect of women's experience in relation to the Divine. My argument takes 
seriously the feminist theological insight that women's experience should be foundational 
for feminist theologies. As I will show, the idea of essentialism is regarded as pernicious 
by most feminist theorists, secular or religious. As well, I will show that social 
constructionism has its pitfalls and should be courted tentatively. 
Outline of Argument 
The recent work of secular feminist theorists in the area of social constructionism 
has been very influential in determining the direction of feminist theologies, particularly 
as there has been a shift towards· adopting non-essentialist, social constructionist 
stances. Following Teresa de Lauretis and Diana Fuss, I argue that in John Locke's work 
we find an interpretation of essence which is critical to feminist discussions of 
essentialism. In feminist theory generally what Locke called 'real essence' (that is not 
language dependent), is thought of pejoratively. But Locke opposes 'real essence' to 
'nominal essence'. This opposition is echoed in the current feminist debate about 
essence. As Fuss points out, the idea of nominal essence can be roughly mapped onto 
the theoretical category, 'social construction' which maintains the primary role of 
discourse in the construction of women. 
31 See Toril Moi, "Patriarchal reflections: Luce lrigaray's looking glass" , in Sexual Textual Politics : 
Feminist Literary Theory (Routledge, London, 1991 ), pp. 127-147; Monique Plaza,' "Phallomorphic 
Power" and the Psychology of ''woman"' in Ideology and Consciousness, 4 (Autumn 1978), pp. 5 -
35 ; and op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said. 
32 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, "Justa" , in But She Said, passim. 
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The relationship between nominalism and social constructionism is highlighted by 
the work of secular feminist theorists like de Lauretis33 and Fuss34 who have developed 
strong critiques of a commitment to real essence. They attack real essentialist concepts 
of women on the grounds of their purported ahistoricism, universalism and immutability. 
In a similar vein, the American philosopher Elizabeth Spelman uses a critique of Plato and 
Aristotle35 to challenge real essentialist notions of 'woman' which abstract gender from 
race and class considerations. Just as class and race factors did not sufficiently 
contribute to the understanding of woman in Aristotelian philosophy, so this is the case 
in today's feminist theories. For Spelman, 'woman' is a socio-political rather than a 'pure' 
sex/gender term and category. 
Such claims against real essence are analogous to feminist historian Joan Scott's 
reconstructing experience as that which needs to be explained rather than that which can 
explain.36 Rather than reifying experience, making experience into an object or thing of 
which a subject, the agent, is the origin, Scott suggests that experience should be thought 
of as that which constructs not that which is constructed by an agent. This would mean 
that ideas like that of autonomous agency in which a subject pre-exists her experience, 
should be re-read so as to give prominence to the roles culture and language play in the 
making of subject positions. The role of discourse in the construction of women rather 
than the role of a non-linguistic substance, is brought to the foreground in such an 
account. 
Language is an important factor in social constructionist theory because such 
theory asserts that discourse plays an originary role in the construction of women. 
33 Teresa de Lauretis, "The Essence of a Triangle or, Taking the Risk of Essentialism Seriously: 
Feminist Theory in Italy, the U.S., and Britain" in differences, A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies. 
The Essential Difference: Another Look at Essentialism, (Summer, 1989), pp. 1 o - 37. Revised and 
reprinted in Schor, Naomi & Weed, Elizabeth (eds.) in The Essential Difference, Books from 
Differences Series (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994). 
34 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference (Routledge, New York & 
London, 1989) passim. 
35 Elizabeth v. Spelman. Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Beacon 
Press, Boston, 1988). 
36 
op. cit., Scott, "Experience" in op. cit., Butler and Scott (eds.), Feminists Theorize the Political , 
p. 26. 
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Whereas essentialism posits a 'reality' independent of language which discourse 
describes and articulates, social constructionism "insists that essence itself a historical 
construction". 37 
These considerations bring into sharp focus the problematic nature of using the 
notion of women's experience as foundational for feminist theologies. 'Women's 
experience' is a contested category because the two notions of 'women' and 'experience' 
are themselves contested. In this context, the question 'Can one ever speak of women 
as women without concurrently speaking of race and class?' implies the substantive issue 
of how to articulate a general concept of women which does not suppress the differences 
amongst them. If Spelman is correct in her critique of the concept of woman, then the 
notion of women's experience will be always qualified by race/class and other factors. 
Hence 'women's experience' as foundational for feminist theologies walks on shaky 
ground if one thinks in universalising terms. The idea that one could be speaking to and 
for all women everywhere becomes problematic and has ramifications for feminist 
theologies, like Rosemary Radford Ruether's, which have relied on the idea of sex/gender 
as their primary analytic category. 
Following Scott's reformulation of experience and Spelman's critique of the idea 
of women, it becomes unacceptable to think of experience as a consequence of subject 
positioning rather than as constituting that positioning. I argue that if the idea of women's 
experience is to be retained as a foundational discourse for feminist theologies, the social 
constructionist perspective not only confronts one with the necessity to reinterpret the 
concept 'woman's experience', but the concept of the Divine as well in a feminist 
theological context. 
On this view, as women are different, of diverse cultures, ethnic, race, sex/gender 
and class contexts, it follows that the concept of women's experiences as foundational 
in feminist theologies should reflect that diversity. The implicit recognition of diversity is 
an important moment in feminist theologies, so one cannot eliminate the idea of women's 
experience as foundational. The consequence of such pluralism suggests the difficult 
question 'How is one to conceive the relation between feminist theologies , whose 
37 
op. cit. , Fuss, Essentially Speaking. p. 2. 
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foundation is a pluralistic relativism, and divinity?' Thus one sees the need for a feminist 
theology which can accommodate a pluralistic relativism in its politics of reshaping 
divinity. 
A version of social constructionism as that which constitutes women is implicitly 
recognised in the theologies of Mary Daly and Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza. Yet they use 
women's experience as a foundation to a woman centred understanding of divinity in 
which they espouse "Feuerbachian projection theory".38 Since both Daly and Schussler 
Fiorenza accept that women are discursively constructed, I propose that in their work 
there is an intimate relation between social construction, language and divinity. Their 
desire to emphasise the role of language in the construction of our concepts of the real 
for instance, means that what counts as the 'reality' of God must itself be socially 
constructed. Their feminist enterprise has been in part to replace the Feuerbachian 'God 
is the mirror of man' with 'God is the mirror of woman' discourse . 
But the importance of Daly and Schussler Fiorenza is that they accept uncritically 
the concept of social constructionism. What does it mean to say that women are socially 
constructed? And if one argues that women are socially constructed, how does this avoid 
the problem of essence? I argue that in Daly's and Schussler Fiorenza's cases, social 
constructionism is not necessarily a solution to essentialism because they both operate 
with a notion of 'real independent of language' which they simultaneously seek to 
repudiate. 
For example, let us consider the points in Schussler Fiorenza's work when she 
argues that "physical sex characteristics are not "biological facts" but are also discursively 
constructed. Anatomical physical differences are as discursively constructed and socially 
maintained as are cultural sex differences".39 Schussler Fiorenza argues that "access to 
reality is always mediated through language" and that feminist theory does not "excuse 
us from giving a more adequate account of reality, an account that does not deny or 
repress the historical activity of the subordinated "others. "40 Schussler Fiorenza clearly 
38 
op. cit:, Frankenberry, "Introduction: Prolegomenon to Future Feminist Philosophies of 
Religions" , p. 11 . 
39 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child , p. 40. 
40 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said. p. 91. 
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wants to argue that there is no brute nature, no brute biology and that nature and biology 
are always already in language. However, what is she maintaining when she also argues 
that we have access to a 'reality' that is always mediated through language and when she 
appeals to the idea of giving a more adequate account of 'reality'? I suggest that here 
Schussler Fiorenza reifies the very category she wants to deny. 
This example shows us that by evoking the idea of social constructionism, we do 
not necessarily avoid the problems of essentialism, a point made by both Diana Fuss4~ 
and Elizabeth Grosz.42 On this basis, I argue that we should discard the opposition 
between social constructionism and essentialism. As Grosz argues, it is a false 
opposition. 43 Such a move is appropriate in a feminist theology which seeks to avoid 
dualistic thinking generally. How can one do this? 
Luce lrigaray's work offers an example of someone whom we could describe as 
a social constructionist and who offers a concept of divinity which reflects women's 
experience and which does not incur the theoretical problems associated with 
essentialism. lrigaray does not oppose herself to essentialism; and as Margaret Whitford 
has pointed out, this is not an issue. in her work. I argue that lrigaray refigures divinity in 
terms more appropriate to women's experience. lrigaray's idea of divinity does not 
submerge the differences among women, is not ahistoric, universalising and immutable 
and does not collapse into an essentialist account of women's experiences. According 
to lrigaray, the development of a feminine Divine and a feminine symbolic are necessarily 
implicated with each other. Representations of women's experience(s) through a unique 
feminine symbolic proceeds from formulating a feminine Divine. Quoting Feuerbach's 
"God is the mirror of man", lrigaray alleges that woman need a Divine of their own so that 
they can become women and not be represented as the lacking Other to men. 
lrigaray's view of divinity as the sensible transcendent ( or the integration of the 
immanent and the transcendent) does not postulate a 'reality' external to language to 
which language more or less has access. For lrigaray, talk about bodies is not 
41 
op. cit., Fuss, Essentially Speaking. p. 6. 
42 
op. cit., Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p. 17. 
43 'b'd I I . 
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contentious, because she never appeals to 'real bodies' outside language. The idea of 
the sensible transcendent reflects women's experiences without essentialising. It also 
reflects women's differences without submerging them in a theoretical framework that 
implies essentialist categories. 
lrigaray's idea of the sensible transcendent implies the possibility of difference 
from the very start. Hers is a feminist politics of divinity in which essentialism is not a 
spectre,44 because she does not acknowledge the opposition of essence and language. 
Rather, in seeking to proceed from a concept of divinity which is a condition of women 
having a positive projection of themselves, she challenges women's atrophied status 
which has been visited upon them as the Other to men. The challenge to this atrophied 
status represents the possibility of founding feminist theologies on women's experience 
without collapsing into essentialism. 
In reading lrigaray in this way, I offer an interpretational framework for 
understanding her commitment to a feminine Divine which many of her commentators 
have found difficult to understand. But I also offer a way of understanding the feminist 
desire for a theology which can embody the ideas of women's experiences and 
differences without appealing to alienating oppositional categories. 
44 
These issues are talked about by Penelope Deutscher , in "'The Only Diabolical Thing About 
Women ... ": Luce lrigaray on DMnity', in Hypatja, Special Issue: "Feminist Philosophy of Religion" 
[Nancy Frankenberry & Marilyn Thie (eds.)] 9 (4) (Fall 1994), pp. 88 - 111. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ESSENTIALISM AND FEMINIST THEOLOGIES: FUNDAMENTALS 
Introduction: The Problem of Essential ism 
A foundational question with which many feminists have concerned themselves 
in recent debate surrounds the problem of Woman/women's essence.1 The Essential 
Difference,2 a collection of critical essays which explores a range of essentialist positions 
and debates across primarily feminist literature, is a fine example of the interests of 
feminists in essentialism. Between Feminism and Psychoanalysjs3 also includes essays 
on "the bearing of essentialism on feminist politics".4 Essentialism has been the worry of 
religious and secular feminists alike, because the idea of ascribing essence to women 
involves the assumption that all women are the same across time, cultures and race. 
Essentialism should be seen within the wider context of the philosophical debate which 
had, for centuries, surrounded the notion of essence and its relation to and involvement 
with substance. The underlying problems which this debate had been addressing 
pertained to ontology. For example: What is it that makes a thing what it is? Are there 
innate qualities or properties and relations, or are these determined by social practice and 
convention? With respect to human beings, are humans born human, or do they become 
human through a process of socialisation? What does it mean to be human? What is the 
relation between the body, being human, and the mind? What are the criteria for saying 
that this thing is the same as it was yesterday? Is everything in a state of flux , or is there 
an unchanging, underlying substance? Should one speak of the One or the Many? And 
1 Whenever I use the term 'Woman' I refer to the universal. In order to refer to individual women, 
groups of women or individual women, I use lower case 'w'. 
2 Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed (eds.), The Essential Difference. Books from Differences 
Series (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994). 
3 
Brennan, Teresa (ed .) Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis 
(Routledge, London & New York, 1989). 
4 ibid., p. 1. 
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epistemological questions: How do we know that this thing exists and is the same as it 
was yesterday? 
Questions analogous to these are frequently asked by feminists in relation to 
women. What is (it that makes a woman) a woman? What is the relation between the 
universal term 'Woman' and individual women? Is it innate qualities, properties and 
relations that 'make' a woman or are there extrinsic or external factors that are involved? 
What is the relation between being a woman and having a certain kind of (sexed) body? 
Is women's experience unique? Can we actually speak of women's experience or should 
we always speak of women's experiences, thus acknowledging diversity and difference? 
My assumption here is that the essentialist problem echoes much older philosophical 
speculation and exploration and can be understood as part of that tradition. 
What is the origin of what is known as the essentialist debate and what currency 
does essentialism have now? And why is it important to feminist theologies? Let me begin 
by suggesting that one can trace the debate about essence at least to Aristotle, who 
discussed at length essence and substance and their relation to universals and 
particulars.5 Essentialism, although covering a range of positions as Naomi Schor points 
out,6 in its most naive form posits an essence, something which makes a thing what it is, 
and without which that thing would not be what it is. In this Aristotelian sense, essence 
is reified.7 Intrinsic natural essence is real, that in virtue of which x is what it is, as 
Charlotte Witt points out: 
If you ask the question, "What is Socrates?" the answer "a human being" 
leads directly to the Aristotelian notion of essence, for an essence is a 
nonlinguistic correlate of the definition of the entity in question. Specify 
what a human being is and you have specified Socrates' essence. On this 
interpretation, since Socrates and Plato are members of the same 
5 Aristotle, Basic Works (ed. Richard McKean) (Random House, New York, 1941 ), "Metaphysics" 
passim, but see especially Book VII, 1029b ff. 
6 Naomi Schor, "This Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips with lrigaray", in op. cit., 
Schor & \Veed, The Essential Difference, p. 43. 
7 See Aristotle, Metaphysics (trans. John H. McMahon) (Prometheus Books, New York, 1991 ), 
1058a and 1058b; op. cit., McKean Aristotle, Basic Works, Book VII, 1029b. 
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species, they share an essence that is also shared by all other human 
beings.8 
On this account "what you are by your very nature is your essence".9 Secondly, 
essence is also what a thing is not: being good is not to be bad, being white is not to be 
black. "So that if the essence of good is not good, neither is the essence of reality real, 
nor the unity of essence one."10 The Aristotelian account of essence does not attribute 
any essence specific to women. This means that women do not have their own essence 
peculiar to being a woman, a theme which is taken up by Luce lrigaray.11 The essence 
of a woman is her being human, but she is of a lower order than man, as we shall see. 
In Aristotle's account of women, women are regarded as a deformity of men. The term 
'woman' picks out a sub-class of human beings and privileges another sub-class, 'man', 
over her. That women are defined in opposition to men in the Pythagorean Table of 
Opposites, as we shall also see, aligns a view of women's essence to this second 
meaning: to be a woman is to be associated with a range of negative attributes defined 
against a range of positive attributes which are attributed to men. In other words, the 
essence of a woman is not to have an essence. Woman's essence is lack: she has an 
atrophied status in relation to man. 
For many feminists, however, lack of essence is not regarded as the central 
problem for women. Mary Daly, for instance, argues that given certain readings of 
Aristotelian texts, an inferior essence has been assigned to women. The supposed 
immutability, ahistoricity and universality of a feminine essence have meant that women 
8 Charlotte Witt, Substance and Essence in Aristotle: An Interpretation of Metaphysics. VII - IX 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY & London, 1989), pp. 2 & 3. Witt points out that there are other 
versions of essence, but the notion of species essence is a common thread running through all of 
them. The quotation in full reads: "The most striking fact about individual substances such as 
Socrates and Bucephalus is that they are members of natural kinds or species (in this case 
different species). Socrates is a human being and Bucephalus is a horse". 
9 
op. cit., McKean, "Metaphysics", Book VII, 1029b. 
10 .b.d 1 1 ., 1031b. 
11 See Luce lrigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One (trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke) 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1985); and Speculum Of The Other Woman (trans. Gillian 
C. Gill) (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1992). 
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have been characterised in ways that condemn them to subservience and 
powerlessness. 
Such a characterisation of women has very negative implications for the notion 
of women's experience. If it is the case that women have intrinsic, natural essence, then 
that essence must determine in some way, what woman's experience will be like. And if 
'it' is intrinsic, then all women will have that essence; 'it' can be used definitionally and 
should be true for all time. 
I noted in my Introduction that Joan Scott rejects a foundationalist approach such 
as this. Instead, she opts for an account of experience which constitutes women rather 
than an account in which women have experience which they construct from their pre-
formed subjectivities. If women have the kind of essence I have been describing, then 
experience will be constructed through the essence, or the essential properties, of 
women. Scott's social constructionist, and the essentialist stances, are two apparently 
oppositional and irreconcilable views, as I have already remarked. But what are the 
specific concerns which feminist theorists have about essentialism? 
The research of feminist theorists in this area is illuminating. Their work has been 
very influential in determining the course of-feminist theologies, particularly as there has 
been a persistent shift towards adopting non-essentialist, social constructionist stances. 
Of course the influence of feminist theologians like Mary Daly who was one of the first to 
denounce essentialism, cannot be gainsaid.12 The specifics of the current debate, 
however, have been much more clearly spelt out by feminist theorists who are not so 
concerned with theological issues. ltle essential difference, to which I referred in my 
opening remarks, illustrates this very clearly. However, a useful reference is also Luce 
lrigaray's article "Equal to Whom?" a review of lo Memory of Her, by the feminist 
theologian, Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza. The fact that such an essay appears in a 
'secular' collection underscores the widespread nature of the essentialist debate. 
What feminists in general have taken exception to should be made clear: that 
there is some difficulty with how one is to understand terms like 'Woman'/women' and the 
relationship between their use(s) and meaning(s). Elizabeth Grosz's concluding paper, 
12 
See Mary Daly, The Church and the Second Sex (with a new Feminist Post Christian 
Introduction by the Author) (Harper & Row, New York, 1975). 
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"A note on essentialism and difference", in Feminist Knowledge, CritiQue and Construct, 13 
lucidly testifies to the difficulties associated with essence and essentialism. Grosz 
comments: 
Feminists have developed a range of terms and criteria of intellectual 
assessment over the last twenty years or so which aim to affirm, 
consolidate, and explain the political goals and ambitions of feminist 
struggles. These terms have tended to act as unquestioned values and 
as intellectual guidelines in assessing both male-dominated and feminist-
oriented theories. Among the most frequent and powerful of these terms 
are those centered around the question of the nature of women (and men) 
- essentialism, biologism, naturalism and universalism .... These terms 
are commonly used in patriarchal discourses to justify women's social 
subordination and their secondary position relative to men in patriarchal 
society. 14 
Grosz does not explore the origins of essentialism (nor is it her intention to do so). 
But she does capture the peculiarities of essentialism when she remarks that 
essentialism "refers to the existence of fixed characteristics, g•ven attributes, and 
ahistorical functions which limit the possibilities of change and thus of social 
reorganisation".15 Essentialism is, then , questionable for feminists at least because of the 
unenviable and uncomfortable position in which it, in terms of definition, seems to place 
women and the consequences which seem to follow. 
It might be the case that essentialising terms are used in the way in which Grosz 
indicates, but the question 'Do they have to be?', 16 is one with which I shall be concerned 
in part. It is arguable that essentialist terms are pejorative only if one regards them as 
more than descriptive and maintains that certain normative practices, rules or laws follow 
from them. That is to say, if one argues that there are some essential facts about 
women's bodies which imply certain moral sentiments ('women are a source of sin'), or 
evaluative judgements ('women are mathematically challenged'), then one is making 
13 Elizabeth Grosz, "A Concluding Note on Essentialism" in Sneja Gunew (ed .) Feminist 
Knowledoe. Critique and Construct (Routledge, London & New York, 1990), p. 332 ff . 
14 
ibid., p. 333 . See also Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Fem inism (Allen 
& Unwin , St. Leonard's, 1994) , p. 212, endnote 15. 
1s 'b'd I I ., p. 334. 
16 I thank Paul Thom for pointing this out. 
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claims which need substantiation. 'Facts' about bodies: that they have ovaries, or that 
brains are bigger/smaller in differently sexed bodies, are linked to behaviour as if there 
were a necessary connection between the two (the bearers of ovaries are very emotional 
or smaller brained human persons cannot think logically). The link between these 'facts' 
and the behaviour to which they purportedly give rise, needs to be elaborated if we are 
to accept that such links do indeed exist. Further, that there might be such 'facts' which 
are themselves not socially constructed, is problematic. Hence there is a debate amongst 
feminists regarding the nature of 'gross' or 'brute' facts. It is not just a case of agreeing 
that there is a Woman's essence and then arguing over how this fact is to be interpreted. 
Rather what is contested is that there is Woman's essence in the first place. 
The question of what makes a woman a woman and what the answer(s) might 
imply, is therefore crucial to developing feminist theologies. That is because women have 
been subjugated, demeaned, undervalued and suppressed because of perceptions which 
relate to their reproductive functions which are given theological significance. The role of 
mothering, for example, has developed from perceptions about child birth and nurturing 
which have been glorified in Catholic Canon. Mary, the mother of Jesus, has been 
proclaimed a model for all women, the model of motherhood. 
Two things need to be noted here: that the supposedly necessary consequences 
of adopting essentialist assumptions might be arbitrary; and that the initial 
presuppositions that lead to the supposedly necessary consequences are contested. In 
this chapter I will explore some of the issues which arise from particular assumptions, 
interpretations and understandings of essentialism and its origins because such an 
exploration will provide a deeper understanding of the problems surrounding women's 
experience in feminist theologies. My assumption is that essentialism is deeply implicated 
in feminist theologies and the representation of women in its theory. For example, it has 
been suggested by Schussler Fiorenza, Toril Moi and others, that Mary Daly's idea of 
women is posited on a universal, archaic, feminine essence which women need to 
rediscover. This essence is assumed to be 'real', the non linguistic correlate of a thing's 
definition, as Witt suggested. But the essence which does not appear to be non-linguistic 
or independent of language, is also examined by some feminist thinkers like Teresa de 
Lauretis and Diana Fuss. This essence which is thought of as nominal essence and 
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depends upon the use of language, is viewed as contingent and changeable. The idea 
of nominal essence is very often what subtends social constructionist perspectives. The 
term 'nominal essence' is taken from John Locke, to whom de Lauretis and Fuss appeal 
for clarification of essence and its relation to feminist theory. So I begin with a short 
discussion of their work. 
John Locke and Nominal Essence 
Both Teresa de Lauretis and Diana Fuss are American feminist theorists who 
have written about real and nominal essence. In this section, I will be exploring some of 
the issues they raise about the nature of essentialism and essence and its problematic 
for feminist theory. In doing this, I indicate that many of the issues they raise are pertinent 
to feminist theologies in their dependence upon women's experience as their foundation. 
Each writer uses John Locke's distinction between real and nominal essence as 
an explanatory tool for developing an understanding of what feminists' concerns with 
essence are. As a preliminary understanding one can, roughly speaking, think of Locke's 
idea of real essence as the underlying (but fictional, according to him) 'reality' of 
something: it is what makes something what it is. Nominal essence, on the other hand, 
is discursively constructed: language in use as it classifies and labels.17 Both de Lauretis 
and Fuss seize on this distinction to argue cases for social constructionism against 
essentialism. Their positions, however, do not mirror each other. Indeed, their readings 
of essentialism indicate substantial cognitive differences. 
De Lauretis has three main concerns in her paper, "The Essence of the Triangle 
or, Taking the Risk of Essentialism Seriously: Feminist Theory in Italy, the U.S., and 
Britain" .18 The first is to clear up misunderstandings about the meaning of the words 
17 For a good discussion of Locke's analysis of essence, see Roger Woolhouse, "Locke's Theory 
of Knowledge", in Chappell , Vere (ed.) The Cambridoe Companion to Locke (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1994), pp. 146 - 171. 
18 Teresa de Lauretis, ''The Essence of a Triangle or, Taking the Risk of Essentialism Seriously: 
Feminist Theory in Italy, the U.S., and Britain" in differences, A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies. 
The Essential Difference: Another Look at Essentialism, (Sum mer 1989), pp. 1 o - 37. Revised and 
reprinted in Schor, Naomi & Weed, Elizabeth (eds.) in The Essential Difference, Books from 
Differences Series (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994). (References are to the original 
article in differences unless otherwise indicated.] 
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'essentialism' and 'essence'. In doing this, de Lauretis hopes "to shift the focus of the 
debate from "feminist essentialism" as a category by which to classify feminists or 
feminisms, to the historical specificity, the essential difference of the feminist theory 
itself" .19 By stating this, de Lauretis is sign posting what she understands as unique in 
feminist theory, viz. its specific emphasis on the cultural, sociological and historical in the 
construction of feminist theory as women's concern.20 
De Lauretis' second concern is to lay bare the shortcomings of feminist works by 
Chris Weedon21 and Linda Alcoff22 ; and the third is to give an account of current Italian 
feminist theory [within the appropriate framework of historical contextualising (historical 
specificity)]. 
De Lauretis begins by stating that the term 'essentialism' "covers a range of 
metacritical meanings and strategic uses that go the very short distance from convenient 
label to buzz word".23 Her main point is not that it has such a range of meanings, nor that 
its use has deteriorated to mere buzz word, but that its meaning is problematic. Guided 
by her intuition 'that either too much or too little is made of "essentialism"', 24 de Lauretis 
consults the Oxford English Dictionary for suitable, useful definitions. 
The dictionary definitions she finds most intellectually compelling are: 
a. of a conceptual entity: The totality of the properties, constituent 
elements, etc., without which it would cease to be the same thing: the 
indispensable and necessary attributes of a thing as opposed to those it 
may have or not ... 
b. of a real entity: Objective character, intrinsic nature as a 'thing-in-itself': 
that internal constitution, on which all the sensible properties depend.25 
19 ibid., p. 12. 
20 
'b'd 1 I I ., p. 1. 
21 Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987). 
22 Linda Alcoff, "Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist 
Theory". Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society. 13:3 (1988), pp. 405-436. 
23 
op. cit., de Lauretis, ''The Essence of a Triangle", in differences, p. 1 O. 
24 'b'd I I ., p. 11. 
2s 'b'd I I ., p. 12. 
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(a) sums up, according to de Lauretis, Locke's description of nominal essence 
exemplified by his statement that the essence of a triangle lies in its being made up of 
three lines meeting at three angles. De Lauretis does not discuss (b) but (b) sounds very 
like Locke's rendering of real essence viz. the thing itself, the underlying 'reality' of a thing. 
Using this distinction, de Lauretis asserts that we should not understand feminists 
to be talking about real essence. She argues that since women are made and not born, 
nominal essence must be what feminists mean when they speak of essence and 
ultimately, of essentialism. The idea of nominal essence 'gels' with the feminist 
conception of the construction of women, since feminists envision the essence of woman 
to be a "totality of properties, qualities and attributes" which they "define, envisage or 
enact for themselves (and some in fact attempt to live out in 'separatist' communities), 
and possibly also wish for other women".26 De Lauretis reminds us that this describes not 
a present state of affairs, a current reality, but a project revolving around a vision of the 
future, which encompasses the past. This is precisely what gives feminism its historical 
specificity.27 As we shall see, this retrospective and futuristic perspective is very influential 
in feminist theological discussion. · 
Thus, de Lauretis seems to think that nominal essence (the conceptually 
necessary properties: the properties which we conceive of as belonging to something and 
which, therefore, constitute the essence of a particular thing), is what feminists should 
prefer. This essence is produced through language practices and is inherently more 
flexible, more accommodating, than real essence (the underlying reality or thing itself 
which is not language or perception dependent). This distinction between the ontological 
(the 'real') and language (the nominal) is important, because it relates directly to feminist 
sentiment which regards discursive practices as perhaps the most significant feature in 
the construction of women. (Hence the claim that "one is not born, but rather becomes, 
a woman".28) 
26 'b'd I I . 
27 'b'd I I ., p. 11. 
28 See Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (trans. H. M. Parshley) (Picador Books, London, 
1949), p. 295. 
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Since the notion of real essence presupposes an inherent, underlying, objective 
and substantial reality, that de Lauretis seeks to dismiss 'it' as the atemporal and 
ahistorical meaning/referent of feminist talk about essence, is not surprising. The idea of 
nominal essence provides an alternative to real essence: essence is no longer reified, a 
'thing', but becomes a product of language practices. 
However, de Lauretis' assumption about the 'proper' meaning of 'essence' is not 
born out by other feminist writers although they do confirm her concern about real 
essence. Diana Fuss' discussion, for example, highlights the ambiguities of the term, but 
she does not share de Lauretis' reservations about what feminists might mean when they 
talk about essence. Certainly, she sees problems with essentialist notions, but her 
introductory remarks serve to belie de Lauretis' position. Fuss writes: 
Essentialism is classically defined as a belief in true essence - that which 
is most irreducible, unchanging and therefore constitutive of a person or 
thing. This tradition represents the traditional Aristotelian understanding 
of essence .... Most obviously, essentialism can be located in appeals 
to a pure or original femininity, a female essence, outside the boundaries 
of the social and thereby untainted (though perhaps repressed) by a 
patriarchal order .... Essentialism emerges perhaps most strongly within 
the very discourse of feminism, a discourse which presumes upon the 
unity of its object of inquiry (women) even when it is at pains to 
demonstrate the difference~ within this admittedly generalising and 
imprecise category [her italics).29 
For Fuss then, the having of an essence in the traditional metaphysical sense, is 
precisely the having of that fixed and determined and irreducible something which makes 
a woman, Woman, what one could think of as Locke's real essence. On Fuss' reading of 
the debate about essence, women are said to be women precisely because they all have 
the same female essence, the essence of Woman: each woman is an instantiation of the 
universal Woman. For her, this is what makes essentialism problematic. 
It is this traditional metaphysical sense which de Lauretis denies to feminists. De 
Lauretis' intuition that feminists are talking about nominal, rather than real, essence 
sounds correct if one construes the two conceptualisations as disjunctive. (One can 
29 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference (Routledge, New York & 
London, 1989), p. 2. 
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choose either, but not both positions).30 But her claim that feminists cannot really mean 
Locke's real essence when they speak of essence, is dubious, since she maintains that 
there are "few truly fundamentalist thinkers to whom the term essentialist would properly 
apply".31 The underlying assumption here is that one could not really be a feminist and 
a real essentialist. 
The complexity of the idea of social constructionism is highlighted by this 
puzzlement. In Volatile Bodies Elizabeth Grosz argues that: 
. . . the constructionists hold a number of distinctive commitments, 
including the belief that it is not biology per se but the ways in which the 
social system organises and gives meaning to biology that is oppressive 
to women. The distinction between the "real" biological body and the body 
as object of representation is a fundamental presumption .... For 
constructionists the sex/gender opposition, which is a recasting of the 
distinction between the body, or what is biological and natural, and the 
mind, or what is social and ideological is still operative.32 
As Grosz describes constructionists, the precise problem to which de Lauretis 
alludes is embedded in their theory. Constructionists are simultaneously essentialist and 
not essentialist because they accept the dualistic division of the nature and the social, 
mind and body. In chapter 2 I will argue that this is a position which is implied by Mary 
Daly's work; and in chapter 3 I will maintain that it is a position against which Elisabeth 
Schussler Fiorenza argues. 
For now, let us assume that de Lauretis' claim about what feminists are actually 
saying is valid: feminists, in talking about essence, really are referring to a collection of 
discursive practices which somehow constitute women as, for example, historically 
specific agents. On Grosz's reading of the debate, it is possible to give some 
interpretation of the idea that there is something essential about women in terms of real 
essence, and that they are also socially constructed. What is essential is their bodies, 
30 Rosi Braidotti alludes to this problem (in terms of culture and nature) for feminist theory in her 
essay ''The Politics of Ontological Difference" in op. cit., Teresa Brennan, Between Feminism and 
Psychoanalysis, passim. 
31 
op. cit., de Lauretis, ''The Essence of a Triangle", in differences, p. 12. 
32 
op. cit., Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p. 17. 
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their sex, and what is socially constructed is the interpretation of their bodies, their 
gender.33 How the 'two' relate to each other needs to be explicated though. 
The resolution of this tension is important for any feminist theory, religious or 
secular, and can take at least three paths. Either one can argue that essentialist claims 
are false and one ought to opt for a form of social constructionism which denies the 
priority of 'brute' biology and 'brute' nature; or one can claim that social constructionism 
is false and opt for a form of essentialism; or one can claim, depending on how one works 
out the two positions, for example by denying the terms of the debate altogether (the 
construction of the opposition between nature and the social, sex and gender), that one 
should deny the incompatibility of the 'two' positions. 
This thesis seeks to resolve the problem in terms of the latter, for the 
inconsistency indicates the very real concern of much feminist literature: just how does 
one construct a theory (or theories) of the female, Woman and women, which accounts 
for the female body, without abandoning the so-called traditional views of femininity and 
Woman? This is especially so when such views contain much which many 
women value (such as woman as peacemaker, woman as mother, woman as nurturer). 
And what does one do if one admits that language itself is a primary patriarchal 
structure/device responsible for the subjugation of women? 
As I remarked earlier, de Lauretis is not alone in her invocation of Locke. Diana 
Fuss, who contrasts essentialism with constructionism, the belief that "self-evident kinds 
(like 'man' or 'woman') are in fact the effects of complicated discursive practices",34 
argues that constructionists maintain that "essence is itself a historical construction". 35 
According to her the two positions, essentialism and constructionism, match the catch-
33 For a discussion of the sex/gender distinction see the following articles in Australian Feminist 
Studies 1 O (Summer 1989): Anne Edwards, "The Sex/Gender Distinction: Has it Outlived rts 
Usefulness?", pp. 1 - 12; Genevieve Lloyd, "Woman as Other: Sex, Gender, Subjectivity", pp. 13 -
22; Denise Thompson, 'The "Sex/Gender" Distinction: A Reconsideration', pp. 23 - 31; Moira 
Gatens, 'Woman and her Double(s): Sex, Gender and Ethics" , pp. 33 - 47. See also, Nancy Jay, 
"Gender and Dichotomy" in A Reader in Femin ist Knowledoe (Routledge , London & New York, 
1991), pp. 89 -106. 
34 
op. cit., Fuss, Essentially Speakino: Femin ism , p. 5. 
3s 'b'd I I . 
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cries respectively of Ernest Jones "Woman is born, not made" and de Beauvoir, "Woman 
is made, not born"36 the conjunction of which is problematic for feminists. 
Essentialists, Fuss argues, have their problems with accusations of ahistoricity, 
making their categories dependent upon ontological and cultural assumptions which stand 
outside time and are thus immutable.37 However Fuss believes that constructionism is not 
the straightforward theoretical model one might think it to be. She argues that its 
deployment often is dependent upon its own essentialising and simplistic notions of 
history.38 It is arguable that this is also the case for feminist theologians who use social 
constructionism. If women's experience is constructed, and if women's experience 
provides the basis for feminist theologies, then feminist theologies are constructed: the 
point is quite trivial. But what is not trivial, and this has resonances with Hampson's 
complaints about the content of feminist theologies, is the question of divinity. That is to 
say, if women's experience is the basis of feminist theologies and as constructed, 
constructs divinity, then, as Frankenberry remarks, the Divine becomes a projection of 
women's experiences and as such, is immediately relativised. So the relation between 
women's experiences and divinity, using a constructionist model like Scott's for example, 
is not straightforward and may engender some very troublesome theoretical problems. 
As a model, social constructionism is problematic and indeed it can maintain dualistic 
categorisation and thinking; a point I will be pursuing later on in the thesis. Note then that 
Fuss argues: 
Constructionists, too, though they may make recourse to historicity as a 
way to challenge essentialism, nonetheless work with uncomplicated and 
essentialising notions of history. While a constructionist might recognise 
that 'man' and 'woman' are produced across a spectrum of discourses, 
the categories 'man' and 'woman' still remain constant. 39 
36 ibid., p. 3. This is Fuss' paraphrase of de Beauvoir. 
37 Although I will return to the point later it is worth recalling here that Elizabeth Grosz holds that 
social construction ism depends upon essential ism. 
38 I take up this point in my concluding chapter. 
39 
op. cit., Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, pp. 3 & 4. 
34 
Her basic criticism (and one might compare this with Scott), is that essentialism 
is intrinsic to constructionism, for constructionists continue to use and give meaning to 
terms, such as 'history', in an uninterrogated way. And the practice of pluralising terms 
"in order to privilege heterogeneity and to highlight important cultural and social 
differences"40 does not solve the problem. One can make essentialist and thus 
universalising statements using plural forms, just as one can using singular forms. (Her 
example is 'American women are"'x"'.) Her tentative answer to what she sees as the 
constructed irreducibility of essence in constructionism and to our insecurities about 
firmly displacing essence, is to appeal to different 'kinds of'.41 She uses John Locke's 
discussion of essence to elaborate this point. 
Locke, reiterates Fuss, contrasted nominal and real essence. Real essence, she 
asserts, connotes "the Aristotelian understanding of essence as that which is most 
irreducible and unchanging about a thing; nominal essence signifies for Locke a view of 
essence as merely a linguistic convenience, a classificatory fiction we need to categorise 
and to label".42 Her purpose in using Locke's distinction is partly to point out that it roughly 
corresponds to the "oppositional categories of essentialism and constructionism"; partly 
as an analytic device to distinguish between the ontological and linguistic aspects of 
essentialism; and partly to suggest that "it is equally important to investigate their 
complicities as types of essentialisms members of the same semantic family''. 43 Overall 
then, Locke's distinction, which she sees as an oppositional categorisation (in her use of 
versus: 'real' versus 'nominal' essence), is supposed to throw light on the infinitely 
regressing problem of essence and its r6!e in perpetuating semantic practices which 
appear to be ahistorical. I read both Fuss' and de Lauretis' use of Locke's distinction as a 
convenient tool for either exploring (Fuss), or saving (de Lauretis) essentialist notions 
which operate within feminist discourse. 
40 ibid., P- 4-
41 ibid. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. 
35 
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Both de Lauretis and Fuss realise that real essence is the internal constitution of 
objects or things. De Lauretis, however, is not specific about this, although she refers to 
essence as "absolute being or substance in the traditional metaphysical sense".44 Hence 
we might take her to assume that there is some relation (perhaps that of identity) between 
essence and absolute being or substance in the traditional metaphysical sense.45 Fuss 
is more specific. She notes that real essence is the real essence of a thing.46 But it surely 
cannot be just any thing. According to Locke (and Fuss does reiterate this), "Essence 
may be taken for the being of anything, whereby it is what it is".47 
The status of 'thing' is an enigma. What is the 'thing' which has real essence? 
Locke maintains that it is particulars which do. The traditional or standard interpretation 
of Aristotle, as I will argue shortly, is that species or natural kinds are what have essence. 
For Locke, the distinction between nominal and real essence has a basis in the distinction 
between, broadly speaking, language and reality. I suggest that the relationship between 
general terms and natural kinds corresponds to the distinction between language and 
reality. Locke, as we shall see, has subverted the Aristotelian notion that species not 
individuals have essence, and has attributed real essence to individuals, rather than 
holding that they share a common essence with all other members of their species or 
categories. That is not to say, however, that he has eliminated universal groupings or 
categories. On the contrary, those groupings now become conceptual or discursive items, 
constructed out of our language practices. 
For Locke then, species, universal categories, general terms, are ontologically 
dependent upon the existence of individual things or simple substances. This is also the 
case with the triangle which de Lauretis cites. Locke says: 
44 
op. cit., de Lauretis "The Essence of a Triangle", in differences, p. 12. Apparently de Lauretis 
thinks of Aristotle as the traditional metaphysician from whom is derived the idea of "traditional 
metaphysical essence". 
45 It is not clear whether de Lauretis intends an inclusive use of "or" here, thus allowing a reading 
which will make "substance" and "absolute being" interchangeable terms. For the argument, it 
perhaps does not matter, but one should be aware that the terms in traditional metaphysics are by 
no means substitutable salve veritate. 
46 
op. cit., Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, p. 4. 
47 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ed. Pringle-Patterson) (Oxford at 
the Clarendon Press, 1947) Bk. 111, ch. 6, p. 234. 
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Thus a figure including a space between three lines is the real as well as 
the nominal essence of a triangle; it being not only the abstract idea to 
which the general name is annexed, but the very essentia, or being of the 
thing itself, that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to which 
they are all inseparably annexed.48 
De Lauretis uses Locke's triangle example to make her metaphorical point about 
nominal essence. What she does not acknowledge, however, is that the nominal essence 
of a triangle is, as we have just seen, its real essence.49 This is important because it is 
an example of the co-existence of both real and nominal essence. Ironically, that 
something can simultaneously have real essence and nominal essence is therefore to be 
found in Locke's work to which de Lauretis is appealing to solve the essentialism 
question. However, there is a logically self-evident tone about the way in which Locke 
talks about the triangle (which he does more than once) which suggests that the term is 
analytic. So-called synthetic terms such as 'woman' and 'man' are not self evidently true 
as are analytic terms like 'triangle' . 
De Lauretis seems to be arguing that just as there are many kinds of triangle, all 
of which must have three sides/angles, so there are many kinds of women, not having 
three sides, but identified through: 
... specific properties (e.g. the having of a sexed body), qualities (a 
disposition to nurturance, a certain relation to the body), or necessary 
attributes (e.g. the experience of femaleness, of living in the world as 
female) that women have developed or have been bound to historically, 
in their differently patriarchal socio-cultural context, which make them 
women and not men. One may prefer one triangle, one definition of 
women and/or feminism, to another and, within her particular conditions 
and possibilities of existence, struggle to define the triangle she wants or 
wants to be - feminists do want differently. And in these very struggles, I 
suggest, consist the historical development and the specific difference of 
feminist theory, the essence of the triangle. 50 
48 ibid., p. 236. For a discussion of the real essence of a triangle see op. cit., Woolhouse,"Locke's 
Theory of Knowledge", pp. 159ft. 
49 How we know this, is not explained by Locke. 
50 
op. cit., de Lauretis "The Essence of a Triangle", in differences, p. 13. 
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The problem with making a metaphor out of Locke's triangle, 51 as de Lauretis 
attempts to do, is that a triangle is more than its nominal essence: once a triangle ceases 
to have three sides/angles, it is no longer a triangle and cannot be described thus - the 
definitional analyticity to which I alluded. The metaphor can work only if de Lauretis is 
willing to acknowledge some real essence to which the nominal essence can be 
'attached'. She cannot make this acknowledgement without being a fundamentalist 
feminist, without employing a notion of thing-itself. So her appeal to Locke's triangle is 
self-defeating unless she is prepared to accept that the incompatibility of real and nominal 
essence is in some way resolvable. 
My argument is that de Lauretis uses the distinction between real and nominal 
essence and then leaves the distinction hanging. Nothing turns on the distinction because 
in the end, de Lauretis does not explain why a nominalist interpretation of essence is 
better able to help us understand the causal relationship between real and nominal 
essence, which is intrinsic to Locke's account in the first place. 
I have been suggesting that the distinction which de Lauretis points out between 
real and nominal essence, suggests a difficulty which needs to be addressed by feminist 
theorists. But an appeal to Lockean essence such as de Lauretis' does not help 
overcome that difficulty.52 What in the end will distinguish her conception of woman's 
(nominal) essence from a conception of Woman's (real) essence, especially when the 
properties, relational qualities and necessary attributes about which she speaks seem to 
be able to be mapped, one onto the other? For the question remains - and I think de 
Lauretis begs it - even if women choose what kind of woman they will be (within certain 
cultural constraints and norms), what makes them women in the first place? That is to 
say, what, for women, is analogous to a triangle's three sides/angles? So her 'metaphor' 
as she calls it53 cannot, and does not, do the job she wants of it. 
51 It is worthwhile pointing out that Aristotle also uses the triangle in his discussion of essence in 
"Posterior Analytics" Book 1, ch.4, 73a 35. 
52 In her discussion of Alcoff, de Lauretis does not see the need to maintain oppositional 
categories ''when one already has the vantage point of a theoretical position that overtakes or 
sublates them". op. cit., de Lauretis, "The Essence of a Triangle", in The Essential Difference. p. 
11 . 
53 
op. cit., de Lauretis ''The Essence of a Triangle", in differences, p. 3. 
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Fuss' understanding of Locke's distinction and the possibilities it has for use by 
feminists, acknowledges the existence of the distinction between real and nominal 
essence, yet she disavows the idea that nominal and real essence are necessarily 
opposed. Her recognition of the role of general terms, amongst which she includes 'class', 
is vital to the discussion. This is so because, as we have seen, part of the debate 
involves elucidation of the relation between Woman and individual women. As I 
suggested in my Introductory essay, this is a problem for feminist theologies which claim 
women's experience as their foundation and are attracted by the possibilities of social 
constructionism over essentialism. 
Locke's theory about essence vacillates between a constitutive (causal}54 account 
of the role of real essence in the establishment of abstract ideas and the denial that we 
should speak of them at all; and the insistence that there is nominal essence constituted 
by abstract ideas by which we classify substances into sorts or general categories. 
It is true that I have often mentioned a real essence, distinct in substance 
from those abstract ideas of them, which I call their nominal essence. By 
this real essence I mean that real constitution of anything which is the 
foundation of all those properties that are combined in, and are constantly 
found to co-exist with the nominal essence; that particular constitution 
which everything has within itself, without any relation to anything 
without. 55 
and 
But they not having any idea of that real essence in substances, and their 
words signify nothing but the ideas they have ... 56 
and 
The measure and boundary of each sort or species whereby it is 
constituted that particular sort and distinguished from others, is that we 
call its essence, which is nothing but that abstract idea to which the name 
is annexed.57 
54 
op. cit., John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. Ill, ch. 6, p. 246. 
55 ibid., p. 245. 
56 'b'd I I . 
57 ibid., p. 242. 
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The discussion of real and nominal essences takes place in the context of a 
controversy about general or universal terms which Locke had inherited from scholastic 
philosophy. This is important because Locke goes to great lengths to establish that real 
essence does not belong to real, general classes (species or natural kinds), but to 
particulars or individuals and that nominal essence is constituted by general (linguistic) 
terms. In other words sorts and species are 'defined' by their nominal essence, what it is 
which enables us to categorise in the first place.58 
So real essence constitutes the insensible part of any particular and cannot be 
known. This is an epistemological problem, a problem of knowledge about the 
definitionally unknowable. The ontological problem, whether or not there is real essence 
independent of language and discursive practices, cannot be solved within Locke's 
program because of its dependence upon ideas. Thus language and ideas are a 
fundamental reality for Locke and even the supposition of real essence is dependent upon 
a prior possession of abstract ideas. That is to say, if we could determine the real 
essence of any substance, if we could say that it is of this kind, then this would 
presuppose linguistic practices which categorise according to nominal essence.59 
Fuss introduced "the Lockean theory of essence to suggest both that it is crucial 
to discriminate between the ontological and linguistic orders of essentialism and that it 
is equally important to investigate their complicities as types of essentialisms, members 
of the same semantic family". 60 As I read Fuss, her strict insistence for purposes of 
clarification, upon the polarising categories of ontology and linguistic order, leaves open 
whether they can belong to the same semantic family. How can they? On my reading real 
essence and nominal essence must belong to quite different semantic families. To call 
them both 'essentialist' positions in terms of viewing nominal essence as ultimately 
reducible to real essence, is misguided: they do not mean the same thing at all. 
58 See D.M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Focus Series (Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1989), for a lengthy discussion of universals, nominalism and realism. See also D.M. 
Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, vol. 1, Nominalism and Realism, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1978); Roger Teichman, Abstract Entities. Part II "Universals and Events", ch. 3, 
"Universals" (Macmillan, London , 1992). 
59 
op. cit., Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. p. 246. 
60 
op. cit., Fuss, Essentially Speaking, p. 5. 
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Nominal essence constitutes a linguistic realm, the discursive world of language 
practice in which we name, categorise and structure. Real essence is the underlying 
constitutive, but unknowable, substance: that which makes something what it is. Nominal 
essence, in being linguistic items or abstract ideas, describes things. Nominal essence 
is, therefore, a descriptor and not reducible to real essence, just as real essence is not 
reducible to nominal essence. It is arguable that nominal essence is not, strictly speaking, 
essence at all but is causally constituted as a descriptor, in language, through the 
operation of an unknowable ontological foundation. As language, nominal essence will 
be subject to change: fluid and in time. This undoubtedly has great appeal to 
constructionists who wish to deny real essence, who for example wish to take a different 
view of constructionism from Grosz's claim that constructionists still accept that the body 
is biological and natural. For theorists like Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, as we shall see, 
there is some cogency in the claim that nominal essence is essence because of the way 
in which language articulates positions that depend upon naturalising assumptions. 
According to her, language practice can simply revalorise the categories one seeks to 
deny. 
For Fuss, the distinction serves to highlight the polarity between ontology and 
language, but it is a mistake for her to assume that real and nominal essence are 
members of the same semantic family. Even given the polarity (which Fuss denies), they 
seem to me to belong to quite different realms of meaning although they are causally 
related. The causal relation between the two needs to be explicated: since we know 
nothing about real essence, the nature of the causal relation (and if there is one) is 
problematic. The meaning of nominal essence lies in language construction; the meaning 
of real essence lies outside language construction and appears to be almost a Kantian 
unknowable noumenal 'object'. Real essence, I would argue might even escape semantic 
considerations. 61 
Hence the rigour with which Locke argues on the whole for nominal essence, 
could be used by constructionists to settle once and for all the question of essence: 
61 
I take this up further in my final chapter when I argue that language conceals and reveals. This 
is part of the notion of the sensible transcendent which is also known as god according to the 
commentator on lrigaray, Margaret Whitford. See chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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essence either exists or it does not. If it exists, then it must be real essence. If it does not, 
then what we have taken to be essential (in the sense of that which makes something 
what it is) is intrinsic to our discursive practice, not to the things we talk about and 
describe. Those things, it can be and is argued, are themselves somehow produced by 
discourse. Locke's distinction can, therefore, be used to great advantage by 
constructionists, and they need not fear disparaging comments about their underlying 
essentialism, as Fuss argues they ultimately must.62 But this does not close the issue. 
The danger of an extreme relativism in the form of linguistic idealism makes a social 
constructionist project which potentially argues that everything is only discursively 
produced. On this reading, 'reality' is a construction of language practice. I shall be 
returning to this issue in my discussion of Schussler Fiorenza and taking it up again in my 
final chapter. 
The strict polarisation of ontology and language, which Fuss implies is present in 
the debate, has then to be encountered and interrogated. The pull of the 
ontology/language dichotomy rebounds through philosophical history. Fuss realises the 
fruitlessness of maintaining the divide between essentialism and constructionism, which 
I am here reading as ontology and language. That is why she says: 
If we are to intervene effectively in the impasse created by the essentialist 
constructionist divide, it might be necessary to begin questioning the 
constructionist assumption that nature and fixity go together (naturally), 
just as sociality and change go together (naturally). In other words, it may 
be time to ask whether essences can change and whether 
constructionists can be normative [her italics]. 63 
Schussler Fiorenza makes exactly these constructionist assumptions and rejects 
naturalism because of its assumed connection with essentialism conceived of in both real 
and nominalist terms. On the other hand, Luce lrigaray does not acknowledge the divide 
in the first place, and offers a different metaphysical framework in which to figure the 
notions of women, the feminine and divinity. So Fuss' point is pertinent to theology just 
62 
op. cit., Fuss, Essentially Speaking, pp. 4 & 5. 
63 
'b'd 6 I I ., p .. 
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as it is to feminist theory more generally. I agree with her that the division needs to be 
challenged and I explore a way of mounting that challenge in the work of lrigaray. 
Fuss' belief that we cannot escape the tugs of essentialism because of "continued 
semantic use"64 is important and worthwhile pursuing. Grosz, as we shall see, asserts 
that social constructionism relies on a notion of essentialism.65 If that is the case, 
discursive practices would essentialise just as ontological commitment to real essence 
does, which is the view Schussler Fiorenza holds. 
However, for de Lauretis this problem remains unsolved. De Lauretis defers the 
issue by refusing to acknowledge that many feminists at all really mean 'real essence' 
when they speak of essence. 
In other words barring the case in which woman's "essence" is taken as 
absolute being or substance in the traditional metaphysical sense (and 
this may actually be the case for a few, truly fundamentalist thinkers to 
whom the term essentialist would properly apply), for the great majority of 
feminists the "essence " of a woman is more likely the essence of a 
triangle than the essence of the thing-in-itself ... 66 
If the above is the case, it is difficult to understand why the term 'essentialist' is 
seen as pejorative, for feminists are usually accused of being essentialist: it is not a term 
of approbation.67 Deferring the meaning simply by invoking the dubious metaphor of the 
triangle does not explain, nor can it, the problems encountered by anti-essentialist 
feminists. 
64 Her example is actually 'man', 'woman' and 'history', but one can extrapolate to all other 
general terms. See op. cit., Fuss, Essentially Speaking. p. 4. 
65 
op. cit., Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p. 213, endnote 20. 
66 
op. cit., de Lauretis, ''The Essence of a Triangle", p. 12. It is worthwhile noting here that "thing-
in-itself" is Kantian, not Lockean, terminology. Kant's thing-in-itself is different from Locke's real 
essence and the meaning of the two should not be conflated. 
67 See discussion of lrigaray's alleged essentialism in Monique Plaza "'Phallomorphic Power" and 
the Psychology of ''woman"' in Ideology and Consciousness. 4 (Autumn 1978), pp. 5 - 35; Elisabeth 
Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation (Beacon Press, 
Boston, 1992); and Toril Moi, Sexual Textual Polttics: Feminist Literary Theory (Routledge, London, 
1991 ); Margaret Whitford, Luce lrigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (Routledge, London & New 
York 1991 ); Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor, Margaret Whitford (eds.), Engaging With lrigaray: 
Feminist Philosophy and Modern European Thought (Columbia University Press, New York, 1994). 
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My discussion so far indicates that there are several problems which arise from 
both de Lauretis' and Fuss' contribution to the sex/gender essentialist issue. What 
emerges is that the difficulties which arise from deciding what it is to be 'Woman', a 
woman, have their origins in the debate about realism and nominalism. In turn, these 
debates emphasise different readings of the given and natural. Social constructionism 
and essentialism, as Fuss points out, are not as clearly distinguishable as one might 
think. 
Essentialism is a problem because of the kinds of interpretations possible for 
essence and associated with being a woman, being female and/or being feminine. De 
Lauretis' and Fuss' appeals to Locke seem, however, to complicate matters even more. 
Locke's discussion of essence was intended to refute Aristotle's position on substance 
and essence. For different reasons and with different projects in mind all three, Locke, 
de Lauretis and Fuss, set out to combat Aristotelian essence. 
Many feminists hold Aristotle responsible in some way for the undervaluing of 
women. The persistence of Aristotelianism in theology remains: from the doctrine of 
transubstantiation, to the belief that women have their own special nature which is 
constituted by a feminine essence and prevents them from being ordained in the Catholic 
Church. So I turn briefly to Aristotle's rendering of essence and women. In doing this, I 
examine some further complications in the essence of woman issue: class and race, as 
Elizabeth Spelman sets out the issues. My initial discussion revolves around the universal 
' 
term 'Woman' and the particular term 'woman' because Aristotle's conception of essence 
was concerned, in part, with how one defines membership of a species. In feminist 
theory, the highly contested term 'Woman', used as a universal term, (for example 
'Woman's experience is the foundation of feminist theology', focuses the debate about 
essentialism). 
Aristotle, Women and Elizabeth Spelman 
Universal Woman 
In the "Metaphysics", Aristotle wrote: 
Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence -
only species will have it, for these are thought to imply not merely that the 
44 
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subject participates in the attribute and has it as an affection, or has it by 
accident; but for everything else as well, if it has a name, there will be a 
formula of its meaning - viz. that this attribute belongs to this subject; or 
instead of a simple formula we shall be able to give a more accurate one; 
but there will be no definition and no essence.68 
In Aristotle's account of essence, 'Woman' does not constitute a natural kind. The 
natural kind is what we in the twentieth century would think of as the species, homo 
sapiens. Hence the species, homo sapiens, is what has essence. Both women and men 
share the same essence because they are members of the same species: individual 
women have essence but they have that essence in virtue of being members of the 
same species as men, not in virtue of being individual women. This does not mean that 
individual women lack individual essence. It simply means that every instance of woman 
has exactly the same instantiated individual essence: that she is definitionally a member 
of a particular species. That is to say, on this account of Aristotelian essence, there is no 
Man's and no Woman's essence. There is only one 'species-essence' and that essence 
constitutes the humanness of individual women and men. 
On this interpretation of ~ristotle, to properly answer the question 'What is 
Elizabeth?', one must reply 'She is a human being' not 'She is a woman'. The question 
of what Elizabeth is, is a question of how one defines her, and one defines her in terms 
of the species of which she is a member. 
According to Aristotle some members of the species are more perfect forms of 
that species than others.69 Even so, even if "male and female are appropriate affections 
of animal",70 the male is the more perfect specimen of the species. What is not the most 
perfect embodiment of the species lacks in something. The female lacks the capacity for 
deliberative reasoning and lacks vital heat. One should understand the female as the 
privative of the male. Not only that, she is passive in the reproduction of the species (she 
provides the matter while he provides the form, and form is superior to matter). 
68 
op. cit. , Aristotle. Basic Works "Metaphysics", Book VII, ch. 4, 1040. 
69 'b'd I I . 
7o 'b'd I I . 
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On this account, women have their essence in virtue of being members of the 
human species: they are defined in terms of that membership; and being female is 
privative, or the negation of being male. The former tells us that for Aristotle, women do 
not constitute a species having a distinctive essence. Definitionally, women are 'tied' to 
men. This makes the enterprise of attributing a specific woman's essence somewhat 
problematic. Either of the following could be the case: women, because they are (provide) 
matter rather than form, do not have essence,71 or, women share the same essence as 
men so that whatever is the essence of men, is the essence of women. However, the 
latter is complicated by women's lack of full deliberative reason and vital heat, which is 
partly spelt out by the idea of the female as the privative of the male, exemplified in the 
Pythagorean Table of Opposites. 
The idea that Woman somehow constitutes a distinctive (inferior) class which is 
identifiable by defining (and privative) characteristics, operates in Western intellectual 
history and has been attributed to the Pythagorean Table. This Table, which Aristotle 
cites in the opening chapters of "Metaphysics",72 sets the margins for characterising 
Woman/women. Not only that, throughout Aristotle's various treatises one finds his many 
infamous 'sexist' remarks, for example his lengthy discussion of the role of semen in 
intercourse and generation (between female and male, not woman and man)73 and his 
discussion of the inferiority of women compared with men.74 Those remarks have 
influenced the concepts 'Woman'/woman' and how women have been constituted: as 
inferior, illogical, natural mothers, care givers, whores, virgins, emotional, irrational and 
so on.75 
71 And I think lrigaray has this in mind when she argues that women do not exist. See chapter 4 
of this thesis. 
72 
op. cit., Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Book 1 986a. As the table is cited by Aristotle, it represents 
the first principles (ten in number) stated by the Pythagoreans. 
73 ibid., Aristotle. Basic Works, "De Generatione Animalium" (trans.Arthur Platt), 71 Sa - 731 b 1 o. 
74 
"Aristotle", in Rosemary Agonito (ed.), History Of Ideas On Women: A Source Book (Putnam, 
New York, 1977); op. cit., Aristotle, Basic Works, "Politics" (trans. Benjamin Jowett), 1254b, 1 o -
15, 1260a, 20 - 30. 
75 Interestingly, many of these 'feminine attributes' are inconsistent with each other (whore, virgin, 
and mother for example) 
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As I read Aristotle, the notion of Woman's essence has developed partly from 
interpretations of female matter (physiological/biological) and partly from a picture of the 
female contained in the Pythagorean Table of Opposites, read in concert with the 
understanding that everything has essence. 
Bound/Infinity 
Odd/Even 
Unity/Plurality 
Right/Left 
Male/Female 
Rest/Motion 
Straight/Crooked 
Light/Darkness 
Good/Bad 
Square/Oblong 76 
In this Table the characteristics which are positioned on the right hand side of 
each pair (as the reader reads) are inferior to those on the left of the pair. And those on 
each side of the pair are related to all the other characteristics on the same side of the 
pair. By association then, the female is related to plurality, motion, darkness, badness, 
infinity and so on. Genevieve Lloyd remarks: 
In the Pythagorean table of opposites, formulated in the sixth century BC, 
femaleness was explicitly linked with the unbounded - the vague, the 
indeterminate - as against the bounded - the precise and clearly 
determined. The Pythagoreans saw the world as a mixture of principles 
associated with determinate form, seen as good, and others associated 
with formlessness - the unlimited, irregular or disorderly - which were seen 
as bad or inferior .... Thus 'male' and 'female', like the other contrasted 
terms did not here function as straightforwardly descriptive classifications. 
'Male', like the other terms on its side of the table, was construed as 
superior to its opposite; and the basis for this superiority was its 
association with the primary Pythagorean contrast between form and 
formlessness.77 
Careful inspection of the Table shows that it does not contain reference to Woman 
or women. Certainly, 'female' occurs as the inferior to male, but 'female' is not co-
extensive with 'woman' (there are female platypus, emus and kangaroos). 'Female' would 
be coextensive with 'woman' only if, in some biological sense, 'woman' were denominated 
as the female of the human species, so that if ever one used the term 'woman' one would 
know immediately that one was referring only to the female of the human species. But as 
it stands, the relationship between 'female' and 'Woman'/women' is not explicated. All 
76 
op. cit., Aristotle, The Metaphysics (trans. McMahon), Book 1, 986a. 
77 Genevieve Lloyd. The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" io Western Philosophy (Methuen 
University Paperbacks, London, 1984), p. 3. 
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that one can argue is that in order to be a woman, it is necessary that one be female. But 
what it means to be female is itself problematic. 
The 'female' is a contested category whose boundaries are difficult to delineate. 
An obvious and perhaps intuitive place from which to begin characterising the female is 
from a 'brute' biological perspective. At this basic level, it could be argued that to be a 
woman means to be embodied as a female. But as we shall see in chapter 3, this idea 
of brute biology is also contested. 
The opposing principles identified in the Pythagorean Table have provided a 
springboard for the development of sets of natural characteristics or properties which 
together have been seen to constitute the essence of Man or Woman. As the female in 
the Pythagorean Table of Opposites is undervalued and inferior to the male, the essence 
of Woman is seen as an agglomerate of inferior properties, properties which tie her to 
materiality, sensuality, sin and ignorance.78 On this account, Woman's essence is 
specific, but it is created through the negation of the good and the valued. Her essence 
is just that set of natural characteristics or properties which identify her as a specific 
universal category. Whatever is true of one member of the category, is true of all. That 
category is tied to the species of which she is a member (homo sapiens), but it is not 
coextensive with the species. In other words, it is not an Aristotelian natural kind and not 
an Aristotelian species essence. 
Since the terms on the same side as 'the female' in the Pythagorean Table are 
aligned with the female, these become strong candidates for explaining, by association, 
what it is to be female, thus what it means to be a woman. If this is the case, the idea of 
Woman/woman is not the 'merely female' thought of in terms of the biological. One might 
also use the associative characteristics in the Table to explain the female. So then, there 
seem to be at least two sets of characteristics, the physiological/biological (the 
characteristics of the female body), and the associative, that characterise the female. 
Hence, Woman's essence seems to be over and beyond the merely female, brute 
female biology. That is to say, while there is a notion of woman which denotes a biological 
entity, the connotations of being a woman are not circumscribed by this mere biological 
78 For a development of this theme of dualism, see op. cit., Mary Daly, The Church and the 
Second Sex. 
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attribution. On this reading, Woman is a category secondary to the category 'female'. If 
that is the case, then one needs to be able to explain how one constructs one's notion 
of Woman/women and then explain the ensuing relation that must exist between the 
primary category (female) and the secondary (Woman/woman). 
I have been claiming that there is a legitimate sense in which one can speak of 
'Woman'/'woman' that denotes the female of the human species. One could appeal to 
such a denotation, claiming that one always means at least the necessary attribution of 
female characteristics when one uses the terms. But the heart of the matter is: which 
female characteristics? The physiological/biological, or what I am calling the associative? 
The associative characteristics are what are prima facie in dispute in the sex/gender 
essentialist issue. In other words, the characteristics which appear in the Pythagorean 
Table of Opposites have a conceptual weight that nudges the physiological/biological to 
the side. 
Once it is agreed that being a woman necessarily implies being female , the 
characteristics that we find in the Pythagorean Table move into the centre of the debate. 
Woman has essence attributed to· her by association with unequal members of paired 
opposites. Woman's essence is infinite, plural and bad, and that essence is seen as 
natural. Woman has essence, necessarily related to her biological femaleness, but it is 
written in terms of the privative, atrophied in relation to the positive status of man. As we 
shall see, this is sufficient for lrigaray to remark that women have no essence except 
through the negation of the good and positive that is exemplified by men. 
That picture has generated a category from which the universal essence of 
Woman has derived. With some syllogistic foreplay, 'Woman' has been immortalised as 
a universal category which depends for its identity upon the possessing of certain 
attributes. That is to say, what 'woman' connotes is constituted by some property or set 
of properties or characteristics which constitute Woman's 'essence' or her 'nature'. In 
order to be Woman, x must exemplify that property or set of constitutive natural 
properties or characteristics: each member of the category, each individual woman, has 
those natural properties (the universalisation to which Grosz referred). On this reading, 
the argument about Woman's and, subsequently, individual women's essence, is based 
on a syllogistic deduction which carries the force of necessity. On this interpretation, to 
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say that x is Woman but to deny those characteristics would be to utter a contradiction. 
Hence, the argument would state, whatever is the natural essence of Woman, is her 
female essence and is necessary to Woman. 
As many feminists have been very quick to point out, concepts like these do not 
account for the differences amongst women. Not only does this kind of conceptualisation 
disallow the role of socio-politics and discourse, but they fail to account for difference 
itself. If all women come out of one mould so to speak, how is it that there are so many 
differences? 
Critics like Elizabeth Spelman view with suspicion the idea that in Aristotle's work, 
every human female is a woman. Spelman regards Aristotle's work as classist and elitist 
as well as sexist. If one were to reject an Aristotelian-influenced account of Woman as 
essentialist, that one could speak of woman per se, is still questionable for Spelman. 
Spelman's work is important and is used by Schussler Fiorenza. Spelman highlights 
differences between women and problematises the idea that one can speak of women's 
experiences if one means to refer to the universal category, Woman. Like Scott, she opts 
for a reading which emphasises women's experience as a category constitutive of 
women, rather than women constituting their experiences. Hence Women's experience, 
as the foundation for feminist theologies may well become problematic for reasons 
greater than definitional and whether or not woman is socially constructed or the 
embodiment of an essentialist ideal. This is where the question, 'The experience of which 
women?' comes to the fore. 
Are all female humans women? 
Elizabeth Spelman has been one of the most vocal proponents of approaching the 
sex/gender essentialist issue in the context of class and race. She argues that Western 
(white middle class)79 feminism has not only dominated feminist theory and practice, but 
that Western feminists have taken their own case to be representative of all cases. In 
doing this, Western feminists have excluded and silenced the voices of women from 
79 Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Beacon 
Press, Boston, 1988), p. ix and passim. 
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cultures other than their own and have obliterated the differences between women. 80 
White feminists have rendered non-white, non-middle class women as 'other' in an elitist 
move that mimics the anthropocentricism ('human condition' discourse) of traditional 
philosophical discourses:81 
It is not news that dominant Western feminist thought has taken the 
experiences of white middle-class women to be representative of, indeed 
normative for, the experiences of all women. Much of such thought, it is 
now common to say, expresses and reinforces the privilege of white 
middle-class women: their lives and works, their griefs and joys constitute 
the norm in relation to which other women's lives - if they are mentioned 
at all - are described as "different. "82 
For Spelman, the issue of how "feminist theory has confused the condition of one 
group with the condition of all"83 directly relates to systemic middle-class privilege, which 
seeks to preserve itself. Using the philosophical works of Plato and Aristotle, she sets out 
to show that 'woman' was ambiguous (Plato) and quite specifically a socio-political rather 
than anthropological term (Aristotle). Already in the use and meaning of the term 'woman' 
in their works, the idea of class and race privilege existed, which meant that women had 
status because of what they did or could do (Plato) and where they were situated 
(Aristotle) in the hierarchies established by male rulers of the polis. 
In The Republic Socrates, according to Spelman, held that "people ought to 
engage in different pursuits only when their differences are relevant to the capacity to 
carry out the task", 84 so that ultimately women and men, although reproductively different, 
could have equality in terms of their functions in the state, but this was directly related to 
80 Cited often by, for example , Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite , "Experience in White Fem inist 
Theory", in Sex, Race and God : Christian Fem inisms in Black and White (Crossroad, New York, 
1989), are feminist theorists like Betty Friedan, Mary Daly, Simone de Beauvoir , and any feminist 
theorist who takes sex/gender as the primary category of oppression from wh ich all other 
oppressive categories (like class and race), follow. Rosemary Radford Ruether, for example, 
seems to hold such a view in Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a Fem inist Theolooy (SCM Press, 
London , 1983). 
81 op. cit., Spe lm an , Inessential Woman , p. 9. 
82 'b'd . I I ., p. IX. 
83 ibid., p. 4. 
84 ibid., p. 21. See Plato , The Republic (trans. A.O. Lindsay) (ed. Terence Irwin) (Everyman 
Edition, J.M. Dent, London , 1992), Book Five , 454b-456c. 
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the manliness or womanliness of their souls. Further, that one is a man or a woman 
should have no bearing on one's capacity to be virtuous. 
Spelman argues that Plato trod a difficult path in articulating his views on women. 
While he believed that biology was not destiny and that women should be involved in 
running the state, he vacillated in his use of the term 'woman'. The capacities of a person, 
argues Spelman, were, for Plato, not directly related to their embodiment. 
According to Plato, not all women are inferior to all men; some woman are 
equal to the best of men and in fact superior to other men. In the best and 
most widely governed state, we can expect to find women as well as men 
among the ruling class.85 
However, that women could actually be involved in ruling meant that they had 
manly souls: the female philosopher-ruler had a female body and a manly soul. 86 Implicit 
in this system of rulers who could be either women or men, was the notion of class. 
Spelman points out that philosopher rulers, either women or men, were in a class of their 
own, superior to all others. 
But we must keep in mind that Plato's argument for the equality of some 
women to some men was inextricably intertwined with an argument for the 
superiority of that group of men and women to all other people. He may 
have refused to assume that biology is destiny, but that does not mean 
that all ways of ranking people disappear. The equality Plato talks about 
is only between men and women who would be guardians and 
philosopher-rulers. He is not talking about equality between slave men 
and philosopher women, or between slave women and philosopher 
women. Surely then we ought to ask : what kind of feminism is it that 
would gladly argue for a kind of equality between men and women of a 
certain class and at the same time for radical inequality between some 
women and some men, some women and some other women, some men 
and some other men?87 
Being a man did not guarantee an elite position in the polis, just as being a 
woman did not guarantee inferiority. Class was also a determining factor in constituting 
85 
op. cit., Spelman, Inessential Woman, p. 34. 
86 Spelman argues that there were four possible combinations of the female/male and 
woman/man pairs. 1. manly soul/male body; 2. manly soul/female body; 3. womanly soul/male 
body; 4. womanly soul/female body. This constitutes Plato's ambiguous use of the term 'woman'. 
See op. cit., Spelman, Inessential Woman, p. 32. See op. cit., The Republic, Book Five, 453b-459e. 
87 ibid., p. 35. 
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one's place. Spelman sees this system as iniquitous. In the final analysis, it was the 
philosopher-rulers who made decisions about the worth of people's souls: 
Plato arrogates to philosopher-rulers the capacity and authority to decide what 
differences between people matter and why. Anybody can know whether a person 
is male or female; only philosopher-kings and -queens can tell what a person's 
soul is really like.88 
The point that Spelman makes is that white feminists have reproduced, or are in 
danger of reproducing, this iniquity. White feminists, according to her, need to recognise 
that class and race89 significantly contributes to the gender debate when it comes to 
deciding what terms like 'woman's nature', 'woman's experience', 'as women' mean. Even 
in the Platonic works, class, gender and race factors are already at play.90 So Spelman 
reads Plato as classist and racist as well as sexist, and argues that these all 
simultaneously contribute to an inequitable system. 
For Aristotle, Spelman continues, the term 'woman' is clear and unequivocal: a 
woman is a member of the ruling class and therefore slaves cannot be women. Hence 
the term 'woman' is a socio-political gender term. She argues that sex and race are so 
interdependent in the Aristotelian scheme, that race and sex together form a necessary 
condition for having a gender. And 'man' and 'woman' are the two genders which could 
be attributable. Slaves have a sex: either female or male, but because they are slaves: 
they fail to have a gender. 91 The mark of the natural ruler, who is a man, according to 
Spelman, is a kind of masculine rationality exemplified by deliberative capacity: 
88 
"b"d I I . 
(m)en are to rule women, for in women the deliberative capacity of the 
rational element is without authority - it is easily overruled by the irrational 
element. Masters are to rule slaves, for while slaves, in virtue of the 
rational element in their souls, can hear and obey orders, they really don't 
have the capacity to deliberate. 92 
89 Class and race are interrelated because slaves were often the conquered and foreign races. 
90 
op. cit., Plato, The Republic, Book Five, passim. 
91 
op. cit., Spelman, Inessential Woman, pp. 54 & 55. 
92 
ibid., pp. 44 - 45. See op. cit., Aristotle, Basic Works, "Politics", 1254b - 1255a. 
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Lacking in deliberative capacity, women and slaves are therefore the natural 
inferiors to the ruler kings. But note the clue that it is women and slaves who lack this 
deliberative capacity. 
Early in her work, Spelman distinguishes sex from gender, asking if sex is to do 
with "the physiological properties of femaleness" and if gender has to do with "the ways in 
which she [a woman] is expected in her culture to think, feel and act? If this weren't true 
no one would ever talk about a female having or lackjng womanly qualities or not acting 
the way women are supposed to act" [my brackets].93 On her analysis there is an 
intimate relation between sex, gender, class and deliberative reason . She remarks that 
rationality is not masculine rather than male: it is gendered or socially constructed. 
Rationality, reason, is constructed around a gender concept (relativised in relation to a 
culture). If that is the case, and gender is itself constructed, and its construction is 
determined by class, then the possession of reason is limited to a small number of 
persons in the polis and these turn out to be men (and women to a lesser degree). Only 
men; the rulers, are characterised by possession of full deliberative reason. 
Spelman successfully shows that in the works of Plato and Aristotle 'woman' is 
respectively an ambiguous and unambiguous class and race term. Given this, and given 
recent interest in feminism and definitions of sex and gender, one may wonder if it is at 
all legitimate to ever speak of women without qualifying the term in some manner. Hence 
one should always speak of Chinese middle class women, or affluent black women, or 
poor white women and so on. In this way, for whom and to whom one speaks is 
immediately clear and on a class/race basis, one cannot be accused of colonising or of 
misrepresenting or silencing or excluding: one speaks for whom one specifies and for 
them alone. 
The answer to the question which heads this section: Are all female humans 
women? is clearly in the negative: No, according to Spelman, not all female humans are 
women. 'Woman', is a class term. Female humans who are slaves or black or poor, who 
belong to underprivileged classes, are not aristocrats, are not women. And if this is the 
93 
op. cit., Spelman, Inessential Woman, p. 14. 
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case, then the question with which I closed the previous section, The experience of which 
womens as a foundation for feminist theologies needs careful consideration. 
Given the interpretation of the origin of the concept 'Woman's essence', one might 
think there are very good grounds for rejecting real essentialist accounts of woman. It is 
possible to argue that if there is a monolithic essential Woman 'inside' every woman, then 
all women should be the same. Certainly they might have individual preferences which 
differ, but 'underneath it all women are all really the same'. Such an account is what is 
presupposed by the constructionists to whom Grosz refers, those who hold that there is 
a natural biological brute body around which interpretations are organised. But if Spelman 
is correct in arguing that 'woman' was, and remains, an exclusive term, then its use is 
always tentative and contested. If one always has to consider socio-political discursive 
practices (class and race as well as gender) when one thinks about the concept 'woman', 
then how is one to conceive of the relation between a woman and her body? Can one, 
contra Spelman ever speak of women as women without referring to class and race? 
Spelman argues the difficulties of never speaking about or referring to women as 
women.94She is clear that the concept 'women' is not simply a gender concept: it is also 
a race and class concept. Hence she insists that when one speaks of women (and men) 
"we remember which women and nien we are speaking about".95 The trend in Anglo-
American feminist theory has become for feminist theorists all to speak of race, class and 
gender in tandem. Those feminists who do not do this are often accused of operating 
under totalising concepts of 'woman'. 
As we have seen, de Lauretis' dismissal of real essence ignores the fact that 
some feminists do take seriously the claim that essentialism is more than a debate about 
the historically and socially specific constitution of theory. This is exemplified by Grosz's 
description of social constructionist understandings of sex and gender. Mary Daly's work, 
I will argue in my next chapter, repeats this rendering of social constructionism and courts 
the idea, contra Spelman, that sex/gender is the primary analytic category. Schussler 
Fiorenza attempts to re-read the notion of sex and gender by denying that there is brute 
94 
ibid., p. 174 & p. 186, passim in chapter 7, "Now Your See Her, Now You Don't". 
95 "b'd I I ., p. 186. 
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biology, brute nature, while appealing to Spelman's sex/gender/class/race analysis of the 
concept of woman. As we shall see, she does not quite solve the problem because she 
retains a notion of 'reality' independent of language which is untenable given her 
commitment to redescribing the natural in terms which deny its independence of 
language. Since my purpose in entering this debate is to discuss the plausibility of using 
women's experience as a foundation to feminist theologies, and thus for 
conceptualisations of divinity, the satisfactory resolution of this problem is imperative. 
Luce lrigaray, I will argue in my last two chapters, endorses the idea of the 
interdependence of the material and language and in doing this, presents an alternative 
to the problems of the nominalist/realist divide. For her, the finding of a Divine for women 
is a condition of women's being able to find themselves. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ELEMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: LANGUAGE AND ONTOLOGY 
IN MARY DAL Y'S TEXTS 
Feminist theologians such as Mary Daly and Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza hold 
that the dominant masculine paternal image of God in Western theologies is based upon 
men's images and experiences of themselves and the world. Their saying this portends 
a major change for theology as it marks a moment when women admit that they might be 
alienated by masculine paternal imagery of God. However, it is one thing to recognise that 
women might be alienated by such imagery and another to argue that feminist politics 
arising from this disclosure has some investment in refiguring the idea of God. The 
plausibility of this investment is a problem because it signals an interesting move in 
philosophy of religion. Refiguring of divinity leads to a reformulation of some issues in 
philosophy in terms of feminist politics. It is entirely understandable that this perception 
of paternal masculine imagery should lead to a feminist philosophy of religion committed 
to reconceiving divinity in terms more appropriate to women's experience. But the 
moment this happens, it immediately raises a whole problematics of whether and how 
one can legitimately refer to women's experiences. 
As early as 1960, Valerie Saiving had remarked on the absence of women's 
experience in theology.1 Saiving's insight has now been appropriated by many feminist 
theologians and the subsequent course of feminist theologies has assumed that women's 
experience should be privileged in its developing canon. Accompanying this development 
has been a growing unease with the idea of women's experience. Judith Plaskow has 
suggested that 'women's experience' should be understood as "the experiences of 
women in the course of a history never free from cultural role definitions".2 It is worth 
1 Judith Plaskow. Sex. Sin and Grace: Women's Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Paul Tillich (University Press of America, Lanham MD, 1980), p. 1. For Saiving's article 
see Valerie Saiving, "The Human Situation: A Feminine View", in Carol P. Christ and Judith 
Plaskow, {eds.) Womanspirtt Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion (Harper & Row, San Francisco, 
1979). 
2 
op. cit., Plaskow, Sex. Sin and Grace, p. 11. 
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adopting Plaskow's suggestion for how the term should be understood. The idea that 
women's experience is constructed, "an effect of complicated discursive practices",3 and 
is not that which pertains to a pre-formed essential subject, has informed feminist 
theologies for many years. 
In the previous chapter, I began exploring the concept 'Woman' as preliminary 
work for elucidating women's experience. I have not so far used or referred to 'the 
feminine'. Note, that Saiving's insight was not couched in terms of women's experience, 
rather feminine experience. She saw 'feminine experience' as peculiarly related to 
women and went on to write: 
Contemporary theological doctrines of love have, I believe, been 
constructed primarily upon the basis of masculine experience and thus 
view the human situation from the male standpoint. Consequently, these 
doctrines do not provide an adequate interpretation of the situation of 
women ... nor, for that matter, of men ... 4 
Plaskow's substitution of 'women's experience' for 'feminine experience' suggests 
either that she would want to reject the term 'feminine' or that she interprets the two as 
equivalent. Certainly she distinguishes between the Eternal Feminine and women's 
experience(s),5 but her interest seems to be in the latter rather than the former. As I read 
Plaskow, she argues against the assumption that there is a woman's nature, the Eternal 
Feminine, which is tied to woman's biological functions as mother and nurturer. Plaskow 
is critical of the proposal that naturalness and passivity supposedly accompany maternal 
functions. Her consistent use of the phrase 'women's experience' implies a distance 
between 'it' and feminine experience: small wonder, when the feminine has been so 
implicated in the essentialising of the Eternal Feminine.6 
3 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism. Nature and Difference (Routledge, New York & 
London, 1989), p.2. 
4 Quoted by Plaskow in op. cit., Plask.ow, Sex, Sin and Grace, p. 1. See also, Saiving, "The 
Human Situation", in op. cit., Womanspirit Rising, p. 27. 
5 See, for example, op. cit., Plask.ow, Sex, Sin and Grace, p. 31 & p. 173. 
6 It is possible that Plaskow reads 'feminine experience' as 'women's experience' in a deliberate 
attempt to sidestep the problems which beset the Eternal Feminine. If to speak of the feminine is 
immediately to make an association with the Eternal Feminine, then it is best left to the side. For 
the moment, I will not use the term 'feminine' unless it occurs in the texts l am reading. 
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What I am interpreting as Plaskow's rejection of the term 'feminine' echoes Mary 
Daly's project in The Church and the Second Sex, originally published in 1968. In that 
work, Daly attacks the Eternal Feminine as an essentialising concept. Daly's later works 
do not feature the term 'feminine'. Indeed, the feminine has for many feminists, including 
feminist theologians, 7 become a term which spontaneously evokes the spectre of 
essential ism. 
In this chapter I will be exploring Mary Daly's analysis of the essentialising Eternal 
Feminine. In terms of my project in chapter 1, the Eternal Feminine represents just the 
kind of essentialising notion which feminists have rejected. The Eternal Feminine is an 
example of that which de Lauretis denies feminists might mean when they speak of real 
essence. Daly has no doubt that the concept of real essence, proclaimed in Christian 
literature for hundreds of years, has guided the lives of millions of women and to their 
detriment. Hence, Daly makes a deliberate attempt to envision women's discourse and 
ontology as intimately connected with each other. Because of the emphasis Daly places 
on discourse and the ontological repercussions which follow from that, one is entitled to 
read Daly as a social constructionist. 
In discussing her work, I move · through Daly's critique of essentialism to 
accusations that she is essentialist and racist. I explore how Daly interprets and treats 
'woman', the role of language and ontology, the body and the Divine. Daly is worthy of 
deep consideration because she was one of the early advocates of taking seriously the 
claims of language in the social production of women. Daly did this within a theological 
context. Her denunciation of the Eternal Feminine was accompanied by a strong stand 
for social constructionism which would produce a new idea of woman. She believed that 
language was the means for women, through recovering the task of naming, to gain 
freedom from oppression. 
On reading her early work it is possible to think that Daly believes one could talk 
about women as a distinct category apart from race and class. That is to say, it is 
possible to interpret her as holding the view that one can speak of woman as woman as 
a category defined in terms of sex/gender alone. Hence, for Daly, 'woman' could be 
7 See for example, Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said; Feminist Practices of Biblical 
Interpretation (Beacon Press, Boston, 1992). 
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regarded primarily as a sex/gender term. Recall that Spelman maintained that sex/gender 
together with class and race constitute women. Daly's argument which uses sex/gender 
as the primary analytic category assumes, it could be argued, that all women are basically 
the same. For this reason, one could read her as precisely the kind of feminist deserving 
of Spelman's ire. 
As we shall see, Daly's failure to speak of race and class as constitutive of 
women, has caused a great deal of controversy in feminist circles. Daly seems to be a 
privileged white woman speaking for herself and other privileged white women. Hence it 
is arguable that for Daly, 'women's experience' is an exclusive category, excluding by 
silence and omission, the voices of 'other' women. I will argue that it is not clear that this 
is the case. 
That women are made and not born appears, on the one hand, to be a proposition 
to which Daly would have little trouble assenting. On the other, the imagery she uses and 
evokes, together with her positing an elemental philosophy which reaches back in 
women's (collective) consciousnesses, suggests that a women's essence, an elemental 
being, is there to be discovered and explored. Daly's most recent elaboration of Elemental 
philosophy suggests she returns to the Eternal Feminine she had rejected in her early 
works. In Elemental philosophy, one encounters the Divine in Ancestral Memory8 as the 
Goddess, the Ultimate/Intimate Reality unravels. For Daly, the Divine mirrors the Goddess 
present in all women. Her critics suggest that Daly has re-invoked real essence. Is that 
the case? 
The Church and the Second Sex 
At this point it is important to discuss briefly the role of symbols and 
metaphors in Elemental feminist philosophy, particularly since this mode 
of discourse traditionally has been disdained by philosophers in general 
and metaphysicians in particular. Since this work describes/unfolds a 
deviant philosophy - and a philosophy for deviants - the reader might jump 
to the facile conclusion that the use of metaphor is "understandable" or 
even "excusable" in the absence of an adequate 
philosophical/metaphysical tradition to express woman identified thought. 
The point is, however, that symbols and "mere" metaphors are required, 
not because of some deficiency or lack in the sphere of abstract 
8 Mary Daly, in cahoots with Jane Caputi. Websters' First New Intergalactic Wickedary of the 
English Language (Beacon Press, Boston, 1987), p. 72. 
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conceptualisation, but because of the demanding, rigorous nature of the 
work itself. 9 
My objection to the Painted Bird in Gyn/Ecology is that its function is 
comparable to that of Sartre's holes and slime: it's not that it isn't very nice 
to talk about other women that way, or that Daly's language here ranges 
from tart to vitriolic, but that the projection of an image of evil in other 
women is indispensable to the Gyn/Ecological speaking position. "Evil in 
other women" may be unfair since it's a matter of what patriarchy has 
done to such women. But in that case, Daly deprives them of identity; they 
are women no-longer Women, male creations, non-Identified women; the 
ones produced by Daly's question in her Preface, "just who are 'the 
women'?"10 
In this chapter I explore Daly's rejection of the Eternal Feminine and then I 
interrogate the allegation that Daly is essentialist.11 It will become obvious why one might 
be excused for thinking that essentialism is implicit in her ontological concerns. I will show 
that this obviousness is superficial. My argument is designed to problematise some of the 
popular readings of Daly, which paint her as racist/elitist/supremacist, anti-feminist and 
essentialist. 
Meaghan Morris, in writing about Gyn/Eco!ogy. has pointed out that Daly uses 
language strategically.12 For Morris, however, Daly gains little in this strategic use, arguing 
t~at Daly confines her critique to "a politics of subverting isolated signs, not one of 
transforming discourse"13 or "language in use".14 When she uses the term "strategy10 
Morris seems to be referring to the way in which Daly deploys "punning, alliteration, word-
9 Mary Daly, Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy (The Women's Press, London, 1984), 
p. 24. 
10 Meaghan Morris, "A-mazing Grace: Notes on Mary Daly's Poetics" in Intervention 16 (n.d.), p. 
83. 
11 See, for example, Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance: A Study of Women io Contemporary 
Philosophy (trans. Elizabeth Guild) (Polity Press, Oxford, 1991 ), p. 207; op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, 
But She Said, p. 106. 
12 
op. cit., Morris, "A-mazing Grace", pp. 71 - 73. 
13 .b.d I I ., p. 71 . 
14 .b.d I I ., p. 73. 
15 Grosz and other commentators on lrigaray use the term 'strategy' in discussing lrigaray's work. 
See chapter 4 of this thesis for a discussion of lrigaray's use of mimesis used in this way. 
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play, allegory, and the Great Metaphor of the Voyage"16 to achieve her revolutionary ends. 
If this is what Morris means then I fully concur. But, I would argue, Gyn/Ecology 
represents the beginnings only of this subversive strategy. For Daly carries this strategic 
practice into the later work, Pure Lust and culminates it in the production of her feminist 
dictionary, Webster's First New Intergalactic Wickedary. 
I will argue that Daly is successfully strategic and that her ontological concerns 
could not be articulated in any other way. I will also argue contrary to Morris, that Daly's 
is not a strategy of subverting isolated signs at all, but an attempt to displace a 
supposedly neutral (but men's) discourse in favour of a women's discourse, the function 
of which is to articulate women's Be-ing.17 
Daly's earlier works, The Church and the Second Sex and Beyond God the Father, 
did not appropriate language in a divisive and destabilising manner. In them, Daly spoke 
out vehemently for both the equality of women and for social justice in the Catholic 
Church in particular and the Christian Church in general. At the time, few women had had 
the courage to write as she did, so publicly and with the depth of scholarship and 
understanding which she displayed.18 
Daly's primary task in The Church and the Second Sex was to argue for the 
equality of women and men as Church members, to expose the masculine bias of 
Christian theology and to demonstrate the explicit iniquitous practical and psychological 
consequences which this theology held (and continues to hold19) for women in the 
Church. She saw the Catholic Church as an oppressive, man-dominated institution which 
failed to reconcile its opposing views of women (as virgin and whore), but which used that 
opposition to revere, regulate and revile the lives of its women adherents. In Daly's view, 
16 
't M . "A . G II 73 op. c1 ., oms, -mazing race , p. . 
17 Daly uses the hyphenated forms Be-ing and be-ing to emphasise their 'verbness' so that the 
reader will not be tempted to reify, as she might if she were to read them as nouns. 
18 
See for evidence of this, Mary Daly, The Church and the Second Sex (with a new Feminist Post 
Christian Introduction by the Author) (Harper & Row, New York, 1975), passim. 
19 
Although topics such as those raised by Daly about women and the Church are commonplace 
discussion in the Church today, little in the sacramental life of the Catholic Church (the official 
position of which remains as it has been for hundreds of years) has changed regarding the 
understandinQ and role of women. See Jean Paul It's recent encyclical Veritatis Splendor (1993) 
for evidence of this. 
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the movement to equality between women and men was anathema20 to the Church 
hierarchy who resisted and opposed any change to the status of women within the 
Church. 
Those engaged in the struggle for the equality of the sexes have often 
seen the Catholic Church as an enemy. This view is to a large extent 
justified, for Catholic teaching has prolonged a traditional view of woman 
which at the same time idealizes and humiliates her.21 
Informed as her work was by Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex,22 her writing 
took on much of de Beauvoir's critique of the socio-ontological arrangements which 
constitute, encompass and entrap women. Indeed, Daly's book can be seen as a Catholic 
response to de Beauvoir's critique of the Catholic Church's oppression of women. Daly, 
however, was keen to make a case for transcending the history and social circumstances 
of women in the Church and to argue for some optimistic outcomes once the problems 
were identified and acknowledged. 
The fundamental difference between Simone de Beauvoir's vision of the 
Church and women and that which motivated this book is the difference 
between despair and hope. For this reason our approach is fundamentally 
far more radical than that of the French existentialist. De Beauvoir was 
willing to accept the conservative vision of the Church as reality, and 
therefore has had to reject it as unworthy of mature humanity. However, 
there is an alternative to rejection, an alternative which need not involve 
self-mutilation. This is commitment to radical transformation of the 
negative, life-destroying elements of the Church as it exists today. The 
possibility of such commitment rests upon clear understanding that the 
seeds of the eschatological community, of the liberating humanizing 
Church of the future, are already present, however submerged and 
neutralized they may be. Such commitment requires hope and courage.23 
20 Although I have used the past tense here, this remains true of Catholic hierarchy and many 
devout men (and some women) Catholics. Arguments against ordination of women to the Catholic 
priesthood for example are based upon an assumed inferiority of women developed from Pauline 
texts in particular. The "equal but different" sentiments which condemn women to lesser positions 
in the Church is also an example of this. 
21 
op. cit., Daly, The Church and the Second Sex , p. 53. 
22 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (trans. H. M. Parshley) (Picador Books, London, 1949). 
23 
op. cit., Daly. The Church and the Second Sex, p. 221. 
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Daly could, therefore, be seen as an apologist for the Truth which she believed 
the Catholic Church manifested and revealed and this is in direct opposition to de 
Beauvoir.24 However, there is a significant and fundamental point on which both de 
Beauvoir and Daly agree. Like de Beauvoir,25 Daly attacked the essentialising notion of 
the Eternal Feminine, the Eternal Woman, the idea of the essential Woman to which I 
referred in chapter 1, that there is a "fixed human nature",26 peculiar to women. Unlike de 
Beauvoir, however, and this is what Daly's critics argue, she does not persist with her 
exposure, ultimately retrieving instead the idealised myth of Goddess which she then 
uses as the projected foundation for a possible gynocracy or rule of women by women. 
On this view, Daly revalorises and re-inscribes the Eternal Feminine in Gyn/Ecology and 
Pure Lust and this is why she is accused of essentialism. 
In The Church and the Second Sex Daly's contention is that the Eternal Woman 
is the essential woman: she is what it is that makes a woman truly a woman; she 
personifies the Eternal Feminine. In terms of my earlier analysis, the eternal woman is 
Locke's real essence and the Aristotelian adopted Pythagorean negation of the positive 
man. According to Daly: 
The characteristics of the Eternal Woman are opposed to those of a 
developing, authentic person, who will be unique, self-critical, self 
creating, active and searching ... By contrast to these authentic personal 
qualities, the Eternal Woman is said to have a vocation to surrender and 
hiddenness; ... Self-less, she achieves not individual realisation but 
merely generic fulfillment in motherhood, physical or spiritual. .. She is 
said to be timeless and conservative by nature. She is shrouded in 
mystery because she is not a genuine human person ... 27 
The Eternal Feminine is the symbol which is at the heart of the Eternal Woman, 
itself a symbolic representation. The Eternal Feminine and the Eternal Woman are, as I 
24 In the Post Christian Introduction to The Church and the Second Sex, Daly speaks of the 
position she had taken in the first edition in terms of dis-ownership. That is to say, she speaks of 
herself in the third person, dissociating from and critiquing the views of the earlier Daly. 
25 See de Beauvoir, op. cit., The Second Sex, Part 111, in particular her discussion of the Mother 
and the Virgin Mary, pp. 170ft. It is beyond the scope of this thesis however, to explore in great 
depth, the relationship between de Beauvoir's work and Daly's. 
26 
op. cit., Daly, The Church and the Second Sex, p. 70. 
27 'b'd I I . 
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read Daly,28 symbols which operate at a normative level in society. 29 Hence, the concepts 
of the Eternal Woman and the Eternal Feminine, although symbolic, are not merely 
descriptive. They prescribe how a woman ought to behave in order to count as a woman. 
These symbols are "radically opposed to female emancipation"30 for they evince a 
perception of women that both describes and prescribes their individual natures. On this 
view, symbolic Woman is naturally "passive, dependent, totally relational"31 and she 
provides the ideal to which individual women should conform. The relationship between 
the symbolic Eternal Woman and individual women is mediated by a symbol which says 
what it means to be a woman: to be a woman is to embody the Eternal Feminine, to 
conform to the Eternal Woman. Anything falling outside this model fails to count as a 
woman. The Eternal Feminine is, in other words, the essence of Woman and individual 
women: ''The formula is very simple: once the a priori norms of femininity have been set 
up, all the exceptions are classified as 'de-feminised"'.32 Note the relationship, reminiscent 
of Aristotle and Plato, between the idea of universal Woman and individual women: one 
is an individual woman in virtue of participating in the ideal form of Woman. 
Daly contended that the Eternal Feminine is the enemy of women who seek 
freedom and personhood. Its immutability, restrictiveness and prescriptiveness ensure 
that women will remain within narrow·social roles, for the roles which women perform in 
society are contingent upon how a society understands what a woman should be, and 
should be like. This has been reinforced by Christian dogma and tradition. Hence the 
characteristics of the Eternal Feminine tie women to, for example, motherhood, nurturing, 
mystery, on the one hand and, importantly, to inferiority and the image of the temptress 
28 What follows is my re-construction of the relationship between the Eternal Feminine, the 
Eternal Woman and individual women. 
29 
op. cit., Daly, The Church and the Second Sex, p. 70. 
3o 'b'd I I . 
31 ibid., p.172. 
32 ibid., p.155. 
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on the other.33 Women's alleged inferiority has developed because of the literal translation 
from the symbolic and theoretical (the Eternal Feminine) to the actual (particular women). 
Thus, biblical accounts of woman's secondary place in creation, her instigation of 
human evil and her association with the flesh, have circumscribed the roles of all women 
strictly in terms of their biological, moral and emotional capacities.34 On this view, biology 
traps women because of the way in which it is interpreted. Biological considerations lead 
necessarily to normative accounts of women's behaviour. The idea that biology/nature is 
a 'fixed category' open to differing interpretations which embody "different cultural 
meanings and values", 35 Grosz's reading of constructionism, is pertinent here. 
As I read Daly, she is arguing that in a strong sense individual women derive 'that 
they are women' from an account of symbolic womanhood which she equates with the 
'Eternal Feminine', predicated on an idea of 'pure' or 'brute' biology and nature. The 
Eternal Feminine is a gender construct; women's sex remains a biological brute fact. This 
interpretation of her reading the Eternal Feminine as a gender construct, returns later in 
her analysis of Be-ing as we shall shortly see. Daly saw the Eternal Feminine as an evil 
which should be exorcised from the Church as well as from the lives of women. While the 
grip of the Eternal Feminine persisted, little could be achieved for women. Daly's was, to 
use a phrase of Grosz's, a project designed "to minimise biological differences"36 to 
change how, and the conditions under which, women should be symbolised. 37 
It is important to acknowledge that Daly was then concerned for women to remain 
within the Church and that, as I noted above, she believed it would be possible to 
transform the Church into the kind of institution in which women would have equality. The 
33 Daly never 'defines' the feminine as such. She seems to assume an explicit understanding of 
the feminine, whilst at the same time, hinting at what it might be like. The feminine, woman and 
women are closely related physically, emotionally, psychologically and spiritually, but she operates 
with a concepts of sex and gender as distinct categories, even in her extensive analysis. 
34 
op. cit., Daly, The Church and the Second Sex, pp. 75 - 76. 
35 
Elizabeth Grosz. Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism (Allen & Unwin, St. Leonard's 
1994), p. 17. 
36 'b'd I I . 
37 See in particular, Daly's chapters, "Demon of Sexual Prejudice: Exercise in Exorcism" and 
"Roots of the Problem: Radical Surgery Required" in op. cit., The Church and the Second Sex, pp. 
166 - 191. 
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last two chapters of The Church and the Second Sex are concerned with "some modest 
proposals" about how this might come about. Daly's optimism witnesses her belief in the 
liberal feminist commitment to full participation in the pre-established (sex-neutral) forms 
of hierarchical institutions. For her, acceptance of women as equal partners in the Church 
will lead to the transformation of the institution itself in which: 
... (m)en and women, using their best talents, forgetful of self and intent 
upon the work, will with God's help mount together toward a higher order 
of consciousness and being, in which the alienating projections will have 
been defeated and wholeness, psychic integrity, achieved.38 
For her, that meant that both women and men must abandon the dominant image 
of women as the embodiment of the Eternal Feminine. In turn, that meant the traditional 
roles ascribed to women (in which the Eternal Feminine is honoured) will need to be re-
evaluated so that women can be given the freedom to move into new space(s). Daly 
contended that men also must go through a process of transformation and come to terms 
with the ways in which society had imposed values on, and expectations of, them. "The 
eternal masculine" traps and limits men as much as the Eternal Feminine has women. 
What is more the 'eternal masculine' itself is alienating, crippling the 
personalities of men and restricting their experience of life at every level. 
The male in our society is not supposed to express much feeling, 
sensitivity, aesthetic appreciation, imagination, consideration for others, 
intuition. He is expected to affirm only part of his real self. Indeed, it may 
be that a good deal of the compulsive competitiveness of males is rooted 
in this half existence .... It is the nature of the disease, therefore, to 
inhibit the expansion of the individual's potential, through conditioned 
conformity to roles, and through a total identification of the individual with 
them.39 
Although at the time of writing The Church and the Second Sex Daly's primary 
concern was with the liberation of women from archaic theory and social practice built 
upon that theory, her concern was also for the liberation of all humans, women and men 
alike. She believed that women and men must transcend the boundaries of their socially 
38 ibid ., p. 223. 
39 ibid., pp. 193 - 194. 
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acquired stereotypes, that the 'real'40 self somehow exists apart from sexual identity. She 
takes up this theme in Beyond God the Father, where she was concerned to explore 
notions centred around androgynous being41 which she later abandoned and disclaimed . 
In Beyond God the Father Daly begets a trinity: language, its uses and meanings, 
transcendence and androgyny.42 The relationship between these three is always implicit: 
together they produce the ontological foundations for human becoming to ultimate, 
authentic Be-ing. What I want to emphasise here, is that regardless of what patriarchal 
intellectual commitments Daly attacks and attempts to refute, her underlying commitment 
to women's liberation remains couched in terms of language and ontology which are 
themselves patriarchal. Yet, ironically, Daly simultaneously rejects patriarchal language 
and ontology because of their de-valorising of women. Overwhelmingly, the 
language/ontology relation is what she appropriates and exploits to make political 
statements, to address what she considers to be socially and morally corrupt practices, 
and to redefine the enterprises of theology and philosophy. 
This relation between language and ontology saturates Gyn/Ecology and Pure 
.Lust, the works in which Daly develops her cosmic odyssey, her gynocratic vision. These 
are also works which have caused outcries from many feminists, who have complained 
bitterly of Daly's Euro-centrism, her failure to acknowledge the cultures and experiences 
of a broad range of women (reading her as making universalising statements about 
women) and her alienation of women who are not woman-identified and therefore not 
'real' women as she would have it (the fembots and Painted Birds for example). 43 
40 Throughout this thesis where the term 'reality' is obviously contested, I use single quotes. 
Where it is not necessarily contested, I omit the quotes. 
41 See Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation (Beacon 
Press, Boston, 1973), passim. 
42 In the preface to Gyn/Eco!ogy, Daly says that along with the terms 'God' and 
'homosexuality','androgyny' is a term she will never use again. See Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The 
Metaethjcs of Radical Feminism (The Women's Press, London, 1979), pp. xi ff. 
43 See for example Audre Lorde,"An Open Letter to Mary Daly" in Sister Outsider: Essays and 
Speeches (Crossing Press, Trumansberg, NY, 1984); op. cit., Morris, "A-mazing Grace" passim; 
Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary Feminist Thought (G. Allen & Unwin, London, 1984); op. cit., 
Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance; Jill Matthews, "Review of Gyn/Ecology" in Gay Information , 5 ( 1 9 81 ) pp. 1 8 - 1 9. 
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As a preliminary gesture in the recovery/discovery of language and, I would argue, 
its use as discourse, Daly in Beyond God the Father, had denounced the practice of 
naming. She argued that what she calls "old naming" as a function of language, has 
assumed an oppressive role within, and is constitutive of, patriarchal structures including 
discursive practice(s). So, Daly believed, "new naming" can creatively constitute a world 
in which all sexual oppression will disappear. 
In order to understand the implications of this process it is necessary to 
grasp the fundamental fact that women have had the power of naming 
stolen from us. We have not been free to use their own power to name 
themselves, the world, or God. The old naming was not the product of 
dialogue - a fact inadvertently admitted in the Genesis story of Adam's 
naming the animals and the woman. Women are now realising that the 
universal imposing of names by men has been false because partial. . . 
To exist humanly is to name the self, the world and God ... 44 
Daly's implicit social constructionism is evident here. She perceives that language 
constitutes social constructionist practices and rigorously claims language as the site of 
transformation for women. But I suggest that in taking this line, Daly resurrects the divide 
between nature and nurture, between sex and gender, body and mind. On this reading 
it is interpretation of, for example underlying· biology, that is at fault, not the idea that one 
makes conceptual distinctions. 
Daly understands language as a whole, as a dialogical, transformative means of 
achieving a radically altered society in which women will have restored to them, their 
autonomy and authenticity as human beings.45 On this basis, Morris' claim about Daly's 
subverting use of isolated signs is dubious. On the other hand, Daly asserts that the 
dualistic structures which constitute oppression and are the outcome and basis of, 
patriarchal society, ought to be transcended in favour of androgynous be-ing or psychic 
wholeness. This assertion is questionable considering her inadvertent retention of ·the 
distinction between body and mind, sex and gender. 
44 
op. cit. , Daly, Beyond God the Father, p. 8. 
45 This point is reinforced in Pure Lust. See "On Lust and the Lusty", passim. 
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In Beyond God the Father, Daly's ideal world of female becoming46 is presented 
as one free of sex-discrimination in which all women and men have transcended "the 
eternal essence" in which patriarchal society has erroneously cast them. By taking 
command of language, claiming the right to name for themselves, women will retrieve 
what has been lost to and through patriarchy: the right to self definition, to Be-ing. But in 
taking this stance, Daly courts essentialism, not merely on the grounds of distinguishing 
between sex and gender, but because she appears to invoke notions of an essential 
female gender. How does she do this? 
Daly and Essentialism 
Language and Ontology 
The power of naming, highlighted in Beyond God the Father, is a crucial feature 
of Daly's work in Gyn/Ecology and by the time of Pure Lust had developed into a highly 
sophisticated network of critical exploration of language, play on words, neologism, and 
re-definition. In terms of the kinds of images and emphases which Daly employs however, 
it is disputable that she had abandoned her vitriolic attack on the Eternal Feminine. It is 
possible to read these newer works as a valorisation of the Eternal Feminine, her 
language interpreting and reinforcing this possibility. For example, she speaks of women's 
bodies as "transmutable to and from energy" and of "(t)he spiration of the Archimage 
within Lusty women, who speak women's words, heals broken connections between 
words and their Sources, reconnecting women with their elemental origins ... "47 
acknowledging, it would seem, some implicit and uncritical notion of what it means to be 
' 
a woman in terms of their embodiment. But she also consistently maintains that one 
46 In Beyond God the Father. Daly is very taken by process theology in part because it does not 
present us with a static world view. She obviously admires the work of Charles Hartshorne, who, 
she says, believes that "process is creative synthesis" (p. 188). But she is dubious about the social 
worth of theory such as his; and is also suspicious of theory which is ready made (man-made) and 
which seems can be readily appropriated by feminists. Her enterprise is to make new philosophy 
and create new language out of the experience(s) of women. "The essential thing is to hear our 
own words, always giving prior attention to our own experience, never letting prefabricated theory 
have authority over us. Then we can be free to listen to the old philosophical language (and all 
philosophy that does not explicitly repudiate sexism is old, no matter how novel it may seem)'~ p. 
189. 
47 ibid., p. 91. 
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ought to reject the forms of feminisation imposed by patriarchal society and against which 
she had formerly argued. Those forms distort women and are responsible for producing 
'fembots' and 'Painted Birds'. Undoubtedly, there is a distinct tension between the two 
readings of Daly. How one can resolve this dilemma, depends on how one interprets 
Daly's project in Pure Lust in particular. I shall return to this point shortly. 
The Wickedary which she (along with Jane Caputi) published in 1987, is an 
encyclop83dic review of her adventures into language and discourse. This book signposts 
the cosmic voyage48 she has made through and with language and is an exciting, 
humorous and methodical exposition of the networks or webs of words and word patterns 
she has created over the past twenty plus years. She identifies naming as a functional 
process which can oppress (as it has women) or liberate, and argues that naming 
oppresses when it is not freely created - in dialogue - by communities acting in the 
interests of all their members, to achieve transcendence. Naming - language as an 
activity which implies, and is implied by, discourse - is a prime mover in both the 
construction and understanding of Being. 
Daly argues that all language establishes and comes out of an ontologically 
committed context.49 In that she is not alone. The concerns of Scott, de Lauretis, Fuss 
and Spelman highlight this. Until the Wickedary. she is never clear about what she 
means50 precisely by 'ontology' and its cognates. However, in the Wickedary she talks of 
elemental ontology, "the philosophical quest for Be-ing; rooted in the intuition that Powers 
of Be-ing are constantly Unfolding, creating, communicating; philosophy grounded in the 
experience of active potency to move beyond the foreground of fixed questions and 
48 
op. cit., Daly, the Wickedary. 
49 See for example, her discussion of titles and roles within a workplace context: 'In women one 
notices "accommodation attitudes," that is, a self-abnegating and flattering manner that is almost 
"second nature." Conditioning to such accommodation attitudes is intensified by such customs as 
nonreciprocal first naming, common even when the boss (Mr. Jones, Father Jones, Professor 
Jones or Doctor Jones) is thirty years of age and the secretary, who is sixty, is called "Sally." A 
similar custom is reference by "the boss" to "Sally" as "the girl" in the office. A young male 
"executive assistant" doing essentially the same work as Sally, for a much higher salary, is of 
course not referred to as a "boy."' See op. cit., Daly. Beyond God the Father, p. 136. 
50 Daly's meanings, of course , can never be guaranteed to take on the meanings of accepted 
patriarchal usage and this , I would argue , is instrumental to her ontological-linguistic strategy. 
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answers and enter the Radiant Realms of Metabeing".51 That she believes there is an 
intimate relation between language and ontology which is fundamental to her work is 
evident here. Her term 'Meta-being', "(r)ealms of active participation in Powers of Be-ing, 
State of Ecstasy'' is intended to convey the lack of disjunction between discourse and be-
ing. For her Be-ing, "Ultimate/Intimate Reality, the constantly Unfolding Verb of Verbs 
which is intransitive, having no object that limits its dynamism; the Final Cause, the Good 
who is Self-communicating who is the Verb from whom, in whom and with whom all true 
movements move", 52 is a kind of all embracing presence which is not yet. 
Daly's Platonic/ Aristotelian influence53 should not be gainsaid in her analysis of the 
Eternal Woman. Her articulation of Be-ing; and her maintaining that be-ing is "actual 
participation"54 in Be-ing, echoes this. What is clear is that the philosophical influences 
on Daly constitute a space from which her tireless deconstruction/reconstruction of 
masculine language emerges. Also at play is an Heracleitan resonance which stresses 
language as primarily "performative/active/animate" activity, potentially alive with 
meaning. It is in this context that we should read her emphasis on Verbs. 
It is apparent that Daly is cavalier about her adoption of philosophical systems, 
using them as befits her own new and originary radical feminist philosophy. Thus her 
distinctions (although often refigured) between Be-ing, be-ing and Be-coming, God the 
Noun and God the Verb, her use of the concepts of authenticity, Otherness, erasure, 
deferral, false consciousness to name but a few, are often left unattributed to their 
sources (Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Process Theology, Liberation Theology 
for example).The point is that Daly is selective in what she wants to accept and reject 
from patriarchal systems. Her creativity arises not in spite of, but because of, those 
systems. 
51 
op. cit., Daly, the Wickedary, p. 86. 
52 ibid., p. 64. 
53 The idea of participation is important for Daly. I suggest that this is derived from the Platonic 
conception of the relationship between an individual or particular and the relevant Universal. 
Accordingly, in the Platonic system, the Form (the universal) pre-exists the individual which gains 
its identity from participation in the universal. 
54 
op. cit., Daly, Beyond God the Father, p. 64. 
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Another significant feature of her language is that it becomes misanthropic. Daly 
deliberately acknowledges that language creates the supposedly sex-neutral world, which 
is actually the world of men, epitomised by patriarchy and its discursive practices. In so 
doing, she endeavours to reconstruct a women's discourse; and embeds herself deeply 
in a traditional problem for patriarchal metaphysicians - that of metaphysical dualism - for 
the world which she creates is apparently an astral world. 55 She sets up a 'system' in 
which the time/space women will create for themselves depends upon their ability to 
imaginatively develop their own inner selves (which have been denied and suppressed 
by patriarchal structures) as well as their own socio-political frameworks and agendas. 
Furthermore, that world also takes on a misogynistic character, as not all women can 
belong in her new Elemental Race of Women. In order to belong to that Race (to be a 
'real' woman) one must reject, in total, the patriarchal identification of women. Only 
women can identify themselves. The use and development of a women's language is not 
only instrumental in this process of identification, but essential to it. 
It is also important to acknowledge that a large part of the becoming of women is 
a becoming of origins. Daly states: 
For we are rooted, as are animals and trees, winds and seas, in the 
Earth's substance. Thus, when true to our Originality, we are Elemental, 
that is "of, relating to, or caused by great force of nature".56 
This appeal to women's Elemental origins suggests that metaphysical dualism is 
not a problem for Daly. Her discussion of nominalism,57 the classic exposition of which 
she rejects, for example, suggests that for her 'reality' is constructed through the interplay 
of words and actions and that the totality is beyond individuals. As I read Daly here, her 
idea of reality is 'two-layered': words overlie another 'reality' independent of those words. 
She exemplifies a real essence position which de Lauretis rejects in favour of nominal 
55 See op. cit., Daly, Pure Lust, p. 3: ''This Lust is in its essence astral". How does one interpret 
such a claim? 
56 
'b'd 5 I I ., pp. 4- . 
57 
I find Daly's rejection of nominalism and her commitment to social constructionism represented 
by her emphasis on the structure use and modification of language, perplexing. Since she uses 
social construction theory, one would imagine that she should read the theory as nominalist. There 
appears to be some ambiguity about the meaning of 'nominalist'. 
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essence. This is also an instance of Grosz's diagnosis of constructionism as that which 
retains the underlying 'reality' of brute biology and nature. Daly appears to be holding both 
positions when she articulates the language/origins relation. 
But hers is not a simple ontological dualism, in which two separate substances 
are postulated. The knower and the known (her usage) participate in each other as 
universal/particular, known/knower which are not disjunctive presences. Where there is 
one, there is both.58 
The negation of any deep ontological Elemental, sense of creative 
participation of the knower and of the known in Be-ing, whether this 
negation is called "nominalism" or "modern realism" or simply "science," 
is indeed emptying out of big - that is meaning-full - words .... Their 
Metaphoric powers which characterize them as Metaphoric messengers 
of Metabeing, are suffocated.T hey become embodiments of that glut 
which we recognize as presence of absence. (her italics]59 
That is not to say though that Daly articulates a view of reality conceived totally 
within the domain of language. Were this the case, her argument against nominalism -
based upon Tillich's assessment that "Even the empiricist must acknowledge that 
everything approachable by knowledge must have the structure of being knowable"60 
would fail because she would be imputing the very idea she disavows: that general terms 
"have no objective real existence".61 But she appears to hold that l~nguage and 'reality' 
participate in each other while remaining separable. The key phrase for her is 
'participation', which she does not elaborate. The nature of participation is elusive, but 
highlights "the force of words". 62 Consciousness of the force of words provides the basis 
for a change in consciousness which will precipitate new naming, women's naming. 
58 
op. cit., Daly, Pure Lust, pp. 160 -161. 
59 ibid., p. 162. 
60 ibid., p. 177. Daly quotes from Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1951-63). 
61 
op. cit., Daly, Pure Lust, p. 161. 
62 ibid., p. 162. 
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Daly argues that "(e)lemental philosophy is not compatible with nominalism and 
its claim that only the individual has reality, for this negates participation".63 For Daly, it 
would seem that in order for general terms and particular terms to participate with each 
other, each must be 'real~ independent of language. The medium through which this 
happens is language and that is why language is so ontologically potent. Access to the 
'reality' underlying general and particular terms depends upon who is doing the 
articulating, and this is why women need to develop their own language. Language is as 
important as what it represents and women need to represent themselves. 
According to Daly, patriarchal language, men's language, which is supposedly 
neutral, is hegemonic, and women must make now their own women's knowledge which 
is both mediated and constructed by women's language(s) and experiences(s) of 
underlying 'reality'. According to her, language is not sex-neutral. The ontological 
foundations for language and discourse in patriarchal discursive structures and practice 
are those which interpret and represent the interests of men. These ought to be 
abandoned by women for their own sex-specific language/discourse. Women's interests 
will be represented by a sex-specific women's language/discourse which is yet to be. Daly 
attempts to make a women's discourse and this is a fundamental if not the fundamental 
feature of her work. 
For the rest of this chapter, I shall be arguing that from Gyn/Eco!ogy onwards, 
language quite explicitly becomes ontology in terms of its expressing Daly's Elemental 
ontology, a sex-specific women's discourse. Thus I will be arguing, contra Morris, that 
Daly's strategy involves more than isolating some signs (even if this had been the case 
in Gyn/Eco!ogy), and that she is explicitly committed to transforming discourse in an 
endeavour to create a space for women, discursively and ontologically. Hence hers is 
subversive linguistic activity to which we should attend because it occupies the space 
between saying and not saying. By this, I mean that her strategy implies quite the 
opposite of a literal reading, understanding and interpretation. She of necessity must use 
the master discursive framework of patriarchal philosophy, whilst employing metaphor 
s3 ibid. 
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and analogy to displace the contents and framework itself, in order to unsay what has 
been said of women. 64 
The implication of this for Daly, is that the unfolding of Be-ing is always slightly off-
centre. There is never the security of a straightforwardly referential context, with a 
promise of truth delivered through literal interpretation. Instead, the dominant metaphors 
carry the uncertainties and opacities of women's be-ing which is never quite bounded or 
complete. In this way, Daly's metaphor is close to the associative qualities of the female 
elaborated in the Pythagorean Table of Opposites, although this time those qualities are 
valorised. The production of be-ing is grounded in displacing patriarchal meanings, in 
appropriating language, acknowledging becoming. This in turn produces be-ing which 
participates in Be-ing. Hence a women's ontology is possible only in so far as discourse 
produces the meanings out of extant discourse. Mark C. Taylor argues: 
While philosophy's other always slips through the structures imposed by 
conceptual reflection, the unthought can only be evoked through the 
language of philosophy itself. The postphilosophical thinkers must 
strategically use language against language. "In order to make the attempt 
of thinking recognizable and at the same time understandable for existing 
philosophy, it could at first be expressed only within the horizon of that 
existing philosophy and its use of current terms."65 
To this extent, language and its use (discourse) is ontology: it is in language that be-ing 
becomes. If there is a choice to be made with respect to deciding how the language of 
philosophy should be used, then Daly has chosen. She has decided to use language 
against language: to look at its etymological foundations, use them, abuse them, draw out 
their implications for women and, echoing Heidegger, do that within the horizon of existing 
64 Nancy Fraser, discussing Foucault's work, also makes this point. She says: "Now, the fact that 
Foucault continues to speak (or at least to murmur) the language of humanism need not be held 
against him. Every good Derridean will allow that there is not, at least for the time being, any other 
language he could speak .... Foucault himself acknowledges that he cannot simply and 
straightforwardly discard at will the normative associations with the metaphysics of subjectivity". See 
Unruly Practices: Power. Discourse. and Gender io Contemporary Social Theory (Polity Press, 
Cambridge UK, 1989), p. 57. 
65 Taylor's comment occurs in discussion of Heidegger in Mark C. Taylor, "Cleaving. Martin 
Heidegger", in AltArity (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987), pp. 42-43. In response to the 
interjector at the 'Daly event' in Sydney in 1981, I would cite a claim such as this. Given that one 
grows up in a culture, how else can one speak except within its terms? Daly is challenging this and 
attempting to dissipate (a little) the boundaries. See also, Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", 
in Basic Works (trans. & ed. D. Krell) (Harper & Row, New York, 1977), p. 235. 
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philosophical discourse. She is therefore engaged in a double project: exploring the 
presentlpast terrain of philosophy, whilst at the same time shifting the boundaries it 
imposes on itself and in particular upon women. As I have already implied, it is in this 
context that her supposed essentialism comes to light. The subverting of discourse is a 
strategy Daly deliberately embraces in order to interrogate essentialism, not in order to 
re-inscribe or valorise the Eternal Feminine. Hers is a political task which depends upon 
undermining language and ultimately the canons of Western philosophy. 
Language as Ontology: Daly as Essentialist? 
Implicit in Daly's work is the assumption that women are embodied. Yet Daly does 
not speak of female embodiment at all. I remarked in chapter 1 that Grosz identified 
biologism and naturalism as two forms of essentialism. Daly does not question that 
women are embodied or that there might be some way of theorising bodies conceived as 
natural. The development of her discourse depends upon the assumption that women are 
embodied in unique ways. Because Daly does not suggest the nature of the relationship 
between women, their bodies and discourse, she leaves herself open to charges of 
essentialism. Here, I will concentrate on explaining Daly's ontological and linguistic 
concerns. But these cannot be understood without noting that they rest upon the idea of 
female embodiment. 
I begin with a short quotation from Beyond God the Father: 
Why indeed must "God" be a noun? Why not a verb - the most active and 
dynamic of all? Hasn't the naming of "God" as a noun been an act of 
murdering that dynamic Verb? And isn't the Verb infinitely more personal 
than a mere static noun? The anthropomorphic symbols for God may be 
intended to convey personality, but they fail to convey that God is Be-ing . 
. . . This Verb - the Verb of Verbs - is intransitive. It need not be conceived 
as having an object that limits its dynamism ... 66 
Daly's concern with the term 'God' as a noun is not simply grammatical. 'God' 
either as a proper name or as a mere noun poses a problem for Daly because of her 
onto-theological concerns and mistrusts. That is to say, Daly ultimately refuses the 
androcentric term 'God', preferring instead 'Goddess'. It is partly making God into a fixed 
66 ibid., pp. 33 - 34. 
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definable thing, reification, that she finds objectionable. Be-ing, with which she identifies 
the Goddess, is not a thing at all. In reifying, in making things into objects when that 
should not be the case, one misses the essential nature of the Divine: that it is not to be 
contained as nouns contain. (This is what patriarchy practices. Witness Daly's claim that 
'God' "represents the necrophilia of patriarchy").67 She argues that reification is a 
masculine engagement with which she refuses to identify. According to her, the term 
'God' and what it represents is irredeemably masculine, thus her rejection of it. Daly also 
acknowledges the possibility of falling into the trap of reifying the Goddess, making it of 
the same ilk as God. But for her, 'Goddess', properly used "affirms the life-loving be-ing 
of women and nature"68 and is the embodiment of the Verb of verbs. Consequently, the 
metaphorical use of the term should not be overlooked. As I read Daly, the Goddess is 
a metaphor which mirrors women's transcendence, articulated as women's be-ing. The 
articulation of women's be-ing means that one engages with the whole of language and 
its use as well as acknowledging that women are embodied. This is a projection theory 
par excellence. Recall that for her, women become, just as the Goddess is the becoming 
of women. The Goddess is the mirror of all that women can be, an idealised projection. 
Hence I am arguing that to take a piecemeal approach to Daly's general thesis is 
to interpret her as Morris does: as someone engaged in isolating the function of some 
signs, without attending to discourse, to language in use and in particular, without 
attending to the weight she gives to verbs which she perceives as having a deeply de-
stabilising affect on language as a whole. It is to ignore Daly's insistence on refusing to 
reify Be-ing in relation to the concept 'Goddess' and it fails to acknowledge the implicit 
relation between ontology and language, the foundation of which is female embodiment. 
In refiguring the Divine, concentrating on what I shall call the verbness of Be-ing, 
Daly is following a long theological tradition which situates discourse in ontology and 
ontology in discourse. 
The Old Testament story of the revelation of the Divine Name is enshrouded in 
cosmic mystery and linguistic difficulties. 
67 
op. cit., Daly, Gyn/Ecology, p. xi. 
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Moses then said to God, 'Look, if I go to the Israelites and say to them, 
"The God of your ancestors has sent me to you," and they say to me, 
"What is his name?" what am I to tell them?' God said to Moses, 'I am he 
who is.' And he said, 'This is what you are to say to the Israelites, "I am 
has sent me to you." ' God further said to Moses, 'You are to tell the 
Israelites, ''Yahweh, the God of your ancestors, the God of Abraham, the 
God of Isaac and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you.'' This is my name 
for all time, and thus I am to be invoked for all generations to come ... 69 
Commentators on this biblical passage point out that there are etymological and 
interpretative worries concerning the text, both of which currently have bearing on Daly's 
concerns. Etymologically, they argue, Yahweh is archaically related to the Hebrew verb 
'to be'. But they also acknowledge that it may be the causative 'he causes to be' or 'he 
brings into existence.'70 In any case, the emphasis is on the activity (being and/or causing) 
of what is signified by the word. The interpretational question is, in part, one of how the 
word functions for it apparently has a naming role. 71 What is pertinent for us is that the 
naming takes place through the use of the present indicative (a verb function), not 
through the isolation of properties, characteristics or features (a noun function in terms 
of modification and qualification). In other words, God's pronouncement, 'I am he who is', 
if we do take it to be a case of naming, is a verb-naming rather than a noun-naming. 
Needless to say, its origins and the rules of Hebrew grammar indicate that it is tied up 
with the verb 'to be' and hence is revelatory of God's Being (as Being).72 Verb-naming 
according to Daly seeks not to reify, but to characterise God as active principle, as 
elemental, which is precisely what is happening in this Hebrew text. 
It is arguable that Daly's insistence on the anthropomorphising of God (in her early 
works and her rejection of the term in her later) by noun-name limitation had already been 
anticipated within a system that was undeniably patriarchal, a system which, married to 
Greek philosophy, gave birth to the philosophical iniquities of Christianity as she sees it. 
69 Exodus 3:13-15, in The New Jerusalem Bible, (Doubleday, New York, 1985). 
70 ibid., footnote g., p. 85. 
71 In the footnotes, the translators discuss the question of whether or not the intention of God is 
to give his name. They assume (not argue) that he does intend so doing and that is the context in 
which I am writing. 
72 
op. cit., Exodus, footnote g. 
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The Hebrew story exhibits a deep religious bias towards acknowledging the Be-ing and 
mystery of divinity which falls outside the usual noun-naming processes. So, in identifying 
noun-naming as a problem for 'God', Daly reiterates part of a tradition which can usefully 
be put to work in a feminist theology.73 
The impetus for producing a peculiarly women's discourse lies precisely in 
theological quandaries such as that represented by the Yahweh debate. Daly's discourse 
relies on excursions to the origins of terms within language as well as parody, punning 
and innuendo. Daly uncovers the prejudice towards anthropomorphism which she 
maintains patriarchal use/discourse displays in its theological language. She realises that 
language constitutes our understandings and conceptualisings, particularly because many 
of our concepts are 'trapped' in nouns. By 'playing around'74 with language, her intention 
is to create not only a conceptual shift, but an ontological shift: a shift that will make 
possible the discovery of the Goddess as a projection in the experience of women. 
But this realisation brings with it a problem: How does one construct women's 
discourse? Daly's attribution (to women) of all that is good, of women's biophilic (life 
loving) tendencies and her wholesale adoption of a model of women which embraces any 
woman who seeks self-identification and total rejection of patriarchal models, immediately 
appears to be essentialising. This is especially so when one considers that female 
embodiment is the site for such conceptualisations. By this, I mean that Daly seems to 
be operating with a concept of woman which contains its own imperatives for woman-
ness, embodied women-ness. This concept is prescriptive. Women's bodies - the bodies 
of fembots and Painted Birds - are painted to please men and ought not be, and should 
not be thought of as the bodies of 'real' women. 
Both Gyn/Eco!ogy and Pure Lust describe women in terms which deny the 
attribution of dependence, inferiority, irrationality and lack of identity to women. They 
speak of women as strong, independent, life giving and life loving, intimately related to 
the earth, women's secret pasts in the Goddess traditions of various cultures, fecund, 
spiralling, spinning, with a deeply symbolic cosmic presence. Yet these are earmarks of 
73 She actually has taken up this suggestion from the Hermeneutic theologians. 
74 
I do mean 'playing around'. Much of her writing is a joyful playing with concepts, ideas, 
etymologies and breaking up of syllables to re-emphasise new and different meanings. 
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feminist essentialism as I argued in chapter 1 and provide further grounds for interpreting 
Daly as an essentialist philosopher/theologian. 
Schussler Fiorenza, for example, reads Daly as a philosopher concerned with 
articulating a feminine alterity, as postulating a feminine essence which valorises the 
maternal feminine. She says that Daly: 
... brilliantly ... uses an ontological-linguistic strategy to articulate such 
an alterity. It is a process of Be-coming instantiated by the Wild, Original, 
Self-actualizing woman who has made the leap from phallocracy into 
freedom, into the Other-world of Be-ing.75 
Schussler Fiorenza argues that Daly's attempts to articulate a feminine alterity 
simply re-inscribe patriarchal constructions of dualistic thinking: that Woman and the 
feminine are to be valorised as natural categories over and against Man and the 
masculine. She describes Daly's position as just one of the many which come 
"dangerously close to reproducing in the form of deconstructive language traditional 
cultural-religious ascription[s] of femininity and motherhood, ascriptions all too familiar 
from papal pronouncements which have now become feminist norms".76 
Rosi Braidotti also maintains that Daly has a "conceptual tendency to naturalize 
the feminine".n Braidotti's case against Daly stems from her analysis of Daly's Goddess 
imagery which she maintains merely puts a female concept of the Divine in the place of 
a male concept. She agrees with Morris whom she reads as accusing Daly of "re-naming 
at the level of lexicon, of the vocabulary, leaving unchanged the syntax of 
representation".78 Morris writes: 
... one focus of Daly's interest in Gyn/Eco!ogy is the possibilities offered 
by changing particular words (those items in the dictionary, i.e. the 
available code - or langue - of patriarchal English). She de-constructs and 
de-forms them in their inert state as signs whose only context is the 
dictionary, and then puts them to work in the discourse .... Her strategy 
75 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said. p. 106. 
76 ibid., p. 107. 
n op. cit., Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance, p. 206. 
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is to warp the words of the patriarchal dictionary, to bend the code back 
against itself until it snaps to their shrieks of derision. [her italics]79 
Braidotti does not suggest what it might mean to change the syntax of 
representation, nor what indeed the 'syntax of representation' itself is.80 If she means the 
way in which words are used, the product of a speaking position (Morris' characterisation 
of 'discourse'),81 not just their meanings - that is if she means that Daly re-inscribes rather 
than changes the master language of philosophy about which Braidotti later speaks82 -
then I would argue that she has misread Daly's project (as has Morris). On the 
Morris/Braidotti reading, the syntax of representation would remain the same, but the 
terms in which it is expressed change. Hence Braidotti claims: 
So Daly falls into what I consider one of the worst traps besetting 
feminism today: the replacement of the masculine subject by the feminine 
subject. ... The latent dogmatism in Daly's thought, quite as much as its 
reactionary nature, seems to me potentially dangerous for current 
feminism, insofar as it subverts the signs, not the codes.83 
The point is that this interpretation says that Daly's (supposed) essentialist stance 
persists because she deconstructs terms within language, without deconstructing the 
corpus, language in use, and her own speaking position. On this reading, Daly valorises 
Woman as she has been understood through the texts of Western philosophy, ascribing 
to Woman an essence which depends upon the implicit acceptance of the categories of 
Western thought. Her ontological-linguistic strategy - her language/discourse which 
instantiates the be-ing of women - carries with it the prejudices and assumptions which 
have always been made about women and which have rendered her Other of/to man. 
79 
't M . "A . G " 72 op. c1 ., oms, -mazing race , p. . 
80 But I assume she means devices such as Lacan's crossing out 'the' before Woman ('the 
Woman'). See Morris' discussion "Digression on Discourse", in op. cit.. A-mazing Grace, pp. 74-78. 
See also, Jacques Lacan, Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne (Juliet 
Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose, eds.) (trans. Jacqueline Rose) (Macmillan, London, 1982). 
81 'b'd I I ., p. 77. 
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op. cit., Braidotti. Patterns of Dissonance, pp. 209-218. 
83 
'b'd 7 I I ., p. 20 . 
82 
N 
Woman's alterity, far from being interrogated, is cast in a problematic women-speak of 
isolated terms and signs. 
I deem this very important for two reasons. Firstly, if it were the case that Daly re-
valorises woman and the feminine84 as they have been articulated through the 
philosophical canon because she is involved in isolating signs without attending to 
discourse, then her work would not have the profoundly disturbing effect which I read it 
as having and which other commentators lead me to believe it has. Can one subvert 
individual signs without subverting the code (and Daly subverts so many signs)? Her 
construction of the Wickedary (a guide to metapatriarchal discourse85} depends upon 
recognising that an implicit female genealogy already exists, albeit hidden. The discourse 
to express the genealogy is yet to exist because men (and their patriarchal thinking) have 
dominated, if not almost totally constituted, philosophical thinking and its discourse. As 
we will see this is an idea taken up by lrigaray in her work.86 
Of course it could be claimed that Daly's work is disturbing because of its alleged 
reactionary nature and latent dogmatism as Braidotti suggests. However, this fails to 
acknowledge what Daly is attempting to do through her use of metaphor and this is my 
second reason for attending to the Morris/Braidotti critique. 
A metapatriarchal metaphor "works" precisely to the extent that it carries 
a woman further into the Wild dimensions of other-centered 
consciousness - out of the dead circles into Spiralling/Spinning motion. 
Be-witching metaphors transmute the shapes of perception. They do this 
by jarring images, stirring memories, accentuating contradictions, 
upsetting unconscious traditional assumptions, evoking "inappropriate" 
laughter, releasing pent-up tears, eliciting gynaesthetic sensings of 
84 Note that this is not Daly's preferred terminology at all , but the feminine is read into her work. 
85 In the Wickedary. Daly notes that 'meanings of the prefix meta- all applicable here, are, 
according to Webster's, "occurring later," "situated behind," "change in transformation of," and 
"beyond, transcending"', p. xiii. The making of meta-patriarchal discourse is what I take her to be 
doing. 
86 Daly notes that the Wickedary "is an entirely New Work. At the same Time, it is 
Ancient/Archaic". op. cit .. Wickedary. p. x:v. I see Daly's project here as analogous to Luce lrigaray's 
proposal that women need their own genealogy. See Luce lrigaray, Marine Loyer of Friedrich 
Nietzsche (trans. Gillian C. Gill) (Columbia University Press, New York, 1991 ); and Luce lrigaray, 
Sexes and Genealogies (trans. Gillian C. Gill) (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993). 
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connections, arousing Dragon-identified Passions, inspiring acts of 
Volcanic virtue, brewing strange ideas.87 
I am not claiming that one cannot be reactionary or dogmatic if one uses 
metaphor. What I am claiming on Daly's behalf is that her declared use of metaphor 
circumvents a literal interpretation of her work to the extent that one cannot conclusively 
argue that she is either reactionary or dogmatic. Her tongue in cheek tone parodies the 
seriousness of men's philosophy, catching the reader off guard, wondering what Daly's 
meanings are. The profoundly disturbing effect of her work then, may come about 
because of uncertainty. Given that she claims to be anti-essentialist, how is one to read 
her when prima facie she seems to be saying one thing and simultaneously not saying 
't? I • 
I suggest that Morris' and Braidotti's readings of Daly are literal. They slide across 
Daly's attempts to situate herself within a tradition of metaphorical discourse of which she 
is simultaneously subversive.88 She alleges: "Metaphors function to Name change, and 
therefore they elicit change .... Thus the very task of naming and calling forth Elemental 
be-ing requires metaphors".89 For Daly, change necessitates the use of metaphor 
because metaphor in metapatriarchal discourse is not disembodied, but situated in the 
sexed interpretations of women's bodies and their experiences.00 
Daly's chapter "Bewitching: The Lust for Metamorphosis" in Pure Lust contains 
a substantial elucidation of both the role and stress Daly wants to place on metaphor. 
There she argues that metaphors are not mere symbols nor mere abstractions. There she 
also maintains that the Great Mother is one of the "myriad possibilities for naming 
transcendence" (and that some women can become fixated on images like the great 
Mother, an example of reification of the Goddess). If one is prepared to acknowledge the 
metaphorical thrust of Daly's work, and if one is prepared to admit that Daly as well as any 
other philosopher can work using only the philosophical lexicon and the discourse that 
87 op. cit., Daly, Pure Lust, p. 405. 
88 ibid., pp.407 - 408. 
89 ibid., p. 25. 
90 ibid., p. 408. 
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engenders, then I think one ought be prepared to reconsider the accusation that Daly is 
an essentialist. 
She is not, as I read her, re-inscribing Woman (and the feminine) at all. Rather 
she is using 'woman' in a metaphorical sense to theorise a woman-centred subject that 
actually does concede woman's difference, especially in terms of how one signifies and 
represents women's bodies. In other words she is using what is available in men's 
philosophical discourse - about women - to destabilise our ideas of woman. Hence I 
would place her in the tradition of the French philosophers of difference, even if Daly 
omits reference to, and critique of, the psychoanalytic tradition.91 Her major themes can 
be redescribed in terms of some of their concerns: jouissance, subverting of the linguistic 
and discursive paradigms, establishing a female genealogy and ecriture feminine. We will 
see this in my discussion of lrigaray's work in chapter 4. So I am suggesting that Daly 
challenges Western philosophy and denies its neutrality, its ability to speak for all 
humans, women and men. 
Suppose therefore that it is the case, as Braidotti argues, that Daly is concerned 
with replacing the masculine subject with the feminine. The claim that there can be no 
sex-neutral subject is discussed widely in feminist literature.92 Would Braidotti prefer the 
articulation of a sex-neutral subject?93 A direct consequence of Scott's analysis of 
women's experience, for example, would be that experience produces subject positions 
which are always sexed/gendered. Let us suppose then, that there are no pre-existing 
subjects who experience; suppose that discursive positioning 'produces subjects'. One 
would imagine that woman's experience would produce 'woman-subject' just as man's 
experience would produce 'man-subject'. The point is that it is not a neutral subject, on 
this account, that is produced through discursive practices and positioning. Further, one 
should wonder about the role of the body in such an account. Is it irrelevant? Is 
subjectivity constituted without reference to a body? Is sexed embodiment significant in 
the construction of subjectivities? 
91 This is not a new point. Morris, op. cit., "A-mazing Grace", compares Daly with lrigaray. 
92 See Moira Gatens,"A Critique of the Sex Gender Distinction" in Sneja Gunew (ed.) A Reader 
in Feminist Knowledge (Rou~edge, London & New York, 1991 ); and op. cit., Grosz, Volatile Bodies. 
93 
You will notice that Braidotti conflates 'subject' and 'subjectivity' in the preceding quotation. 
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Daly abandoned her early attempts at positing androgyny (neutrality), realising that 
such a concept does nothing in terms of subverting masculine, phallocentric philosophy. 
Her attempt to find a feminine (woman-) subject, if that is what she is doing in her work, 
is laudable and defensible, simply on the grounds of its ultimate denial of the supposed 
neutrality of discourse: that there can be no sex-neutral subject articulated in and through 
language. And as the argument is proceeding, a sex-neutral discourse would produce a 
sex-neutral divinity, an idea anathema to Daly. The idea of female embodiment 
necessitates the idea of female subjectivities. The question of neutrality is a very 
important issue to which I shall return when I discuss Luce lrigaray's work in a later 
chapter. 
Daly's concern is with developing a metaphorical understanding of woman and 
divinity which is open-ended. In this sense it is worthwhile interrogating her project as 
non-literal and not essentialist (i.e. committed to 'real' feminine essence) at all. Language 
and ontology become one because they participate in each other. The idea of divinity, the 
Goddess, mirrors the language which interprets and represents women. Daly stresses 
process and possibility rather than thing and definition. The materials available for her to 
work with are precisely the materials of Western philosophy. This is not to revalorise 
either them or it, to re-inscribe the · categories they assume and impose, but it is to 
challenge their status as fixed and Ultimate Truth (for there is only Be-ing, itself in 
process). 
Daly, criticises what she calls "simple inversions" (the practice of deliberately 
misapplying terms and labels to create metaphorical representations). She wrote of 
essential ism: 
Particularly insidious is the pseudo-feminist usage of the term essentialist 
to label and discredit all feminist writing that dares to Name and celebrate 
the Wild and Elemental reality of women who choose to think beyond the 
prescribed parameters of patriarchal mandates .... The projection of the 
label "essentialist" on to women (Radical Feminists) who strive for Self-
definition beyond the amorphous blob-concept of "human-
essence"f'human nature" is typical patriarchal reversal. The projection of 
the accusatory label "essentialist" onto Radical Feminist thought and be-
ing is not merely deceptive; it is evil. It elicits the patriarchally embedded 
Self-censor in women attempting to create in women-identified ways ... 
In other words, the expression of Original Powers and of the Ecstatic 
existential experience of women breaking free from patriarchal 
mindbendings is stigmatized by the label "essentialist," leaving only the 
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grimness of oppression as that which women have in common. Ultimately 
this reversal/usage functions to negate Hope for Life that transcends the 
illusion of inclusion in forever male-identified "humankind."94 
The answer to the question, 'How does one construct a women's discourse?' 
should be seen in terms of metaphor and using men's discourse to remove oneself from, 
to step outside, that discourse. The charge of essentialism against Daly is an admission 
that one has not understood her project. While it seems immediately obvious that she is 
essentialist, the superficiality of that claim becomes apparent if one admits the role of 
metaphor and re-reads her work in that light. 
Daly and Moral Supremacy 
Recall Spelman's argument that 'woman' is not simply a sex/gender term. 
Sex/gender, together with class and race constitute the idea of woman. Women are 
therefore produced in complex socio-political structures that render them not all the same. 
When one speaks of women, one should always have regard for the range of factors 
which constitute them. One of the complaints made about Daly is that she fails to 
recognise these points. Her position, it is argued, is middle class and white privileged-
w~man centred. She does not speak to and for all women. 
In light of this there are two areas I want to cover in this section: Audre Lorde's 
"Open Letter to Mary Daly" and Daly's alleged moral supremacism or its equal, political 
elitism.95 Both of these issues are embroiled in feminist concerns about political 
correctness, who can and should speak for whom, who is (and ought be) included and 
who is (and ought not be) excluded by feminist theories and an often implicitly assumed 
solidarity amongst women. 
Daly is not alone in facing these worries. Many feminists are caught in a double 
bind: if one speaks, then there is the question of just for whom and to whom one is 
94 
op. cit., Daly, the Wickedary. p. 251. 
95 See op. cit., Morris, "A-mazing Grace", p. 78. 
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speaking. 96 If one speaks for oneself or a group whom one represents, then it can be 
argued that one excludes large numbers of women whose views one does not 
countenance or which might be different from one's own. If one speaks for others, then 
one can be accused of universalising, or of disenfranchising, the women for whom one 
speaks, that in fact one ought not speak for anyone, especially if one's race, sex 
preference, class, religion et alia are different. For example, one should, as an outsider, 
an observer of a culture, not speak against genital mutilation97 because the women to 
whom this happens are culturally, religiously and ethnically different from one's own. 
One's speaking can represent a supreme arrogance and often, the argument goes, might 
assume a deplorable cultural supremacism on one's part.98 So that one should never refer 
to other women as Painted Birds or fembots, metaphorically or ironically even. 
Mary Daly's speaking position has been called into question by Audre Larde. Her 
Open Letter to Mary Daly is poignant and profound.99 Larde praises Daly, overall for the 
"First Passage", the beginning of the cosmic journey in Gyn/Eco!ogy for her discourse on 
the function and nature of the Goddess, but notes that Daly omits any reference to non-
european Afrekete, Yemanje or Oyo.100 Larde suggests that perhaps Daly had made a 
"conscious decision to narrow her scope and to deal only with the ecology of western 
European women".101 Clearly if that had been the case in Gyn/Eco!ogy, it is something 
Daly addresses in Pure Lust. There she explicitly acknowledges the differences amongst 
and between women, especially in terms of race, exploring too the concept of racial 
oppression and sex. 102 
96 See for example Morris' discussion of the interjector at Daly's 1981 lecture in Sydney, who 
claimed that Daly was not speaking to her. I think there are enormous problems associated with 
this question but in itself it is way beyond the scope of this thesis. op. cit., Morris, "A-mazing Grace", 
pp. 79 - 80. 
97 And is 'mutilation' an apt choice of words, given the symbolic associations? 
98 See Vicki Kirby, "On the Cutting Edge: Feminism and Clitoridectomy" in Australian Feminist 
Studies 5 (1987), pp. 35 - 55. 
99 op.cit., Lorde, "An Open Letter to Mary Daly", p.66. 
100 
"b'd 67 I I . , p. . 
101 .b.d I I . 
102 See, for example, her discussion ''The Touchable Caste" op. cit., Daly, Pure Lust, pp. 232-243. 
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But Lorde's substantive problem with Daly is that she represents non-european 
women in the "Second Passage" as: 
... victims and preyers on each other. I began to feel my history and my 
mythic background distorted by the absence of any images of my 
foremothers in power. Your inclusion of African genital mutilation was an 
important and necessary piece in any consideration of female ecology, 
and too little has been written about it. To imply, however, that all women 
suffer the same oppression simply because we are women is to lose sight 
of the many varied tools of patriarchy. It is to ignore how those tools are 
used by women without awareness against each other ... 103 
Again, this is something which Daly addresses in Pure Lust when, for instance, 
she says "As derivative beings, women share in some of the privileges and many of the 
hardships of their male possessors. For example, as white, wealthy, or middle class, 
many women have advantages over many sisters in other echelons of the patriarchal 
world, as well as over many oppressed races, classes, nations, and other groups".104 
Race considerations (in terms of valorising), as Braidotti also points out, 105 do appear to 
be a quite serious omission from Daly's work in Gyn/Eco!ogy ( except in the token sense 
to which Larde alludes).106 
The claims Daly makes about what is the case do not imply what Larde suggests 
at all and this is a point of logic. Firstly, Daly's story of women's oppression, does not 
mean or imply that there is nothing historically noteworthy or valuable in the cultures of, 
for example, Aboriginal-Australian, African-American or Chinese women. That is to say, 
because Daly argued that certain practices are followed in a culture, and that these 
practices are bad or immoral, it does not follow that all practices within the culture are 
bad or immoral. Nor does it follow that because Daly fails to mention other affirming 
practices and traditions that they do not exist or that women never had power. The point 
of Daly's recounting these traditions is to highlight the implicit acceptance of anti-woman 
practices by dominant cultures, which happen to be patriarchal cultures. Who actually 
103 
op. cit., Lorde, "Open Letter to Mary Daly", p. 67. 
104 
op. cit., Daly. P_ure Lust, p. 240. 
105 One wonders if Braidotti has read Daly's later works. 
106 
op. cit., Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance, p. 207. 
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carries out the practices - be they women or men - is irrelevant. What counts is that the 
discourse, the oral traditions and cultural mythos, affirms the practices. That discourse 
is men's discourse where men constitute the hegemony. Women are tools of patriarchy 
in other words, and may even be complicit in their own oppression. 
Secondly, Daly's account neither assumes nor implies that all women suffer the 
same oppression because they are women. What she does assume is that all women 
suffer from oppression, because they are women within hegemonic patriarchal 
frameworks and that these oppressions can be different and that they can come from 
women as well as men.107 This is the point of her writing about genital mutilation, suttee 
and foot binding: across cultures women are oppressed by often highly symbolic customs 
and practices. That does not mean that they cannot also be oppressed because they are 
African-Americans or Aboriginal Australians: it simply means that in these cases, that they 
are women, their sex, is the primary factor in their oppression because oppression is an 
intra-cultural practice not extra-cultural. On this reading, Daly's argument is about cultural 
difference. In other words, oppression is an intrinsic part of the norms of particular 
cultures where 'outside' questions of race or ethnicity, for example, may not apply. 
Furthermore, such practices can be perpetrated by women as well as men, acting on and 
within overarching patriarchal imperatives. 
Daly critiques practices which she sees as explicitly oppressive to women in the 
societies about which she speaks. Daly is unqualified in her antagonism towards socio-
political cultural practices which she finds appalling. She may well be speaking the horror 
which other women might feel at such practices. It does not follow, however, that every 
woman will feel the horror, nor that they will think that it is the business of white Western 
women of privilege108 to be telling all women how they ought to conduct their lives. What 
does follow is that Daly has a moral position, an ethic which she believes is based upon 
freeing women from oppressive practices which are embodied in men's discourses and 
107 See Elizabeth v. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion io Feminist Thought (Beacon Press, Boston, 1988); op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, and Schussler Fiorenza, 
Jesus: Miriam's Child, Sophia's Prophet: Critical Issues io Feminist Christology (Continuum, New 
York, 1994), for accounts of the multiplicative effects of gender, class, race, ethnicity. 
108 This is a phrase which Schussler Fiorenza frequently uses. 
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cultural norms. Should Daly fail to analyse, criticise the practices, and say, for example, 
speak of the glass ceiling or women's poor democratic representation in western 
parliaments, she would exclude the oppressions of non-european, non-western women. 
Should she speak of the oppressions which poor, black, or Muslim women live, she is a 
cultural supremacist or exclusive of their rich culture and history. Either way, Daly can be 
accused of cultural inclusion (colonisation) or cultural exclusion (supremacism, elitism). 
Underlying this 'damned if you do and damned if you don't' dichotomy109 is the 
question of how one is to speak of women in the first place. It seems to be clearly the 
case that women are not an homogeneous group. If women are not a homogeneous 
group, then lack of homogeneity could be interpreted as evidence against there being an 
'essential woman'. Heterogeneity is conceived as an argument against essentialism 
because if women are all different then plainly, it might be argued, women cannot have 
any one thing in common. To suppose that one can say anything about women as a 
group or class, is to deny heterogeneity, to assume that there is some one quality or set 
of qualities which all women possess. This argument has a superficial plausibility about 
it. That plausibility is enhanced by Scott's claim that women are constituted through their 
experiences (which need to be explained) rather than women having experiences ( and 
those experiences explaining what itis or what it means to be a women). 
Morris has read Daly as proposing that women are all basically the same. Her 
quotation earlier in the chapter in which she claims that Daly projects the image of evil in 
other women condemns Daly for daring to judge other women, indeed, for making the 
judgement that women who have not taken critical distance from patriarchy are not 'real' 
women at all. Morris argues that this projection of evil is "indispensable to the 
Gyn/Ecological speaking position".110 Why should it not be? Daly's point after all, as I have 
been arguing here, is that men's language/discourse is the theoretical underpinning of 
what it means to be (a) woman. What reason can there be for women to refrain from 
criticism of each other as well as of men? Not surely, that women are a homogeneous 
group, for that would be to beg the question about essentialism. Nor that women are 
109 Throughout op. cit., Gyn/Ecology. Daly acknowledges this problem of speaking, for whom and 
who will and will not be included/excluded. 
110 
·t M . "A . G " 83 op. c1 ., oms, -mazing race , p. . 
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morally superior (to men) and above factionalism and the making of value judgements? 
Or that women ought recognise the differences between/amongst themselves and accept 
the equability of those differences, without making any value judgements? Why should 
women not make value judgements, declare that some positions, some ways of be-ing, 
are of more or less value? 
This returns us to the ontological and semantic questions raised in chapter 1. 
What is it to be a woman and what is the meaning of the term 'woman'? At stake are 
problems of signification and reference. On Daly's analysis, there do seem to be some 
meaningful grounds on which one can use the terms 'woman' and 'women'. These terms 
do seem to refer. The problem then is to what do they refer in Daly's discourse? What do 
they signify? And how does one define the terms if that is what one seeks to do? 
I have already argued that Daly is not seeking to define 'woman', but she obviously 
intends these terms to be understood in a certain way. The ontological commitment she 
makes in reconstructing discourse, re-orients the signification of 'woman'. This means 
that women should reject phallic be-ing for Elemental women's be-ing, - Gynergy -
adopting as they do, a new women-centred discourse. But this is surely to beg the 
question for what is Gynergy? According to the Wickedary, Gynergy is "the female energy 
which both comprehends and creates who we are; that impulse in ourselves which has 
never been suppressed by the patriarchy, nor by any male; woman identified being".111 
Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza implies that feminists like Daly reinscribe patriarchal 
discourse by mere use of certain terms. 112 Daly neither spells out what she means by 
'female' and 'woman' (except to state that she is using the terms in a metapatriarchal 
way); nor does she sort out what relation those terms might have to women's bodies, the 
female body. Yet implicit in her work is the idea of female embodiment. Of course 
Schussler Fiorenza's comments have behind them her own theoretical agenda: that the 
body is already theorised, inscribed by cultural, socio-political discursive practices, so that 
one cannot really speak of the body per se. 
111 op. cit., Daly the Wickedary. p. 77. 
112 See op. cit., But She Said, pp. 104-109. 
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Hence, that these terms can be read as 'woman' within a purportedly 'new' 
(metapatriarchal) discourse where they no longer signify what they once did, is 
problematic. A purported change in signification which bears a change in reference - only 
those entities that embody and are embodied by women's discourse, are Elemental or 
postpatriarchal women - also becomes problematic. Painted Birds, fembots are the 
embodiment of, and are embodied by, men's discourse, certainly, because the bearers 
of such derogatory labelling never distance themselves from patriarchal discursive 
practices. But this reading suggests a questionable language dualism with a 'pure female 
body' as its substructure. Either one opts for female embodiment theoretically overladen 
by patriarchal discourse (fembots, Painted Birds); or one opts for female embodiment 
theoretically overladen by metapatriarchal (metaphorical) discourse (crones, witches, 
chums and so on). 
On either reading, one might argue that discourse is the target of Daly's anti-
essentialist stance. Women, on such a rendering, have nominal essence: essence 
dependent on discursive practice, in spite of Daly's denial of nominalism. That is to say, 
if women are constructed through discourse albeit through their own semiotics and 
meaning systems, and there is something unique, particular, individual about women as 
a class, then nominally, women are women because they are produced through discourse 
which is manifested in unique, particular, individual ways that labels them women. This 
places a heavy emphasis on the role of language and the construction of gender over 
'brute' biology. In turn such a re-orientation changes the syntax of representation. The 
meanings ascribed to 'brute' biology in patriarchal societies are overturned and 
transcended by metapatriarchal discourse in which women can become. Regardless, 
women are embodied in an uninterrogated way in terms of their sexed embodiment. 
This reading, it might then be argued, depends upon a notion of real essence 
which operates at the level of body: female embodiment remains constant, that around 
which discursive practices take place. As I have indicated, this position is problematic. 
If it is the case that men's discourse has been and continues to be what 
constitutes patriarchal women (fembots, Painted Birds), then men's discourse has been 
and remains the theoretical foundation for the elaboration of the idea of woman. For Daly, 
that is unacceptable. The development of woman's be-ing, Elemental woman's be-ing, 
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is dependent ultimately on the rejection of masculine discourse, men's discourse. The 
production of the Wickedary is not an odd, isolated semantic act. It carries with it the 
promise of something new for women and an ethic of celebration of the goodness of 
women. That does not mean that all men are bad and all women are good. What it does 
mean is that the terms 'woman' are in a process of re-conceptualisation that combines 
all that is good in (male defined) women and points to the newness of (female 
constituted) women. 
Daly's intuition about the role of discourse is very sound. Her belief is that the 
Divine, the Goddess, is mirrored through language practices and therefore the Divine is 
the mirror of women. The claim that discourse must be sex/gender specific, and Daly's 
creating the context for metapatriarchal discourse, is a superb strategy. But if, as I have 
suggested, this rests on some unarticulated assumptions about female embodiment, the 
project needs to be interrogated because it is undeniably dualistic. On the other hand, 
that female embodiment is implicit in Daly's ontology 'ties' feminine being to the Divine, 
the goddess through participation. One could not elaborate the Goddess without 
elaborating what it means to be a woman. The Divine mirrors women in terms of their 
gendered construction and their sexed embodiment. The question remains: Can one 
account for female embodiment in non-essentialist ways? Or must we accept Schussler 
Fiorenza's assertion about reinscription and revalorisation? 
For Schussler Fiorenza, reinscription and an associated concept, revalorisation, 
work on assumptions about the supposedly natural. Her project is to de-naturalise 
feminist terminologies and discourses. Far from accepting that embodiment is in some 
way theoretically pure - 'brute' biology - as Daly seems to imply, Schussler Fiorenza takes 
to task feminists who do not interrogate what she regards as culturally laden assumptions 
about body facts and characteristics. In my next chapter, I shall be exploring Schussler 
Fiorenza's work in that context, counter positioning her with/against Daly. 
In this chapter, I have shown that Mary Daly's work is primarily directed towards 
the re-creation of women through the construction and re-construction of discourse. In 
that, Goddess is the mirror of women. I have argued that far from her project's being a 
mere changing of isolated signs as Morris has argued, she is concerned to produce a 
subversive woman's discourse. Implicit in that project is the development of an ethic 
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which valorises women without re-inscribing real essentialist accounts (such as the 
Eternal Woman) of woman. I have argued along with Morris that Daly uses language 
strategically to disrupt and destabilise the dominant discourse. I have also argued, using 
Schussler Fiorenza's terminology, that this strategy is ontological-linguistic, meaning that 
Daly maintains a strong relationship exists between be-ing and language, indeed that the 
two are so intertwined that language becomes ontology for Daly. By this I mean that 
discourse both embodies and constitutes the very be-ing of Elemental women so that 
they can participate in Be-ing. Hence I maintain that the sex-neutrality of the dominant 
discourse is called into question by Daly's visioning of a women's discourse which re-
works the terminology of men's discourse while projecting a future possibility. 
I have claimed that interpreters such as Morris and Braidotti fail to acknowledge 
Daly's sub-text: that the use of metaphor is the means by which she proceeds. Thus one 
should not read Daly's texts literally. A literal reading renders her work as inconsequential 
and essentialising. However, I have also claimed that Daly is attempting to develop a 
feminist ethic through her discursive work, one situated in the re-making of women from 
men's discourse - patriarchy. In that sense, Daly cannot but use her cultural heritage, but 
her use is always tongue in cheek and subverting. And I have maintained that 
commentators like Laude draw invalid implications from Daly's works. 
I have also argued that Daly uses a dualistic strategy ih which language is 
constitutive of the production of woman, a nominal essentialism, which depends upon an 
unarticulated but implicit real essentialist account of female embodiment. In this way, Daly 
exemplifies Grosz's rendering of constructionism which is manifested in de Lauretis' 
rejection of real essence as the locus of feminist theorising about essence. On an 
account like the one I have offered for Daly, this conjunction is plausible and real essence 
and nominal essence 'sit' together, even if their relationship is unexplained. But can one 
talk about the body in the essentialist way which seems to be implicit in Daly's account? 
Since this use of 'real' echoes Locke's notion of real essence as independently 'real', what 
would it mean to think of the body thus? And what repercussion would this have for an 
account of women's experience? What would maintaining that there is an independently 
'real' body say about the Divine in women's experience? These are matters which I shall 
be addressing in my next chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BUT SHE SAID, BUT SHE DID NOT SAY: ELISABETH SCHUSSLER FIORENZA, 
AND THE EKKLESIA AS THE MIRROR OF G*D 
Mary Daly's rejection of the eternal feminine, hence her rejection of woman's 
essence, resonates in the work of the Christian feminist theologian, Elisabeth Schussler 
Fiorenza. The socio-political orientation of Schussler Fiorenza's work is very different from 
Daly's emphasis on personal emancipation and self-discovery as a condition of socio-
political change. Daly and Schussler Fiorenza represent in different ways, the twin 
projects of feminist theologies: refiguring the Divine and its inalienably political 
commitment. However, both theorists share the belief that language is instrumental in the 
oppression of women. They also hold the view that women are not subjects who have 
experiences. Their views on women's experience(s) follow more closely that of Scott's: 
women are constituted as women through their experiences. Subjectivity is a result of 
experience, not that which gives rise to experience. 
Further, Nancy Frankenberry's claim that there is a conspicuous reliance on 
Feuerbachian projection theory in feminist theologies is in evidence in the work of Daly 
and Schussler Fiorenza. Both Daly, as I argued in the last chapter, and Schussler 
Fiorenza, as I will argue in this chapter, share this theoretical standpoint. Whereas Daly's 
projected Divine is the Goddess, the Verb of all Verbs which mirrors women's 
emancipatory discourse, Schussler Fiorenza's Divine, G*d, I will argue, is the mirror of the 
ekklesia, although she declares that "G*d radically transcends human experience".1 In an 
interesting twist, I will contend that as the Divine is the mirror of the ekklesia, so the 
ekklesia is the mirror of the Divine, the 'reverse projection theory' of Plato's to which I 
referred in my introductory chapter. 
I also argued that Daly entirely rejected essentialism and that what she offered in 
its place has been interpreted as the re-appropriation of essentialist theory. Schussler 
1 Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child. Sophia's Prophet: Critical Issues io 
Feminist Chrjstology (Continuum, New York, 1994), p. 179. 
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Fiorenza is equally ardent in her rejection of women's essence. But what she offers in its 
place is a social constructionism which denies that language reflects any 'facts of the 
matter'. As I read Schussler Fiorenza, she believes that discourse constructs 'reality'. I 
will argue, however, that Schussler Fiorenza does not interpret 'social constructionism'. 
Rather, she takes its meaning to be transparent. As I argue later, her assuming the 
transparency of 'social constructionism' raises some complicated theoretical issues, 
which lead to neglecting the idea of embodiment and its importance for feminist theology. 
In terms of the essentialist debate Schussler Fiorenza and Daly apparently occupy 
opposing corners, although their opposition to essentialism is unfaltering. Daly has left 
the Catholic Church (although she has retained much of its theological embroidery) while 
Schussler Fiorenza has chosen to remain faithful to its spirit, working for reform from 
'within'. Schussler Fiorenza is anti-essentialist and re-works Christian theology inside a 
feminist, critical hermeneutical liberationist framework. 2 Daly maintains that she has 
deserted Christianity but retains what she believes to be an anti-essentialist perspective. 
However, their metaphysical assumptions with respect to 'reality' are closely connected. 
The connection lies in their emphases on discourse as that which primarily constitutes 
'reality'. Yet Daly's tacit assumption, and Schussler Fiorenza's explicit acknowledgement, 
is that there is an essential 'reality' independent of discourse. In Daly's case, as I have 
argued, that 'reality' is female embodiment. In Schussler Fiorenza's, as I will argue, it is 
both 'that about which one can have more or less adequate accounts' and G*d. 
Contrary to Daly's, Schussler Fiorenza's position on speaking of women as women 
is not decried by her commentators because she does not believe that it is possible to 
talk of women as women, as a 'sex/gender only' category. She follows Spelman carefully 
in arguing that race and class are important primary oppressors along with gender, and 
that all are cultural factors which act simultaneously to oppress women. As I read both 
Scott and Schussler Fiorenza, Schussler Fiorenza would endorse Scott's analysis of the 
idea of women's experience. Women are not pre-formed subjects who have experiences; 
rather women are constructed through their experiences. Hence Schussler Fiorenza's 
2 See Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza. lo Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction 
of Christian Origins (SCM Press, London, 1983). 
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discussions of woman, language, ontology, and sexed embodiment are couched in terms 
of discursive constructionism in which the notion of the socio-political is paramount. 
My purpose in this chapter is to examine Schussler Fiorenza's use of social 
constructionism and to reflect on her rejection of essentialism and the consequences this 
has for the development of the idea of women's experience(s) and the Divine. I begin with 
two quotes, one from Schussler Fiorenza and one from de Beauvoir. Each quote fairly 
represents their authors' refusals of essentialism and their acceptance of forms of social 
constructionism. They should be read comparatively, noting their similar philosophical 
stances. 
What it means to be a Christian woman is not defined by essential female 
nature or timeless biblical revelation, but grows out of the concrete social 
structures and cultural-religious mechanisms of women's oppression as 
well as our struggles for liberation, selfhood and transcendence. Feminist 
identity is not based on the perception of women defined by female 
biology or feminine gender and societal roles, but on the common 
historical experience of women as an oppressed people, collaborating 
with our oppression and at the same time struggling with liberation in 
patriarchal biblical history and community.3 
When I use the words woman or feminine I evidently refer to no 
archetype, no changeless essence whatever; the reader must understand 
the phrase "in the present state of education and custom" after most of 
my statements. It is not our concern here to proclaim eternal verities, but 
rather to describe the common basis that underlies every individual 
feminine existence.4 
I introduced the debate about woman's essence in order to highlight the 
problematic nature of women's experience for feminist theologies. In chapter 1 I noted 
that tables like Pythagoras' use binary oppositional terms which construct and sanction 
privilege so that women are defined in terms of the lesser side of a hierarchy which 
emerges. In chapter 2, I discussed the work of Mary Daly who has been a vocal opponent 
of essentialism and whose present work, I noted, is seen by many to return to a (real) 
essentialist position. I argued that Daly's work might be essentialist in two ways: 
3 
Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Bread Not Stone: The Challence of Feminist Biblical 
Interpretation (Beacon Press, Boston, 1984) , p. 86. 
4 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (trans . H. M. Parshley) (Picador Books, London , 1949), p. XXX. 
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nominally, when one considers her creative use of language, and realist, when one 
considers her implicit acceptance of an apparently natural body existing independently of 
language. On this account the idea of a nominal essence of women brings with it the 
promise of becoming, historicity, difference and open-endedness. The status of female 
embodiment in terms of essence is unstated. Women are embodied, but Daly declines 
to give the idea of embodiment explicit meaning. 
Schussler Fiorenza takes her critique of essentialism further than Daly's, rejecting 
even nominal essentialist positions since in her view they revalorise and reinscribe the 
feminine and traditional concepts of women. Unlike Daly, who 'mixes' her social 
constructionism with an implicit acceptance of female embodiment which is apparently 
independent of language, Schussler Fiorenza rejects essentialist talk, implicit or explicit, 
which implies the existence of a natural, independently 'real' body. 
In terms of her interpretation of the 'natural', Schussler Fiorenza's position is 
ambiguous and difficult to determine. She can be read either as claiming that there is only 
language - and in this respect one might think of her as a linguistic idealist; or she can be 
read as arguing that everything is already in language, that there are no brute facts. On 
the first interpretation, language is responsible for producing all of our concepts and 
constructs 'reality' totally. On the second, the distinction between what we interpret and 
what there is, is not acknowledged: the world and language interact in such a way as to 
be inseparable. I proceed on the basis that Schussler Fiorenza is not a linguistic idealist 
because of her insistence on the independent 'reality' of G*d, and because of her views 
on access to truth about 'reality',5 which I discuss later in this chapter. 
It should be noted that the difficulty with claiming either of the two views for 
Schussler Fiorenza, is exacerbated by her appeal for a "feminist version of objectivity" 
5 
For an excellent discussion of theological realism and reference, see ch. VII, "Metaphor, 
Reference and Realism" and ch. VIII, "Metaphor and Theological Realism" in Janet Martin Soskice, 
Metaphor and Religious Language (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992). For a discussion of the real 
in Plato, see ''The Sophist" in Francis Macdonald Cornford (trans. & commentary), Plato's Theory 
of Knowledge (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, New York, 1935), 237b - 251 a. 
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and a "more adequate account of a 'real' world",6 a "more adequate account of reality".7 
However, underlying Schussler Fiorenza's work is the assumption that language does not 
refer. As I just suggested, she assumes a view of language implicit in which are the ideas 
of interpretation, meaning and discursive construction. As I read her, she could be 
arguing that there is no distinction between that which one talks about, and that about 
which one says one is talking. 8 On this view there is no independent or objective item or 
thing about which one is talking, no essential referent in principle separable from 
language. When, for instance, Schussler Fiorenza speaks about secondary sexual 
characteristics, an example I shall discuss more fully later, she claims that there are no 
facts of the matter. Schussler Fiorenza's seems not to be a theory just about meaning 
ladenness and signification, nor just about categories and classifications, but about what 
we, for example, can say about sex/gender in a referential context (that having a beard 
is a male secondary sex characteristic, for instance). Thus her talk of a feminist version 
of objectivity is puzzling. 
I read Schussler Fiorenza as making the inference from "one cannot give a theory 
independent description of things"· to "there are no theory independent things".9 One 
version of the claim that there is no distinction between things and their descriptions, the 
belief that 'everything is in language', dominates current French and some American 
feminist theory.10 Schussler Fiorenza, as we shall see, clearly wan·ts to argue that there 
is no brute nature, no brute biology, and that nature and biology are always already in 
6 Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation (Beacon Press, 
Boston, 1992), p. 90. 
7 
8 
9 
ibid., p. 91. 
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990), p. 268 ff. 
ibid., p. 279. 
10 See Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism (Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonard's, 1994); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1987); Luce lrigaray, Speculum Of The Other Woman (trans. Gillian C. Gill) (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1992), and This Sex Which Is Not One (trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke) (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1985); and 
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge, London & New York, 1990). 
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language. She accepts that discursive construction is responsible for producing our ideas 
and concepts which are in turn culturally and socially conditioned: 
... once women have recognised ourselves as historical subjects and 
theological agents we can develop a hermeneutics of suspicion which 
recognises the androcentric ideological construction of reality in language, 
texts and other religious-cultural representations. 11 
On the other hand, Schussler Fiorenza explicitly embraces the idea that meaning 
and existence are separable. As we shall see, she maintains a distinction between 'reality' 
and language, between what exists and what meaning is ascribed to that existence 
through different socio-cultural discursive practices. 
Historical representation gives meaning not existence to past events ... 
By underlining the fact that all cultural forms of representation are 
ideologically grounded and that access to reality is always mediated 
through language, one problematises and de-naturalises references to the 
real. Such a demystification does not, feminist theory insists, excuse us 
from giving a more adequate account of reality, an account that does not 
deny or repress the historical activity of the subordinated "others."12 
The Divine and history are two examples of this. In this way, I will argue, 
Schussler Fiorenza is essentialist. Recall that Fuss argued that the pull of essentialism 
is difficult to escape because of continued semantic use. Also recall Fuss' claim that the 
division between (real) essentialism and social constructionism has (real) essentialist 
implications with which we should not persist. 
As I read her then, there are several competing perspectives in Schussler 
Fiorenza's work in relation to the idea of reality and the Divine. Firstly, there is the notion 
that socio-cultural discursive practice constructs some concepts, like that of the 'natural' 
and the 'given', which we (mistakenly) take to reflect 'reality'. Since there is no 'reality' 
independent of language which the natural and the given reflect, her argument is that we 
should think of such concepts and relations as discursively produced. Secondly, she 
maintains that the Divine reality cannot be comprehended by human language, 13 that 
11 op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said , p. 90. 
12 ibid., p. 91. 
13 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, p. 161. 
101 
there is something 'real' to be interpreted and understood, and that something transcends 
human experiences. Thirdly, the goal of feminist analysis, for example in feminist biblical 
interpretation, is to "empower women through critical analysis and constructive narrative" 
to create a "different reality''. [her italics]14 The ambiguity of Schussler Fiorenza's position 
echoes the essentialistlsocial constructionist dilemma posed by de Lauretis. (Feminists 
do not really mean 'real essence', but 'nominal essence', when they talk about 
essentialism.) I shall return to this shortly after I have discussed Schussler Fiorenza's 
reading of the 'natural' in relation to the idea of women. 
Schussler Fiorenza's argument about discursive practice and social 
constructionism is not confined to the idea of women. For her, all that we count as 
'natural' is produced through discursive practice. Notwithstanding the fact that Schussler 
Fiorenza attributes an 'independent of language' status to G*d, the idea of the Divine 
does not, I will argue, resist discursive positioning. This is realised in the idea that the 
Divine is the mirror of the ekklesia. 
The concept of the ekklesia, women-church, evokes the ideas of justice, wisdom 
and freedom from oppression. The socio-political systemic oppression which constitutes 
individuals as classifiable within sex/gender, class and racial categories, is not patriarchy, 
maintains Schussler Fiorenza. She argues that the idea of patriarchy speaks only to 
sex/gender considerations. Since they alone are not responsible for producing 
oppression, she refigures 'patriarchy' as 'kyriarchy'. Along with that, she declares that 
women are not alone in being oppressed, and re-characterises those who are oppressed 
as 'wo/men'. 
'Ekklesia', together with 'kyriarchy', 'G*d' and 'wo/men' are neologisms which 
Schussler Fiorenza introduces in her attempts to destabilise androcentric biases in 
theological discourse. Preparatory to my discussion, in the next few pages I will elaborate 
these ideas in the context of exploring the relation between the Divine and women's 
experience. 
Kyriarchy and Wo/men 
14 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said. p. 92. 
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Schussler Fiorenza's early works are devoted to investigating the origins of 
androcentric biblical interpretation. She argues that androcentric interpretation either fails 
to acknowledge women's experiences and/or has succeeded in silencing women. In 
Bread Not Stone and lo Memory of Her she attempts to reconstruct women's experiences 
as disciples of Jesus and she argues that women were central to his life and mission.15 
She also argues, as she continues to do in her later works, that:: 
... feminist biblical interpretation must place at the center of its attention 
every woman's struggles to transform patriarchal structures, both in 
biblical times and in our own, rather than focusing only on the androcentric 
biblical text and its authority. Since, throughout the centuries, patriarchal 
theology and church have silenced women and excluded us from religious 
institutions of authority, feminist theology must seek to empower women 
to become theological subjects, to participate in the critical construction 
of biblical-theological meanings, and to claim their authority to do so. In 
reclaiming women's authority to shape and determine biblical religions, 
feminist theology attempts to reconceptualize the act of biblical 
interpretation as a moment in the global praxis for liberation.16 
The emphasis in her writing is two-fold: on uncovering the biblical traditions which 
valorise women and their experiences of oppression and liberation, and on translating into 
the present, theological truths which em_erge from liberationist biblical texts. Hence, 
Schussler Fiorenza reads and interprets the Christian Testament17 and the Apocrypha as 
texts which suggest that women, far from being powerless and lac~ing in authority, were 
instead influential and instrumental in the early spreading of the gospel news. Although 
it is not evident in traditional interpretations that women were empowered in the ways she 
alleges, Schussler Fiorenza argues that their roles were devalued by the patriarchalisation 
of the Church and the ascendancy of power politics. An embryonic democratic politics 
based on social justice and the desire for freedom from oppression was eliminated 
through this patriarchalisation. She proposes a radical feminist hermeneutics in which the 
15 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, lo Memory of Her, passim. 
16 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, p. 8. 
17 Schussler Fiorenza alleges that the terms 'New' and 'Old' Testament are supersessionist and 
replaces them with 'Christian' and 'Common' Testaments respectively. This is in keeping with her 
refusal to use the term 'Judeo-Christian' because of its elitist overtones. See op. cit., Schussler 
Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, p. 193. 
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androcentric nature of biblical texts are highlighted and revealed and where she attempts 
a textual recovery of women.18 
Bread Not Stone and later lo Memory of Her are works which place the 
foundations for a specifically feminist approach to biblical hermeneutics and a feminist 
theology of liberation. But She Said and Jesus: Miriam's Child, Sophia's Prophet, 
Schussler Fiorenza's most recent books, elaborate a sophisticated 'logic of democracy', 
in which she argues for communities composed of equal disciples who share differences, 
yet are united in their desire for liberation, justice and equality. 
She argues, as I have already noted, against a sex/gender focused position, 
claiming that sex/gender is but one reason for oppression amongst other socio-political 
oppressions like race, class and ethnicity. I indicated that Schussler Fiorenza believes the 
sex/gender system arises out of certain 'naturalising' social power relations, 
arrangements, interpretations and structures which appear to be common sense. Part of 
her enterprise is to de-naturalise the sex/gender system, claiming that it, and the 
assumption that it is somehow 'natural', is a product of kyriarchal relations and discursive 
practices arising from those relations. She maintains that patriarchy, defined as 
male/female gender dualism in which all men oppress all women, misrepresents what 
patriarchy really is, a systematic, oppr~ssive and hierarchical organising structure which 
is multiplicative.19 For Schussler Fiorenza, to conceive of patriarchy solely in terms of 
sex/gender binary opposition, as a system in which all men dominate all women, is over 
simplistic. 20 
The term 'kyriarchy', and its cognates 'kyriarchal' and 'kyriocentric', which she uses 
instead of 'patriarchy', speak to the interlocking dominating power structures which 
18 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, passim. 
19 ibid., ch 4. "Justa", especially p. 114, and passim. 
20 ibid., passim. See especially, p. 114: "The mainstream feminist articulation of women's 
oppression primarily in terms of gender domination has been problematised for years by socialist-
Marxist feminists as well as by Third World feminists. They have pointed out, on the one hand, that 
women are oppressed not only by sexism, but also by racism classism and colonialism. On the 
other hand, they have rejected the mainstream feminist definition of patriarchy which holds that 
men are the oppressors and women the victims, and that culture history and religion are man-
made. Instead, women of colour have argued consistently that women of subordinated classes are 
often more oppressed by elite white women than by men of their own class, race, culture, or 
religion." 
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oppress all women and some men. Taking a cue from Joan Cocks, she maintains that 
what she calls the kyriocentric regime has two aspects "namely patriarchal and phallic 
power ... Patriarchal power as kyriarchal power operates on an institutional-structural 
level while phallic power functions on a linguistic ideological level. However, the two 
modes of kyriarchal power are not equivalent". [her italics] 21 It is the former with which 
Schussler Fiorenza is overwhelmingly concerned. 
'Kyriocentric' (and its cognates), by shifting the emphasis from men to power 
relations, excuses all men from the charge of universally dominating and oppressing all 
women. According to Schussler Fiorenza it is not the case that all men dominate all 
women. A claim like this about sex/gender misrepresents the oppressive power structures 
of European dominated societies which have been influenced by Greek and Roman 
concepts of democracy. Sex/gender is but one of the many oppressive 'systems'22 which 
operate to preserve the interests of the privileged minority who exploit the majority. 
Privilege is constructed through a combination of the 'right' class, sex/gender and race. 
By the term kyriocentric I mean to indicate that not all men dominate and 
exploit all women but that elite Western educated propertied Euro-
American men have articulated and benefited from women's and other 
"non-persons"' exploitation. 23 
In arguing that patriarchy is actually an oppressive and hierarchical theoretical and 
socio-political structure, better called 'kyriarchy', Schussler Fiorenza maintains that 
sex/gender alone is not responsible for, nor the basis of, oppressive systems. 24 Her 
21 ibid., p. 123. 
22 Schussler Fiorenza consistently refers to the 'sex/gender system'. See op. cit., Schussler 
Fiorenza, But She Said and Jesus: Miriam's Child, passim. 
23 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, footnote 37, p. 241. 
24 Her argument follows closely the arguments of Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: 
Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Beacon Press, Boston, 1988), about which I spoke in 
chapter 1. Indeed Schussler Fiorenza acknowledges Spelman's claim about the relationship 
between gender and other oppressive factors such as race and class. In arguing that sex/gender 
is not the central or primary oppressive category, Schussler Fiorenza is taking a stand against 
feminists who argue all oppression is in some way based upon sex/gender oppression (for example 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, in Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology (SCM Press, 
London, 1983), and standing for feminists who claim that other factors, like race, contribute equally 
to oppression. And Luce lrigaray argues that "Women aren't just poor amongst the poor. As half 
the human race, it is their exploitation that makes it possible to exploit others". See Luce lrigaray, 
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argument revolves around the idea that patriarchy, thought of in terms of sex/gender 
binary opposition, is Euro-centric and does not take into account the many forms of 
oppression which arise out of class, race and ethnic relations and which seem to be 
ignored by many Euro-American feminist theorists. This is the nature of the complaint 
made by Lorde against Daly, as I noted in chapter 2. It is also in the spirit of Spelman's 
analysis: class, race and ethnicity concurrently constitute the concept 'woman'. 
Schussler Fiorenza also argues that any use of sex/gender as a primary analytic 
category reinscribes hegemonic patriarchal discourses and practices. Schussler Fiorenza 
maintains that kyriarchy is organised through a powerful structure which can be 
represented by a pyramidal schematising of the democracy of ancient Greece and Rome. 
In this pyramid, the kyriarchal pyramid, those who are the least oppressed, are at the top 
and those who are the most oppressed are at the bottom of the pyramid. 25 
Schussler Fiorenza acknowledges the multiplicative, the compounding effects, 
that simultaneous oppressions have.26 To repeat, she does not consider that there is 
anything originary about the kind of oppression that sexism is. If we accept the primacy 
of sex/gender oppression, Schussler Fiorenza thinks, what follows from that omits other 
primary oppressive categories: race, for example, as a primary oppressive force is 
overlooked and as black feminists have argued, that is a special concern for them. Their 
oppression as blacks is obliterated or silenced, as the condition for white women, often 
middle class, is taken to be representative of all women. 27 Since, on Schussler Fiorenza's 
view, sex/gender oppression is always moderated and compounded by class, race, 
ethnic, cultural and religious considerations, sex/gender alone cannot have the theoretical 
and practical implications which are attributed to it by Euro-American and white feminists. 
"Equal To Whom?", in Naomi Schor & Elizabeth Weed (eds.), The Essential Difference. Books 
from Differences Series (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994), p.68 
25 See op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, pp. 114 - 120. 
26 The term 'multiple jeopardy' occurs in the work of Deborah H. King, "Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple 
Consciousness: The Context of Black Feminist Ideology", in Micheline R. Malson, Jean F. O'Barr, 
Sarah Westphal-Wihl & Mary Wyer (eds.) in Feminist Theory io Practice and Process (University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989).'The modifier "multiple" refers not only to several simultaneous 
oppressions but to the multiplicative relationships among them as well" p. 80. ) 
27 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, p. 114 and passim; See op. cit., King "Multiple 
Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness", p. 78. 
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In other words, as a central organising concept, as the primary oppression sex/gender 
fails to acknowledge its own contextuality. This, as I read Schussler Fiorenza, is a 
mistake that is made and perpetuated by theorists who understand patriarchy as a system 
of binary and totalising oppositions. The need to de-naturalise sex/gender is a direct 
response to both the articulation of patriarchy in terms of binary oppositions and the 
centrality given to sex/gender in that conceptualisation. Note again Schussler Fiorenza's 
resonance with Spelman. 
Why Schussler Fiorenza should want to displace the emphasis on sex/gender as 
the central organising concept for feminists is, then, very clear. In the first place she 
believes that the emphasis on sex/gender is a Euro-American, or at least Euro-centric, 
phenomenon which is articulated primarily by privileged Euro-American or Euro-centric 
women with a particular understanding and interpretation of patriarchy.28 
Secondly, and this is related to the first, the question 'For whom are Euro-centric 
(white middle class) women speaking?' underlies her critique. To this end, she uses the 
writings of coloured women to point out that they do not think the white privileged are 
speaking for them. Quite to the contrary, argues Schussler Fiorenza. Many women of 
colour feel that they are excluded by the privileged 'white talk'29 of such feminists. 30 
A third reason for Schussler Fiorenza's wanting to displace the emphasis on 
sex/gender is her wish to see sex/gender differences and relations de-naturalised. As I 
have observed, she appeals to Spelman's work on Plato and Aristotle which argues that 
not only sex/gender relations but class and race relations were also purported by the 
Greeks to be 'natural'.31 She believes that sex/gender categories and relations arise from 
the structural workings of patriarchy (later kyriarchy) which separate men and women who 
28 ibid., pp. 106 - 107. 
29 My term, not Schussler Fiorenza's, but it is appropriate here. 
30 See, for example, bell hooks' comments in feminist theory from margin to center (South End 
Press, Boston,1987), about Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique (Dell Books, New York, 1974). 
See also Ann Pattel-Gray, "Not yet Tiddas: An Aboriginal Womanist Critique of Australian Church 
Feminism" in Maryanne Confoy, Dorothy A. Lee and Joan Nowotny, Freedom and Entrapment (Dove Publications, Melbourne, 1995). 
31 See op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, "Justa" passim. 
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are understood to be distinguishable through fundamental essential and natural 
differences. 
As I have been arguing, Schussler Fiorenza does not hold that differences are 
'essential' or 'natural'. Class, race, ethnicity and sex/gender emerge through socio-political 
arrangements and in this sense are socially constructed. Note that Schussler Fiorenza 
does not simply argue that differences are interpreted differently across different cultures. 
Rather, hers is the stronger thesis that differences themselves are (already) socially 
constructed, not merely their interpretation. I shall return to this important point later. 
For Schussler Fiorenza, to reject essential (and 'natural') differences is precisely 
to de-naturalise sex/gender. Schussler Fiorenza believes that if one ascribes essential 
properties to something, then one assigns natural properties to that something. She 
thinks of those 'natural' properties as 'common sense' or 'given'.32 To ascribe essential 
properties to women, is to say that women have certain 'natural' or descriptive properties 
from which follow ascriptive valuations. The descriptive, on this view, gives rise to the 
normative. For example, if one were to ascribe to women the essential property of having 
two x chromosomes, it would also be to ascribe the supposedly natural properties of 
caring and nurturing to women. It is therefore somehow 'common' sense to think of 
women in terms of their abilities to bear, care for and nurture children . Schussler 
Fiorenza's move then is not to deny that the normative follows from the descriptive, but 
to claim that what we have though of as 'natural', should be unmasked as androcentric 
interpretation taken to be universally true for all. 
I remarked in chapter 1 that Elizabeth Grosz notes that essentialising terms are 
"used in patriarchal discourses to justify women's social subordination and their 
secondary position relative to men in patriarchal society".33 There I asked the question, 
Do they have to be? If we think of the way in which terms are used to justify certain 
customs in patriarchal discourse as a claim about normative practices, then Schussler 
Fiorenza's argument about the 'natural' is exemplary of Grosz's interpretation. In other 
words, Schussler Fiorenza implicitly accepts that the normative, the prescriptive, follows 
32 ibid ., p. 104. 
33 See chapter 1, p. 26. 
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from the descriptive, thought of in terms of essence. On her view, I am claiming, once 
one does admit essences into one's ontology, normative consequences unavoidably 
follow. That is to say, she appears to believe that if one admits that secondary sex 
characteristics for example are taken to be 'real' independent of language, then one must 
also accept that prescriptive or normative entailments follow. I will return to this problem 
in my final chapter. Now I simply signpost this as a problem which needs to be 
addressed. 
To denaturalise, as I have been reading Schussler Fiorenza, is to deny that there 
is anything 'essential' or 'given' or 'natural' and 'common sense' about the categories of 
sex/gender, class, race and so on. The process of de-naturalising sex/gender is therefore 
dependent upon rejecting the idea that women and men have certain essential and 
'natural' properties which are 'common sense'. This is also the case for race, class and 
ethnicity, none of which, Schussler Fiorenza asserts, is 'natural'. Schussler Fiorenza 
appears to think that 'essential', 'natural', 'given' and 'common-sense' are co-extensive. 
But it is unclear in what sense one is supposed to understand the co-extensiveness of 
'natural' and 'common sense'. 'It's natural for women to two x chromosomes' and 'It's 
common sense for pregnant women to give birth in hospital in case they have post 
partum haemorrhages' are not statements which one would regard as equivalent. One 
could not argue that 'It's natural for women to have two x chromosomes' is equivalent to 
'It's common sense for women to have two x chromosomes', just as one could not argue 
that 'It's common sense for pregnant women to give birth in hospital in case of post-
partum haemorrhage' is equivalent to 'It's natural for pregnant women to give birth in 
hospital in case of post-partum haemorrhage'. Here, the natural and the common sense 
are obviously different categories. 
However, it is clear that Schussler Fiorenza's strategy is to subvert the idea of 
natural categories in an attempt to dislodge the dominance of androcentric "logic of 
identity": 
... the philosophical logic of identity, which in antiquity articulated the 
asymmetric binary dualisms of human/animal, male/female, and free/slave 
as "natural" differences in order to legitimate patriarchal relations of 
dominance and subordination, is also inscribed in the discourses of 
modern Eurocentric political philosophy and theology. . . . In short, 
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knowledge is not just gendered, but also racial, class-centred and 
Eurocentric. 34 
It is in the context of her project to naturalise what we have understood as 'natural' 
or 'common sense' categories that Schussler Fiorenza's neologism 'wo/men' comes into 
play. Schussler Fiorenza alleges that "'woman"/''women" is often read as referring to white 
women only' .35 As I noted in chapter 1, Elizabeth Spelman argues that 'woman'/'women' 
was an exclusive category in Aristotelian philosophy.36 'Woman' as well as being opposed 
to 'man', was also opposed to 'female slave': one was not and could not be both a female 
slave and a woman. 'Woman' was therefore not an anthropological or biological term, 
signifying a natural class, but was a social, class term. 
Schussler Fiorenza's comments about conceiving of 'woman' as white (middle 
class), suggest that she believes we have not moved beyond this Aristotelian position. 
Thought of in sex/gender terms, 'woman' retains the classist, racist overtones which 
Spelman attributes to it; therefore as a sex/gender term, it is exclusive rather than 
inclusive. As it excluded female slaves in the Greek State, so it now excludes many 
women who are not white or middle class. Schussler Fiorenza does not want to eliminate 
use of the term 'woman' completely. Instead, she wants to retain the use of the terms 
'woman' and 'women' as a political category.37 
According to Schussler Fiorenza, one of the main problems with the terms 
'woman' and 'women', apart from the critique of sex/gender as that which primarily 
constitutes patriarchy, is that they evoke the (false) notions of a universal essence 
possessed by all women, regardless of class, religion, culture. On this reading women 
constitute a 'natural' category. There is little room for difference to operate in this 
universalising, ahistorical conceptualisation. 
Schussler Fiorenza introduces the neologism 'wo/men' to circumvent its 
sex/gender associations. Her expression, and its use, is meant to indicate that women 
34 ibid., pp. 121-122. 
35 For a discussion of this, see op. cit., Jesus: Miriam's Child, endnote 1, p. 191 . 
36 
op. cit., Spelman, Inessential Woman. 
37 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, p. 191. 
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form an unstable, polymorphous category. The term is meant to be inclusive of all women 
as well as any men who are oppressed by class, gender/sex, culture et alia and she does 
not want it to be understood as an exclusive, universalised gender term.38 By coining the 
expression 'wo/men' Schussler Fiorenza intends to transcend the binary opposition of 
women against men, to displace any naturalistic connotations the word 'woman' might 
have. Her term 'wo/men' as she also indicates in Jesus: Miriam's Child. Sophia's Prophet, 
"seeks to indicate that women are not a unitary social group but rather are fragmented 
and fractured by structures of race, class, religion, heterosexuality, colonialism, age and 
health". 39 
In shifting the emphasis from, and de-naturalising, sex/gender as Schussler 
Fiorenza sets out to do, she also sets out to destabilise the theoretical prominence of the 
subject in favour of an emphasis on the socio-political context of oppression.40 Along with 
the concepts of wo/men and kyriarchy, Schussler Fiorenza uses the complex term 
'ekklesia gynaikon', women-church, by which she means the democratic church 
community, the rhetorical, symbolic space, the discursive frame of reference for women.41 
Her rudimentary attempts to explain this concept revolved around the "political-
oppositional rather than exclusionary" notion of "self-identified women and women-
identified men in biblical religion"42 reminiscent of Daly's early work. 
Schussler Fiorenza abandons this explanation of ekklesia in In Memory of Her and 
re-orients it in But She Said and Jesus: Miriam's Child, Sophia's Prophet to explicate it 
as a "radical democratic praxis" which "provides a symbolic space in which a feminist 
reading of the Bible is possible". 43 It is here that she acknowledges her preference for 
38 ibid., p. 191. 
39 ibid., p. 24. 
40 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza. But She Said, "Justa", especially pp. 109ft. 
41 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, p. 28. See also op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, 
But She Said, passim. 
42 See op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Bread Not Stone, p. xiv 
43 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza. But She Said, p. 11. 
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what she calls a "logic of democracy" (radical equality44) over what she terms a logic of 
identity, because the emancipatory struggles of wo/men are identified through a socio-
political rather than an individual-subject hermeneutics. The socio-political is the site of 
struggles for freedom from oppression where kyriocentric practices which dominate and 
oppress must be located and destroyed. 
Schussler Fiorenza's impetus for the logic of democracy originates in radical 
interpretative analysis of biblical texts. Schussler Fiorenza acknowledges the 
androcentricity of biblical texts, but maintains that in the life of Jesus and because of his 
association with women, women are already valorised in Christian origins and traditions, 
but that these traditions have been omitted or have silenced woman through the 
ascendancy of patriarchy.45 In reconstructing women's biblical and early Christian 
experiences, and in acknowledging and challenging the socio-political context of 
structuring all lives through kyriarchal relations, Schussler Fiorenza believes that wo/men 
can overcome the androcentric message which has been privileged as 'The Truth' in the 
development of biblical-theological understandings. Hence the logic of democracy is 
intertwined with the ekklesia gynaikon, the discipleship of equals where wo/men are full 
participants, the "full democratic assembly of wo/men".46 
Ironically, Schussler Fiorenza's notion evolves from the Greek idea of democracy 
which she acknowledges was imperfect and exclusive: only men were citizens in Greek 
democracy and as such were the only ones who could fully participate in deciding their 
own affairs.47 She adopts Page du Bois' analysis, which interprets the logic of democracy 
as a "notion of equal power among members of community". This notion, which "required 
the radical distribution of wealth, the elimination of social and political hierarchies. For 
44 ibid., pp. 131-132. 
45 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, p. 29. Here Schussler Fiorenza speaks of 
women's presence and agency in biblical texts, recalling her arguments in op. cit. Schussler 
Fiorenza, lo Memory of Her, where this is a dominant theme. 
46 op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, p. 27. 
47 For an in depth discussion of democracy see op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said. "Justa" 
and "Sophia1 passim. 
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some ancient thinkers, even slavery itself, was eventually called into question".48 
Schussler Fiorenza propounds the idea of democracy as that which overcomes 
domination and oppression and which insists on the "free assembly of citizens who gather 
to decide their own affairs". 49 
As she understands it, the logic of democracy leaves open and continually calls 
into question the historical contextualisation of biblical texts and their interpretations, and 
situates "(t)he hermeneutical insights and theological challenges of the heterogeneous 
voices emerging from the feminist movements of liberation around the world" which are 
"central to the process of biblical interpretation in the rhetorical space of the ekklesia". 
[her italics]50 
This understanding of feminist biblical liberationist hermeneutics and the theology 
it entails, brings a different understanding of God. In Bread Not Stone and In Memory of 
.l::ie.r, her use of the term 'God' is not problematic. Taking precedent from Rebecca 
Chopp, 51 Schussler Fiorenza re-writes 'God' as 'G-d' in Discipleship of EQuals and .B.u.! 
She Said. 'Such a writing of G-d is meant to indicate that G-d is "in a religious sense 
unnameable" and belongs to the "re~lm of the ineffable" G-d is not G-d's "proper name"'. 52 
With the publication of Jesus: Miriam's Child, Sophia's Prophet, Schussler Fiorenza again 
changes her notation, writing 'G-d' now as 'G*d'53 in deference to Jewish feminists who 
had taken exception to what they saw as a conservative and reactionary "theological 
48 'b'd p 151. I I ., · 
49 ibid., p. 150. 
50 ibid., p. 152. 
51 Rebecca Chopp, The Power to Speak: Feminism. Language, God (Crossroad , New York, 
1991 ), p. 32. 
52 
op. cit. , Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said , p. 220. 
53 It has been pointed out to me that there is little difference between the signs '-' and '*' in terms 
of the functions they are intended to carry out. Either way, the term 'God' is intended to be 
destabilised. Schussler Fiorenza does not argue the case for preferring one way of signing over the 
other. She only noted that she defers to Jewish feminists who argue that the earlier notation is 
offensive, "conservative" and "reactionary". See op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child . 
p. 191. Schussler Fiorenza does not reflect on the differences or similarities between '-' and '*'. 
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frame of reference".54 The point, however, is that Schussler Fiorenza seeks "to destabilise 
our way of thinking and speaking about G*d".55 
I will argue in a later section that for Schussler Fiorenza the givenness of G*d is 
never in dispute.r,s Rather, the nature or kind of G*d revealed in rhetorical inquiry is what 
is at stake in her work. As I remarked at the beginning of this chapter, two theoretical 
perspectives are in tension here. The sign 'G*d' might be destabilising yet it represents 
a given which is an epistemological mystery. What is given is, however, problematic: the 
'reality' of G*d underlies androcentric, oppressive structures. 
Through feminist political-religious struggles for liberation the ekklesia of 
wo/men seeks to mediate divine "revelation"; it makes experientially 
available the 'reality' of the life-giving power of G*d in the midst of death-
dealing power of kyriarchal oppression and dehumanization. G*d's power 
for salvation must 'reveal' itself as active in the struggles for survival and 
well-being of women living at the bottom of kyriarchal pyramidal 
oppressions. 57 
As I read Schussler Fiorenza, it is in the relationship between wo/men and the 
ekklesia gynaikon mediated by the logic of democracy, that 'G*d' emerges and is 
revealed. However, such a conceptualisation of the Divine creates a dilemma in 
Schussler Fiorenza's work which is not easy to resolve. On the one hand, Schussler 
Fiorenza's 'G*d' is a relational concept constituted by a believing community through its 
discursive practices and guided by biblical interpretation. In this sense, G*d is the mirror 
of the ekklesia. Yet on the other hand, G*d seems also to be separable from the ekklesia, 
as if G*d were a 'reality' independent of discursive practice. Since Schussler Fiorenza 
claims that women's experiences are germane to developing a feminist theology, and 
since she has also implied that the inclusion of women's experience more adequately 
reflects 'reality' because such an account would not 'deny or repress the historical activity 
54 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, p. 191. 
55 'b'd I I . 
56 See op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, p. 6, where she comments that she is not 
concerned with the existence of G-d, but '"what kind of G-d' the Bible proclaims and Christians 
believe". 
57 ibid., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child. p. 28. 
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of the subordinated "others"', 58 the relation between those experiences and a 
transcendent Divine should be interrogated. Such an investigation should, however, be 
conducted in light of Schussler Fiorenza's claims about women and the 'natural', to which 
I now turn. 
The Natural and Women 
Schussler Fiorenza's desire to de-naturalise the sex/gender system is in keeping 
with much feminist theory which has argued that sex/gender is socially constructed as a 
binary system which privileges the male over the female. 59 As a social construct, 
sex/gender is contingent. In being contingent, 'it' is changeable. If 'it' is changeable, then 
one needs to alter one's socialisation practices and sex/gender oppression will be 
eliminated.60 
But Schussler Fiorenza's concerns are deeper than this, for she also maintains, 
as I have pointed out, that the idea of the sex /gender dualistic system itself is a 
misconstrual of a wider problem: alone, sex/gender cannot account for the totality of 
oppressions in society. Theorists like Rosemary Radford Ruether have argued that 
sex/gender is the foundational oppression from which all other oppressions develop.61 
Instead, according to Schussler Fiorenza, the sex/gender system is part of a systematic 
oppressive structure which includes race, class and colonialism which are also thought 
of as natural. Hence, to talk about sex/gender without talking about these other equally 
important oppressors, is to affirm that sex/gender dualism is the, not a primary oppressor. 
I mentioned above that Schussler Fiorenza appears to think of 'natural' 'essential' 
'given' and 'common sense' as co-extensive. At the very least she conflates their 
58 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, p. 91. 
59 See, for example, op. cit., Spelman, Inessential Woman; Moira Gatens, Feminism and 
Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality (Polity Press, Cambridge UK, 1991 ); Michele 
Le Dreuff, Hipparchia's Choice: An Essay Concerning Women. Philosophy, etc. (trans. Trista 
Selous) (Blackwell, Oxford & Cambridge MA, 1991 ); Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: "Male" 
and "Female" io Western Philosophy (Methuen University Paperbacks, London, 1984). 
60 Moira Gatens makes this point about contingency in "A Critique of the Sex Gender Distinction" 
in Sneja Gunew (ed.) A Reader in Feminist Knowledge (Routledge, London & New York, 1991 ). 
61 
op. cit., Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, passim. 
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meanings. What Schussler Fiorenza actually means by 'de-naturalising' is never 
transparent, for what she means by the 'natural' is never clear in the first place. She talks 
of the 'natural' in terms both of common sense and 'the given' and implies that the 
common sense is the given.62 For her the ideas of the 'natural, the 'common sense' and 
the 'given' are all linked in one essentialising program of making everything the same, a 
commitment to the logic of identity.63 
She consistently contrasts essentialism with constructionism, another term the 
meaning of which she never makes clear. She claims that sex/gender differences are 
'represented as natural, biological, universal "givens" although they are in reality merely 
signifying practices'.64 Hence for her, the 'natural' has at least two aspects: what is 
thought of as biologically given (pre-discursive or independent of discourse); and what is 
socially constructed over the 'givenness' of the 'biological'. This is precisely Grosz's 
interpretation of constructionism which I introduced earlier. There is a rough 
correspondence between these two perspectives and the distinctions also made earlier, 
between the real essence and the nominal essence of Locke. The 'biological given' has 
a totalising or universalising application, yielding the idea that there is a universal, real 
essence possessed by all women. The socially constructed over that 'biological given' 
again universalises, but this time in terms of discursive practices which yield nominal 
essences constructed contingently through discourse. Thus both views are essentialist. 
It is worth recalling that these are the two ways in which I argued one might think of Daly 
as essentialist. On either count, according to Schussler Fiorenza, each recommends itself 
as common sense and as 'natural' and 'given'. 
Schussler Fiorenza argues that both essentialist views reinscribe and revalorise 
the feminine. 65 Her way of dealing with essentialism, either nominalist or real, is to 
promote, as a working model, an idea of social constructionism which does not 
universalise in terms of depending upon the idea of essence. Schussler Fiorenza's use 
62 
op. cit. , Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, p. 104, p. 106 and passim. 
63 ibid., "Justa", passim. 
64 
"b'd I I ., p. 112. 
65 'b'd I I . 
116 
of constructionism argues that discursive practices produce social 'realities' like 
sex/gender, class and race, a position argued by Butler and Grosz, for example.66 This 
idea of social constructionism, analogous to Scott's notion of experience, is responsible 
for the production of subject positions within socio-political frameworks like kyriarchy. Just 
as the latter insists that experience is what is in need of explanation and should not be 
thought of as the explanation, so Schussler Fiorenza asserts that sex/gender, class and 
race are created through discursive practices. In this way she hopes to escape the 
Western dependence upon supposedly natural categories for its ontological foundations. 
Schussler Fiorenza refers to the work of Teresa L. Ebert67 and Tamsin Lorraine68 
neither of whose theories, according to Schussler Fiorenza, "operates within the Western 
essentialist paradigm" and which do not understand "gender as an attribute of anatomy. 
Instead, both strategies understand gender identity as an effect of one's discursive 
positioning and strategies"69 and each project "understands women's gender oppression 
as primary and originary oppression".70 Since Schussler Fiorenza does not believe that 
gender is the primary oppression, it is not her intention to use Ebert and Lorraine tout 
court. Rather, what interests her is Lorraine's articulating "a self-identity which is 
continually transforming"71 and Ebert's contextualising of signification in terms of 
"mapping of patriarchal ideology". 72 
Further, social constructionism emerges, in Jesus: Miriam's Child, Sophia's 
Prophet where Schussler Fiorenza takes up Rosemary Hennessy's attempt 'to develop 
an "analytic" that extends post-modern and feminist critiques of the centred subject 
66 
op. cit., Grosz, Volatile Bodies ; op. cit., Butler, Gender Trouble. 
67 Teresa L. Ebert, ''The Romance of Patriarchy: Ideology, Subjectivity and Postmodern Feminist 
Cultural Theory" in Cultural Critigue, 1 o, 1988. 
68 Tamsin E. Lorraine, Gender, Identity and the Production of Meaning (Westview Press, Boulder, 
1990). 
69 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, p. 108. 
7o 'b'd I I . 
71 'b'd I I ., p. 109. 
72 'b'd I I ., p. 113. 
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without giving up a commitment to the possibility of transformative social change'73 as 
well as Hennessy's articulation of discourse, specifically history and materialist feminism 
as ideology. 74 
Underlying her extensive use of these and other theorists is her drive to dislodge 
'natural or 'common sense' understandings from their hegemonic moorings which she 
believes to be discursive, socio-political constructions engendered by kyriarchy. Since 
these scholars acknowledge the centrality of discursive practices within socio-political 
groupings both for the constitution of groups as a whole and of the individuals who make 
up the groups, it is little wonder that Schussler Fiorenza finds them useful. But Hennessy, 
for example, is not convinced that categories are as neatly definable and discreetly 
dichotomising as Schussler Fiorenza sometimes appears to think they are. Hence 
Hennessy writes: 
It seems to me, however, that for all of the invocations of "politics" in 
studies that have addressed the "discursive construction of the subject," 
we still have very few rigorous theoretical formulations of exactly what 
these terms mean.75 
That is not to say that Schussler Fiorenza is insensitive to the vagueness and 
ambiguities of language: quite to the contrary, as my exposition shows. On one level, 
Schussler Fiorenza appeals to an unarticulated assumption about the role of social 
construction and interpretation: that everything is always already interpreted.76 That is to 
say, from this perspective, there is no 'natural' because discursive practices and 
constructs impose themselves into our understandings from the very first: there is no 
"transcendent existing apart from, and identifiable independently of, any social practices 
73 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, p. 25. 
74 See Rosemary Hennessy, Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse (Routledge, New 
York; Chapman & Hall, London, 1993), "Introduction", p. xvii; and op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza., 
Jesus: Miriam's Child. pp. 25 - 26. 
75 
op. cit., Hennessy, Materialist Feminism, p. xiii. 
76 See Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England & Sydney, 1989), p. 22. 
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whatsoever".77 Schussler Fiorenza argues against the idea that the 'natural' is 
'independent of language', pre-existing discursive practices. By implication she reads and 
argues against a conception of the 'natural' as that which cannot or does not fall within 
the constraints of language, what is independently 'real', independent that is, of social 
(discursive) practices. She rejects such a conceptualisation because she holds that 
concepts are embedded in socio-political discursive practices which have a vested 
interest in preserving their hegemony. In other words, that one thinks of 'woman', for 
example, as a 'natural' category, valorises the secondary status accorded to many 
women. For this reason, Schussler Fiorenza's rejection of nominal essence is 
paradoxical. As I argued in chapter 1, the idea of nominal essence is the basis upon 
which social constructionism is founded. It seems then, that Schussler Fiorenza wants 
to reject an explicit originary component of her own theorising, while continuing to use the 
theory as a whole. 
My claim is that Schussler Fiorenza's use of social construction as a feature of her 
conceptual framework should be thought of as an attempt to deny the category of the 
'natural' and therefore to deny the 'natural' as a foundation for social constructionist 
theories. Hence, use of social constructionist theory is for her a means of arguing against 
the ideas of both nominal and real essence. One should see her project as a denial that 
there is a 'natural' world, a 'real' world independent of discourse, upon which one maps 
one's discursive practices. She retains the socio-political as a discursive system and 
denies that it has any 'natural' or common sense or 'given' basis. But she also disavows 
the historical origins of her favoured position: socio-political discursive construction. 
Along with the claim that 'common sense' assumptions and value judgements 
(aesthetic, moral, political) are socially constructed, Schussler Fiorenza argues that facts 
and cultural differences are likewise socially constructed. She also makes the much 
stronger claim that what we take to be 'natural' characteristics (for example secondary 
sex characteristics) are socially constructed. This should be read in conjunction with her 
primary claim that the sex/gender system, as well as the class and race system are 
n Nancy Fraser. Unruly Practices: Power. Discourse, and Gender io Contemporary Social Theory (Polity Press, Cambridge UK, 1989) , pp. 59-60. 
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socially constructed. For her, "language is not a reflection of reality but rather a socio-
cultural linguistic system".78 She argues for example that the: 
. . . cultural sex/gender system "naturalizes" the category "sex" as 
biologically given rather than as discursively constructed. It does not take 
into account that primary and secondary physical sex differences are not 
"biological facts" but are also discursively constructed. For instance, 
common sense has it that facial hair is a male physical secondary sex 
characteristic. This common place assumption conceals, however, that 
it is discursively constructed. In order to uphold the ostensibly male 
standard, a multibillion dollar cosmetic industry strives to eradicate all 
facial hair in women. Anatomical physical differences are as discursively 
constructed and socially maintained as are cultural sex differences.79 
It is here that Schussler Fiorenza most clearly articulates the inference from "one 
cannot give a theory independent description of things" to "there are no theory 
independent things", to which I referred earlier. Not only is she claiming that system, 
differences and facts are discursively constructed, but her claim seems also to be that 
so-called natural characteristics themselves are socially constructed. This stronger claim 
amounts to a possible reading which argues not only that there are no theory independent 
things, but that there is only theory. Material objects, things, are eliminated from one's 
ontology, to be replaced by the idea that theory is the origin of all that there is. For 
example, the mind produces all of our ideas including the idea that there is an 
independently existing material world. In other words, it is possible to read Schussler 
Fiorenza here in terms of linguistic idealism: there is only discourse. Sexual 
characteristics on this account, are not independent of the ideas we have of them. They 
are constructed in their entirety through discursive practice and the belief that ideas 
constitute all that there is.80 I prefer to discount such a reading because, as I have been 
arguing, Schussler Fiorenza wants to claim that the natural is in language, that there is 
no 'transcendent'. In other words, Schussler Fiorenza does not deny the existence of 
things: she simply denies their existence independent of language. 
78 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, p. 161. 
79 'b'd I I ., p. 40. 
80 See, for example, George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge [and] Three 
Dialogues Between Hy!as and Philonous (ed. with an introd. by G.J. Warnock) (Collins, London, 
1962). 
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In contrast to this, Schussler Fiorenza asserts that "the relationship between 
language and reality is not a given but constructed in discourse".81 Here Schussler 
Fiorenza appears to be distinguishing between 'reality' and language by positing that 'they' 
are relational. The problem is that what Schussler Fiorenza means by her claim that 
language is not a reflection of 'reality' is disputable. She could mean either that there is 
no 'reality' which language reflects: that 'reality' is itself a social construct. If that is the 
case, then language and 'reality' are one and are not separable. Or, she could be arguing 
that language does not reflect reality because it cannot, as she does when she argues 
that human language cannot capture the reality of G*d. 
How then is one to understand her claim that language is not a reflection of 
'reality'? The contested claims are: 
a) Language is not a reflection of 'reality'; rather language constructs 'reality'. 
and 
b) Language and 'reality' are independent of each other. 
If claim a) is read without the rider ("rather language constructs reality") then a) 
and b) need not be interpreted as inconsistent. Read together, however, the two claims 
are inconsistent: language cannot both construct 'reality' and be simultaneously 
independent of 'reality'. In the required sense, language is reality. But what counts as 
'reality' for Schussler Fiorenza? 
I argued earlier that Schussler Fiorenza subscribes to a view that 'reality' is open 
to more adequate accounts.82 Certainly her accounts of sex/gender, class and race deny 
their 'reality' independent of language in terms of differences, facts and characteristics. 
If it is the case that characteristics are socially constructed, if, for example, secondary sex 
characteristics are not 'real' independent of discourse, then what is it that is open to a 
more adequate account? Schussler Fiorenza implies that since her project is not totally 
relative, then there must be something objective which admits of more or less adequate 
accounts in terms of truth.83 In other words, Schussler Fiorenza is keen to retain a notion 
81 'b'd I I ., p. 161. 
82 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said, pp. 90 - 91. 
83 'b'd I I . 
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of objectivity while arguing for a social constructionist stance which invokes the idea that 
"access to reality is always mediated through language".84 
Having argued, however, that language is not a reflection of reality and that the 
'natural' which is supposed to reflect 'reality' is discursively produced, of course Schussler 
Fiorenza must argue that 'reality' is always mediated by language. But on this view, there 
is no 'reality' over and beyond language, no objective something, no 'reality' independent 
of language. Hence, language must mediate itself. And if that is the case her reification 
of 'reality' as that which is external to language, that which is objective, is puzzling. 
It is arguable then, that Schussler Fiorenza's notion of reality operates at several 
different levels. On one level there is a notion of 'objective reality' to which language more 
or less has access. At this level, different and perhaps competing accounts, say of 
historical events can be given, yielding some adequate and some more adequate 
accounts. What counts as 'adequate' here will depend on the number of perspectives 
which are surveyed, but the truth conditions for saying that some accounts are more 
adequate, are undisclosed. Her reconstruction of Christian women's origins would fall into 
this camp. The relation between language and 'reality' at this level is constructed through 
the discursive practices of different cultures: what is significant and meaningful to 
different cultures at different times. 
At another level, the signifying practices of different cultures produce differing 
accounts of what is natural or given or common sense, depending upon prevailing 
hegemonic structures. In this case, language does not reflect a 'reality' independent of 
discourse, because language is actually responsible for producing the idea of what is real 
in the first place. At this level, the signifying practices of different cultures determine what 
counts as 'real'. Secondary sexual characteristics would come under this umbrella. And 
on a third level, there is the 'reality' that is G*d who transcends human experience and 
language. This latter is a distinctly mystical notion of G*d, and is found throughout the 
history of theology. Can these accounts of 'reality' be coherently read together and if so, 
how? 
84 ibid. 
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Women's Experience, Embodiment and G*d 
In the concluding chapter of Jesus: Miriam's Child, Sophia's Prophet, Schussler 
Fiorenza makes the following two claims: 
1) Since G*d radically transcends human experience, no human language, not 
even that of the Bible, can speak adequately about the divine. The via 
negativa of classic theology stressed that we are not able to say properly who 
G*d is but must say again and again who G*d is not. 
and 
2) Since G*d is the G*d of liberation and well-being, an affirmative theological 
strategy (via affirmativa) can positively ascribe to G*d all the Utopian desires 
of liberation and well being of which countless people dream and hope .... 
Moreover, affirmative discourses about G*d must always be conscious that 
their language is only analogical since G*d always transcends human desires 
for liberation and our images of salvation.85 
In invoking these two conceptualisations of the Divine, Schussler Fiorenza 
pinpoints a theological tradition which readily embraces the tension between transcendent 
and immanent notions of the Divine.06 It is unproblematic for Schussler Fiorenza that G*d 
is 'real' in terms of having objective existence independent of language. What is 
problematic, however, is that Schussler Fiorenza has also claimed that some of our major 
categories: that of the natural and what . we take to fall under these categories, for 
example sex/gender, are socially constructed. Because they are socially constructed, they 
do not reflect 'reality'. The idea of G*d is excluded from Schussler Fiorenza's program to 
de-naturalise. Admittedly, she says that she is concerned to de-naturalise sex/gender, but 
remember that along with that, she also seeks to de-naturalise class and race as well. On 
that basis, one might legitimately ask why the idea of G*d should not also be 'de-
naturalised'? Here, a reading of 'de-naturalised' would be in terms of challenging all 
androcentric attributions to divinity, including that of G*d's radical transcendence of 
human experience. 
My concern here is not so much to argue that Schussler Fiorenza is not uncritical 
about the idea of divinity. One might read her work, in particular her earlier texts, as 
85 
op. cit. , Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child , p. 179. 
86 The tension between the ideas of the immanent and the transcendent is identifiable in both the 
Common and Christian Testaments, and in theological traditions ranging from Plotinus to Gutierrez. 
See also Introductory Essay, footnote 11, of this thesis. 
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specifically aimed at reconstructing non-patriarchal conceptualisations of the-Divine. My 
concern is more with the idea of how we are to think of 'reality' in its relation to experience 
- women's and men's - and the idea that discursive practice produces some of what we 
take to be 'real' and what that might mean. 
I argued above that G*d is the mirror of the ekklesia because the relationship 
between the ekklesia and wo/men, mediated by the logic of democracy, is the birth place 
of the idea of G*d. This G*d is not just emergent however. According to Schussler 
Fiorenza, the ekklesia also mediates Divine revelation in its socio-political struggles for 
freedom and justice.87 The tension between these two views is analogous to de Lauretis' 
finding something strange about claiming that real essence is what feminists mean when 
they talk about essence and proposing instead that feminists actually mean 'nominal 
essence'. How is one to construe the apparently competing claims that 'G*d is objectively 
real', and that 'one can positively ascribe to G*d Utopian desires for liberation' within a 
conceptual framework that also argues that the idea of 'reality' independent of language, 
is a product of socio-political androcentric hegemony'? 
A possible solution lies in arguing that the idea of the objective reality of G*d is 
dependent upon discursive practice and so Schussler Fiorenza is mistaken in excluding 
G*d from that which is to be de-naturalised. This argument would rely on Schussler 
Fiorenza's failure to distinguish between the notions of the natural, the given and the 
common sense. If the idea of G*d is given, as Schussler Fiorenza seems to hold it is, 
then there is no reason to suppose that G*d is not socially constructed as is sex/gender. 
That is to say, Schussler Fiorenza needs to provide some grounds for holding that some 
of our categories (like sex/gender, class and race) are socially constructed and others are 
not. 
She also needs to provide some content to the idea of 'reality' independent of 
language. While she holds that access to 'reality' is always mediated by language, she 
also holds that language does not reflect 'reality'. If the latter is the case, in what way 
does language provide us with some access to 'reality'? And then the epistemic question: 
87 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, p. 28. 
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'How would we know that language does or does not give us access to reality and the 
extent to which it does?', needs to be raised. 
The question of the relation of women's experience to the Divine needs also to be 
raised. If it is the case that "no human language can adequately speak about the divine", 
then the inclusion of women's experiences in articulations of Divine intention seems 
superfluous. Certainly, the claim that perspectives on women's experiences present a 
different reality seems plausible enough. But if concurrently the claim is that language 
does not reflect 'reality', it is difficult to see what difference inclusion of women's 
perspective would make. The relation between women's experience and G*d becomes 
an arbitrary matter. On the one hand, the epistemic considerations concerning how one 
would know that women's experience actually does present a different reality come to the 
fore. On the other, why men's experience has not already adequately comprehended the 
Divine (perhaps without their even knowing it) must be addressed. 
This is where projection theory is extremely important to Schussler Fiorenza. Her 
claim that G*d can be the site of the ascription of positive Utopian attributes relates such 
ascription to the ekklesia. 'The given' on this view, is that G*d is a G*d of liberation and 
well being. Even though the language of such ascription is analogical, and even though 
l~nguage does not reflect 'reality', it is arguable that within this framework the ekklesia 
reflects G*d in modelling Divine justice for example. Because language mediates but 
does not reflect 'reality', and because language is concerned with signifying practices of 
different cultures, even concepts of G*d must be always already interpreted. That being 
so, the idea of G*d is conceptually dependent upon, in this case, the projection of the 
ekklesia. On this basis, G*d becomes the mirror of wo/men and their experiences. 
An interpretation like this, however, problematises Schussler Fiorenza's idea of 
the separation of language and talk of the independent 'reality' of G*d. It also calls for a 
closer examination of projection theory. Luce lrigaray specifically acknowledges a debt 
to Ludwig Feuerbach to whom she turns in order to elaborate her idea that women need 
their own Divine. In the next chapter, I explore lrigaray's reading of God as the mirror of 
Man, before moving onto how this can be spelt out in the context of women's experiences 
and 'reality' independent of language. 
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BEYOND IRIGARAY: M/Mi=SIS AND THE POLITICS OF DIVINITY 
The "soul" escapes outside herself, opening up a crack in the cave (une 
antr'ouverture) so that she may penetrate herself once more. The walls 
of her prison are broken, the distinction between inside/outside 
transgressed. In such ex-stasis, she risks losing herself or at least seeing 
the assurance of her self-identity-as-same fade away ... 1 
lrigaray's Divine is not conceived in naturalistic, personal or judgemental 
terms. God is not totality, unity or origin.2 
It can be argued that both Mary Daly and Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza continue 
to explore the idea of divinity in terms of unity, totality and origin: the Goddess/G*d 
represents the origin and the telos of all human existence. Working within the Freudian 
psychoanalytic tradition, however, Luce lrigaray concentrates instead on the idea that 
women have always been defined in terms of the Other of men. Women, according to 
lrigaray, need a new concept of divinity for themselves. Accordingly, her project is to 
investigate the possibility of making a feminine symbolic. lrigaray argues that the 
development of a feminine symbolic requires the idea of a feminine Divine. Thus her 
interest might be interpreted as refiguring the Divine in terms of women's experience(s}.3 
In this chapter, I will begin exploring the ways in which lrigaray's 
psychoanalytic/philosophical discourse might provide a resolution to the tensions we have 
seen in the work of Daly and Schussler Fiorenza. I have argued that Daly seems to work 
within a dualistic framework in which an ontological-linguistic strategy overlies an 
'independently real' female body. Schussler Fiorenza, as we just saw, denies the 
'independent reality' of the body on the one hand, claiming that discursive practices are 
1 Luce lrigaray, "La Mysterique", in Speculum Of The Other Woman (trans. Gillian C. Gill) (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1992), p. 192. 
2 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists (Allen & Unwin , St. Leonard's, 
1989), p.159. 
3 See Penelope Deutscher, "'The Only Diabolical Thing About Women ... ": Luce lrigaray on 
Divinity', in Hypatia, Special lssue: "Feminist Philosophy of Religion" [Nancy Frankenberry & Marilyn 
Thie (eds.)] 9 (4) (Fall 1994), pp. 88 - 111. 
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responsible for producing characteristics, facts, and reality; and on the other hand, 
assumes a 'reality' independent of language to which we have more or less adequate 
access, as well as an independently real G*d. 
On Daly's account it seems possible to speak of 'women as women', as a class 
of individuals whose main defining characteristic is sex/gender, while this is not the case 
with Schussler Fiorenza. Both Daly's and Schussler Fiorenza's positions depend heavily 
on implicit accounts of the role of language as that which constitutes realities: social, 
political and religious. Hence for both of them, ontology and language are very closely 
linked; women are totally or in part products of socio-political discursive practices; and the 
Divine appears also to be generated, at least in part, by socio-political discursive 
practices. The body, its relation to discursive practices and its relation to the Divine, 
remain problematic areas for both Daly and Schussler Fiorenza. In all of this, women's 
experience itself remains problematic because while each theorist grants that 
constructionism is a definitive force, it can be argued that both Daly and Schussler 
Fiorenza revalorise dualistic conceptions like essence and language so they do not 
adequately account for social constructionism in the first place. That is to say, they both 
believe that language constructs reality, but they remain within the frameworks which they 
criticise. 
Schussler Fiorenza is one amongst many theorists who have accused lrigaray of 
essentialism.4 As I argued in the last chapter, Schussler Fiorenza maintains that any kind 
of essentialism, one that proposes a natural essence or one that arises out of discursive 
practices, or both, is wrong. In my analysis of essentialism in chapter 1, I argued that in 
the nominalist/realist debate we can find the foundations of the essentialist controversy 
in feminism. Schussler Fiorenza's claim that any kind of essentialism, nominalist or real, 
commits one to revalorising and reinscribing kyriarchal essentialist categories, does not 
undermine this contention. Paradoxically, one might read her position as an incongruous 
4 See Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza. But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation (Beacon Press, Boston, 1992); Monique Plaza,"'Phallomorphic Power" and the Psychology of 
"woman'" in Ideology and Consciousness, 4 (Autumn 1978), pp. 5 - 35; Tori! Moi, "Patriarchal 
Reflections: Luce lrigaray's looking-glass" in Sexual Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (Routledge, London, 1991 ). 
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development of this distinction, but Schussler Fiorenza fails, however, to realise her own 
debt to nominalism. 
In Schussler Fiorenza's view, lrigaray's positioning herself within the 
woman/feminine, maternal/feminine discourse commits her to essentialism. As Schussler 
Fiorenza reads her, lrigaray is an unrepentant essentialist.5 Underlying Schussler 
Fiorenza's suspicion of lrigaray is her belief that any position which revalorises the 
feminine reinscribes "the Western kyriarchal sex/gender system".6 So for Schussler 
Fiorenza the mere use of terms (such as 'feminine') appears to constitute revalorising or 
reinscribing, as I pointed out in chapter 3. Use, then, is theory laden for Schussler 
Fiorenza, never value free (which is also the case for Daly and, as we shall see, lrigaray). 
In 1989, differences published Luce lrigaray's review of lo Memory of Her. 
lrigaray's review was at once praising and condemnatory of Schussler Fiorenza. lrigaray 
noted that she had begun reading "lo Memory of Her with astonishment and joy. At last 
something new on Christianity!"7 Her initial excitement was, however, tempered by 
Schussler Fiorenza's lack of acknowledgement that women are without a Divine of their 
own. lrigaray's review/critique challer:iges Schussler Fiorenza precisely at the point where 
traditional theology has failed to account for itself: how is one to theorise female 
embodiment in a religious context where it has always been devalorised in spite of the 
fact that the Incarnation and Resurrection have been, and remain, central to its beliefs 
and practices ?8 
5 For a discussion of the debate about lrigaray's alleged essentialism see Naomi Schor, 
"Previous Engagements: The receptions of lrigaray" in Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor and Margaret 
Whitford (eds.), Engaging With lrigaray: Feminist Philosophy and Modern European Thought (Columbia University Press, New York, 1994). 
6 Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, Sophia's Prophet: Critical Issues in 
Feminist Christology (Continuum, New York, 1994), p. 77. 
7 Luce lrigaray, "Equal To Whom?", in Naomi Schor & Elizabeth Weed, (eds.) The Essential 
Difference, Books from Differences Series (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994), p. 63. 
8 For some recent feminist readings of the Incarnation, see Susan A. Ross, "God's Embodiment 
and Women"; Mary Catherine Hilkert, "Experience and Tradition"; and Mary Aquin O'Neill, "The 
Mystery of Being Human Together", in Catherine Mowry La Cugna (ed.) Freeing Theology: The 
Essentials of Theology in Feminist Perspective (Harper, San Francisco, 1993). For a discussion of 
the lncorporeality of God, see Grace M. Dyck, "Omnipresence and lncorporeality" in Religious 
Studies. 13 (1977), pp. 85 - 91. See also Grace M. Jantzen [formerly 'Dyck'], God's World. God's 
SQd¥ (Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1984). For a response to Jantzen, see Charles Taliaferro 
''The lncorporeality of God" in Modern Theology, 3 (2) (1987), pp. 179 - 188. For her response to 
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The relationship between a feminine Divine (lrigaray's term) and a theology of the 
body9 has been important in lrigaray's recent writing. This is less of a concern to 
Schussler Fiorenza whose main interests are with the socio-political and the communal, 
rather than the articulation of the embodied subject, as I argued in my previous chapter. 
This 'rather than' should be read in terms of Schussler Fiorenza's implicit use of binary 
oppositional constructions (which she simultaneously seeks to disclaim): the logic of 
identity (everything is the same) or the logic of democracy (the ekklesia), but not both. 
That is to say, although Schussler Fiorenza contests binary constructions, she remains 
within a dualistic framework without recognising that she does so. However, she is very 
quick to concur with her commentators who think that lrigaray is dualistic in her thinking. 
Morny Joy, for example, argues in an article "Equality or Divinity: A False 
Dichotomy?"10 that lrigaray's review dichotomises equality and divinity. I do not agree that 
lrigaray actually does do this, although Schussler Fiorenza points out that Joy has 
correctly interpreted her whereas lrigaray has not.11 In my view, lrigaray is not dualistic 
or essentialist as Schussler Fiorenza understand the terms. lrigaray's review suggests 
that she does not think equality and divinity should be thought of disjunctively. 
The denigration of Christ's incarnation as a sexual being and the use to 
which that denial is put in ·the service of sexual hierarchization and 
exploitation seem to have blocked the understanding of that sexual nature 
and confined it to the province of patricians and Pharisees. This is what 
I find most compelling in Fiorenza's theological-historical argument. But, 
having said that, I think it's something else that interests me in part, 
namely the fact that a theology of women's liberation establishes as its 
Taliaferro, see "Reply to Taliaferro", in Modern Theology, 3 (2), 1987, pp. 189 - 192. See also, 
Sallie McFague, "God and the World",Models Of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age 
(Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1987), ch. 3, pp. 59 - 79. See also, Sallie McFague, The Body of 
God: An Ecological Theology (Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1993), where she explores the 
metaphor of the world as God's body. The point I am making, however, is that female embodiment 
is, generally speaking overlooked for two reasons: historically because of sexist assumptions and 
currently because of the danger of courting essentialism. Luce lrigaray, as we shall see, explores 
the trope of female embodiment in her discussion of divinity. 
9 For a discussion of the notion of a theology of the body in Catholicism, see op. cit., O'Neill , ''The 
Mystery of Being Human Together", in La Cugna, Freeing Theology. pp. 152 - 155. 
10 Morny Joy, "Equality or Divinity A False Dichotomy?", in Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion. 
6 (1) (1990), pp. 9 - 24. 
11 In private correspondence to me, Joy has acknowledged that she no longer believes this to be 
the case. 
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priority not equal access to the priesthood, but rather an equal share in 
the Divine. This means that what I see as manifestation of sexual 
liberation is God made a couple: man and simply God made man.12 
My reading of lrigaray here is that when it comes to articulating a liberation 
theology, it is an equal share in the Divine which is paramount and that precedes 
("establishes as its priority") equality in say, a women church, but the two are not 
exclusive. lrigaray perceives equality and divinity as different issues: equality concerns 
socio-political structuring and a share in the Divine is ontological and metaphysical. That 
does not make them necessarily opposed, however they may have been conceived 
historically.13 
Schussler Fiorenza notes that she and lrigaray use "two different discourses" and 
that the false dichotomy, the disjunction, equality or divinity (which I hold lrigaray does not 
construct), are not just what is at stake, but "the feminist theoretical shift from the logic 
of identity to that of democracy".14 Since lrigaray's declared intention is to fracture15 what 
Schussler Fiorenza calls the logic of identity (lrigaray: the logic of the Same), this is a 
strange remark for Schussler Fiorenza to make. Schussler Fiorenza argues that the logic 
of identity has two primary characteristics: its tendency to think everything as one 16 while 
simultaneously producing binary oppositional or dualistic terminology. 17 For Schussler 
Fiorenza, the logic of identity emphasises the individual over the socio-political cultivating 
an ethos of self interested pre-occupation which is witnessed by, for example, the 
12 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, "Equal to Whom?", p. 74. 
13 For example, this dichotomy might be thought of as analogous to the public/private dichotomy. 
See Moira Gatens, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality (Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 1991), passim. 
14 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said. p. 129. 
15 For a good discussion of lrigaray's fracturing in relation to dualism and mirroring, see Kathryn 
Bond Stockton, God Between Their Lips: Desire Between Women in lrigaray, Bronte and Eliot 
(Stanford University Press, California, 1994), especially "Divine Loss", pp. 49-60, where Bond 
Stockton discusses fracture, mirrors/mirroring and sameness. 
16 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said , p. 139. 
17 ibid., and passim. 
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concerns of privileged white women who have a vested interest in maintaining their first 
world advantage.10 
lrigaray and Schussler Fiorenza then, share a similar understanding of the logic 
of the Same/identity. But the emphasis which lrigaray places on the psychoanalytic and 
ultimately the symbolic structures of discourse, leads Schussler Fiorenza to reject her 
because she reads her as an essentialising feminist. Since lrigaray speaks of the 
specificity of women, the feminine and women's bodies,19 Schussler Fiorenza assumes 
she must be reinscribing masculine kyriocentric categories. My contention is that this is 
not the case. Rather, lrigaray uses an essentialist strategy which entails adopting 
essentialist language, without actually being committed to essentialism as it has been 
portrayed so far in this thesis.20 This strategy is the use of mimesis. Schussler Fiorenza's 
assumption indicates a lack of understanding of lrigaray's overall project: to explore the 
possibility of a feminine symbolic, which is not merely imitative of the male symbolic which 
generates (the concept of) and is imposed upon women. 
lrigaray's use of 'woman', 'the feminine' and 'the female' is always already 
interpreted within the double context of biology (the material) and culture (the discursive). 
At the same time, she uses these terms deliberately in a mimetic strategy contrived to 
acknowledge the pervasiveness of the male symbolic and structures. According to 
lrigaray, women are produced through a male symbolic which renders them the Other, 21 
the remainder, the excess of men. lrigaray's usage suggests that it is possible to talk of 
women as women, as a category defined by sex/gender, without reference to other 
18 Schussler Fiorenza quotes Laura Kipnis, "Feminism: The Political Consciousness of 
Postmodernism?" in Andrew Ross, Universal Abandon?: The Politics of Postmodernjsm (University 
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988), p. 162, as an instance of someone who holds this view. 
19 For example, the trope of the two lips in Luce lrigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One (trans. 
Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke) (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1985), passim; and the 
trope of the cave as uterus in 'Plato's Hystera' in op. cit., lrigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, 
pp. 243 - 364. 
2
° For discussion of lrigaray as a strategic feminist, see Margaret Whitford, Luce !rjgaray: 
Philosophy in the Feminine (Routledge, London & New York 1991); op. cit., Grosz, Sexual 
Subversions; and Naomi Schor, "Previous Engagements", in op. cit., Burke, Carolyn, Schor, Naomi, 
Whitford, Margaret (eds.) Engaging With lrigaray. 
21 In this she follows de Beaver. See The Second Sex (trans. H. M. Parsley) (Picador Books, 
London, 1949). 
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factors like class and race, because of her distinct allusions to the female body. For her, 
women's experience is something more than constructed through socio-political 
discursive practices: indeed 'woman' is a universal sex/gender category which is related 
to sex/gendered bodies. 
In this chapter I explore lrigaray's use of metaphor and mimesis in relation to the 
idea of women, as she examines the possibility of a feminine Divine. Echoing Grosz, I 
emphasise that lrigaray's project is not onto-theological. Her conception of the Divine is 
not concerned with elaborating being, with teleology, with genesis. Grosz comments that 
lrigaray's "notion of God is an inversion and displacement of its theological origins".22 On 
this reading, lrigaray does not set out to recover the "naturalistic, personal or 
judgemental" God to whom Grosz refers and who has figured in the theological 
ruminations and history of men. lrigaray's Divine is situated in the totality of women's 
experience(s) as Other to men where the possibility of a Divine is the possibility of a 
feminine symbolic. Women's experience and the Divine cannot be isolated. If for example, 
women's experience of the Divine is lack, then it is in lack that the Divine will be 
encountered. I take up these themes throughout this and in the next chapter. 
My discussion refers to, and where appropriate elucidates, Fauerbach's and 
Lacan's influence on lrigaray. 23 I assume that they have been significant in lrigaray's 
subversive project of imagining a possible feminine symbolic and Divine. Clearly the place 
we first encounter the influence of Lacan is in the symbolic. 
lrigaray claims that there is no feminine symbolic and that women exist through 
a symbolic which is masculine.24 She also claims that women have no Divine of their own 
and that they should develop their own sex-specific Divine in relation to a feminine 
22 
op. cit., Grosz, Sexual Subversions, p. 159. 
23 The Lacanian influence on lrigaray is well documented. See for example, op. cit., Joy, "Equality 
or Divinity: A False Dichotomy?" 
24 For discussions of the symbolic see op. cit., Whitford, Luce lrigaray: Philosophy io the Feminine; 
op. cit., Grosz. Sexual Subversions; and Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros: !rigaray's Re-writing of the 
Philosophers (Routledge, New York & London, 1995). This is a 'standard' line argued by many 
commentators on lrigaray. See, for example, op.cit. Grosz. Sexual Subversions. 
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symbolic.25 Grosz, as I remarked, notes that lrigaray rejects formulating God in traditional 
terms.26 lrigaray's elucidation of the Divine is influenced by Christian traditions, discussing 
as she does Christ's incarnation and the role of Mary, the Mother of God for example. 
Concurrently, she is influenced by Feuerbach's anthropological theology, rejecting the 
kind of onto-theology (theology of being}27 of which we have seen elements in Daly and 
Schussler Fiorenza. 
lrigaray's discussion of the possibility of a feminine symbolic also has important 
consequences for deciding what will count as women's experience, for a feminine 
symbolic is necessary to the construction of the concepts 'woman'. A sexually specific 
Divine provides the impetus for understanding the possibility of a feminine feminine and 
a feminine symbolic. 
Sexual Sameness and The Divine 
Throughout this chapter, I refer to the psychoanalytic concept, the symbolic, which 
Luce lrigaray has adapted from Lacan.28 lrigaray, interpreting Lacan and Freud, has 
argued that women have no symbolic of their own, that the symbolic through which one 
represents and interprets one's meanings is masculine and patriarchal, and assumes 
25 
"II manque a la femme un mirroir pour devenir femme. Avoir un Dieu et devenir son genre vont 
de pair. Dieu est l'autre dont nous avons absolument besoin ... Un dieu feminin est encore a venir 
... " Luce lrigaray, "Femmes Divines" in Sexes et Parentes (Les Editions de Minuit, 1987), p. 79. 
(Woman has no mirror wherewith to become a woman. Having a God and becoming one's gender 
go hand in hand. God is the other that we absolutely cannot be without ... A female god is still to 
come ... " Luce lrigaray, Sexes and Genealogies (trans. Gillian C. Gill) (Columbia University Press, 
1993), p. 67. 
26 
op. cit., Grosz, Sexual Subversions, p. 155: "Instead of seeing lrigaray as a 'born-again' Christo-
fem inist, her notion of God, or gods, and the divine is part of general strategy of deconstructive 
textual reading of philosophical (not simply theological) texts. This is an attempt to replace a 
metaphysical masculinist onto-theology, in which man defines and is not in turn defined by, God 
with the idea of sexual (and presumably cultural) specificity. Not a single, paternal God , whose unity 
is and universality sweeps away a polytheistic pantheon , but sexually specific gods, gods who 
represent the extension and perfection, the infinite becoming of sexually specific subjects". 
27 ibid., p. 155. 
28 Luce lrigaray, "Questions" in This Sex Which Is Not One. See Whitford, Luce lrigaray: 
Philosophy in the Feminine, for a comprehensive discussion of lrigaray's use of the symbolic. See 
also "Luce lrigaray and the Ethics of Alterity'' in op. cit., Grosz, Sexual Subversions; Jacques Lacan , 
Ecrjts: A Selection (trans. Alan Sheridan) (Tavistock Routledge, London, 1989): "The function and 
field of language in psychoanalysis" especially "II Symbol and language as structure and limit of 
the psychoanalytic field" and "Ill The resonances of interpretation and the time of the subject in 
psychoanalytic technique". 
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women's sameness rather than their difference.29 The masculine symbolic is patriarchal,30 
in so far as it represents power relations amongst and between men who exchange 
women as commodities in a society dominated by the Law of the Father.31 The primary 
symbols of that symbolic are the Phallus and the Father. lrigaray has claimed that women 
need to make their own female symbolic in which the feminine can become. 
My basic assumption is that the context for the meaningfulness of theistic 
experience and philosophical discourse in the Hebrew traditions, is the male symbolic. 
Its symbols are not sex-neutral and they represent the interests, power relations and 
interpretations of men. The God of Moses and subsequently the God of Christians and 
the God of the Philosophers,32 for example, connote the expression, understanding and 
belief which is embedded in the generation of a male symbolic which represents itself as 
neutral. The supposedly neutral symbolic engenders the apparently sexed/gendered 
subject and the purported neutrality ultimately, of reason itself.33 
The symbolic does not reflect feminine consciousness, a feminine subject, but 
encourages women to believe in the neutrality of the system in which lies their 
psychoanalytic origins. This, in part, is what lrigaray means when she speaks of the 
metaphysics of Same: that there is one common origin for all sexed/gendered positions.34 
lrigaray argues that the feminine - persisting and pervasive - needs to be radically cross-
29 See op. cit., lrigaray, "Any Theory of the "Subject" in Speculum of the Other Woman, passim; 
and "Plato's Hystera", p. 357. 
30 lrigaray does not represent patriarchy as a relationship between members of a gendered 
society per se. As I read her, she understands patriarchy as the rule of the masculine paternal, 
which is to say the father, as bearer of the phallus, rules and is symbolically (and practically) 
privileged in a society of his own making. The masculine symbolic therefore encompasses 
patriarchy. For a discussion of patriarchy as a relationship amongst gendered members of society, 
see op. cit., Gatens, Philosophy and Feminism. For a critique of patriarchy see op. cit., Schussler 
Fiorenza, But She Sajd. I take the ideas of the 'symbolic' and the male 'symbolic' to be co-
extensive. 
31 
op. cit., lrigaray, 'Women on the Market" and "Commodities amongst Themselves" in This Sex 
Which Is Not One. 
32 See Introductory Essay, pp. 8 ff. , of this thesis. 
33 See Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy 
(Methuen University Paperbacks, London, 1984); Sandra Harding , The Science Question in 
Feminism (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY & London, 1986); Evelyn Fox Keller, "Gender and 
Science: an Update" in Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Lancuace, Gender and 
Science (Routledge, New York, 1992). 
34 Compare this with the Genesis story in which the woman is produced from Adam's rib. 
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examined and explored. Her intuition that it is the symbolic which needs interrogation for 
it is the symbolic system - structure and content - which engenders the eternal feminine 
or any notion of the feminine, is a radical insight. The notions of woman/female/feminine 
are situated within, and arise from, the male symbolic which is supposedly neutral.35 
One of lrigaray's central claims is that women do indeed need their own Divine to 
develop their own symbolic. Let me emphasise then, that the pursuit and development 
of a female symbolic presupposes a philosophy of sexual difference which does not rest 
easily- nor is it intended to - with traditional theological conceptions of divinity, arising as 
they have from a male symbolic, the philosophical foundations of which have been clearly 
stated.36 lrigaray claims that there is only one sex, that the feminine in which women 
primarily participate, has been symbolised only as a masculine adjunct, the 'not' that the 
masculine is, the Other of the Same. 37 
The concept of sexual sameness dominates traditional metaphysics. In this 
lrigaray and Schussler Fiorenza are in complete agreement. Sexual sameness constitutes 
all humans as essentially one kind of subject: the rational masculine projection, the 
purportedly sex-neutral subject. How can this be changed without appealing to 
essentialist and dualistic notions of sex/gender? 
Women's Experience, the Masculine Symbolic and the Divine 
I argued in earlier chapters that feminist theologians have maintained, or 
assumed, that feminist theologies ought to be based upon women's experiences. 38 Apart 
35 
op. cit., lrigaray, Ibis Sex Which ls Not One. lrigaray announces that of course we do not know 
what masculine discourse is, there is no Other, p. 140. 
36 See the Pythagorean Table of Opposites, chapter 1, p. 47, of this thesis. See also Caroline 
Whitbeck, "Theories of Sex Difference" in Carol C. Gould and Marx W. Wartovsky, (eds.)~ Women 
and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation (Putnam, New York, 1980), for a discussion of the 
Pythagorean Monad and Dyad. 
37 See Rosi Braidotti,"Radical Philosophies of Sexual Difference: Luce lrigaray" in Polity Reader 
in Gender Studies (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994), pp. 62 - 70, for a discussion of this point. See 
also op. cit., Whitford, Luce lrigaray: Philosophy io the Feminine, p. 50 and p. 104. 
38 See Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, lo Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction 
of Christian Origins (SCM Press, London, 1983); Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-
Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology (SCM Press, London, 1983). For discussions of the notion of 
experience in relation to feminist theory see Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn't: Feminism. 
Semiotics, Cinema (Macmillan, London, 1984), p. 159; Joan W. Scott, "Experience" in Judith P. 
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from considerations about the semantics of the terms 'woman' and 'experience' which I 
have been discussing throughout, it follows that if it is the case that 'woman', 'female' and 
'feminine' are concepts from within the male symbolic, then to speak of women's 
experiences is to speak of experiences which are constructed out of the meanings implicit 
in that symbolic. Women's experience must be masculine feminine experience, to use 
lrigaray's expression. 
On this account, a theology based upon women's experience must, therefore, be 
a theology whose structures and contents are inalienably male. Hence, for women to think 
of community or immanence, for example, as the experiential basis upon which to build 
a theology, is for women to subscribe to patriarchal, masculinist notions of womanhood, 
femininity and the Divine. In Sexism and God-talk for example, one of Radford Ruether's 
primary categories is 'women's experience'. Ruether argues that "Human experience is 
the starting point and ending point of the hermeneutical circle".39 She goes on to argue 
that "the uniqueness of feminist theology lies not in its use of the criterion of experience 
but rather in its use of women's experience, which has been almost entirely shut out of 
theological reflection in the past" [her emphasis].40 
Radford Ruether acknowledges that women's experience has been silenced, 
omitted and overlooked in the mainstream traditions. But Radford Ruether does not take 
a step back and examine what she means by 'women's experience'. She takes it that the 
Butler & Joan W. Scott (eds.), Feminists Theorize the Political (Routledge, New York, 1992); bell 
hooks. feminist theory from margin to center (South End Press, Boston, 1987); Deborah H. King, 
"Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of Black Feminist Ideology", in Micheline 
R. Malson, Jean F. O'Barr, Sarah Westphal-Wihl & Mary Wyer (eds.) in Feminist Theory in Practice 
and Process (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989); Anne Pattel-Gray,"Not yet Tiddas: An 
Aboriginal Womanist Critique of Australian Church Feminism" in Maryanne Confoy, Dorothy A. Lee 
& Joan Nowotny, Freedom and Entrapment: Women Thinking Theology (Dove Publications, 
Melbourne, 1995). 
39 See op. cit., Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-talk, p. 12. 
40 ibid., p. 13. 
136 
concept is self-evident and that it is somehow a 'pure' category. For Radford Ruether, it 
would seem, women's experience is explanatory and not in need of explanation. Radford 
Ruether's account typifies the kind which Scott rejects. 
Experience, thought of as that which explains, emanates from the idea of a 
subject which is pre-given.41 The idea that the subject is pre-given implies an essential 
nature which is stereotypically and essentially feminine. On this view, women's 
experiences, that they are supposedly caring, nurturing and gentle for example, is linked 
to women's biological functions as mother, the eternal feminine. Schussler Fiorenza is 
correct in claiming that one should reject this kind of characterisation as essentially true 
of women. lrigaray takes the important step of linking those qualities to the male symbolic. 
Within the male symbolic they are self-evidently true: women are no more than what is 
already structurally, symbolically, given. 
Recall for instance that in the Pythagorean Table of Opposites, male and female 
are opposed and the qualities on each side of the Table are associated with each other. 
Women's experience, I argued, is defined in terms of the negative Other against the male. 
The female is the privative of the male and for this reason, women, conceived of as 
necessarily female, lack specific woman's essence. The system within w~ich the female 
is defined, however, is itself male, insofar as it privileges its own positive attributes. 
Because the female is defined against the male and in terms of the privative, the male 
includes the female. 
On this account, women's experience as a point of departure for a female 
symbolic, is fraught with the difficulty of masculine inclusion of the feminine. The 
masculinity of the symbolic has repercussions not only for the status of the feminine: 
given that the symbolic is masculine, its God, too, is masculine. lrigaray sets out 
deliberately to refigure the Divine in terms of the feminine. She wants to make a God for 
women. lrigaray remarks that: 
All men (especially according to Fauerbach) and all women, except when 
they remain submitted to the logic of the essence of man, should imagine 
a God for themselves, an objective and subjective place or path for the 
41 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge) (Clarenden Press, Oxford, 
1968), Book I, "Of the Understanding", Section VI "Of Personal Identity", pp. 251 - 263. 
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possible assemblage of the self in space and time: a unity of instinct, 
heart and knowledge, a unity of nature and spirit, a condition of the 
homeland and of sainthood. Only a God can save us and guard over us. 
The feeling or experience of a positive, objective and glorious existence 
for our subjectivity is necessary for us. Such as a God who helps and 
guides us in our becoming, who holds the measure of our limits - women -
and our relation to the infinite, which inspires our endeavours. Not only as 
an opposition to or critique of but as a position consisting of new values, 
"essentially" Divine ones [her emphasis].42 
lrigaray's comments bring into sharp focus her recognition that sociology is not 
enough. Her remark about being quickly bored with sociology when she expects the 
Divine, which I used at the beginning of this thesis, finds its rationale in the above 
quotation. For lrigaray, the Divine is the site of resolution of opposites: objective and 
subjective, intuition and reason, spirit and nature, finitude and infinity. I take up this point 
further in chapter 5. The 'new values' which these dichotomies supersede and create, re-
position woman's potential outside the male symbolic, and are intimately tied up with the 
development of a potential feminine symbolic. Those values are expressions of the 
feminine Divine. 
lrigaray does not believe that women should simply adopt the masculine projection 
of the feminine and consonantly, she does not believe that women sh~uld adopt the 
paternal masculine God. Instead, women should seek a feminine Divine in which new 
values can be elaborated. The two are intimately connected, for she maintains that if 
women develop a feminine Divine, and therefore a feminine subject, women will also 
develop a feminine symbolic. The development of a feminine Divine is a condition for the 
development of a feminine symbolic.43 This is the moment at which Feuerbach's 
contention that man projects his own God is deeply significant for lrigaray. She does not 
read the term "man" generically. She reads it as sex-specific and takes this up to make 
her announcement that woman needs her own God. 
Quoting Feuerbach's "God is the mirror of man", lrigaray alleges that "Woman has 
no mirror wherewith to become a woman. Having a God and becoming one's gender go 
42 Luce lrigaray, Divine Women (trans. of 'Femmes Divines', Stephen Muecke) (Local 
Consumption, Sydney, 1986), pp. 8 & 9. 
43 See op. cit., Deutscher,"'The Only diabolic thing about women . . . ". 
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hand in hand. God is the other which we absolutely cannot be without. "44 Elizabeth Grosz 
implies that lrigaray has no more than a Feuerbachian project in mind when she posits 
the necessity of a Divine for women.45 lrigaray positions herself more critically in relation 
to Feuerbach than this. She argues that the paternal masculine God46 has indeed 
developed from a mirroring/projecting process in which men have engaged in order to 
displace their finitude. But she sees women's project as developing an ideal for 
themselves, a positivity which is a condition for developing a feminine symbolic. 
If we grant lrigaray's assertion that having a God and becoming one's gender go 
hand in hand, and that the symbolic is not gender neutral but masculine, it must be the 
case that men already have their God. Because she reads "man" as sex-specific, 
however, it is not the case that women have a God of their own. 
But what is it that Feuerbach is claiming when he argues that God is the mirror 
of man? He argues: 
Religion is human nature reflected, mirrored in itself. That which exists 
has necessarily a pleasure, a joy in itself, loves itself and loves itself justly; 
to blame it because it loves itself is to reproach it because it exists. To 
exist is to assert oneself, to affirm oneself, to love oneself; he to whom life 
is a burthen, rids himself of it. Where, therefore, feeling is not depreciated 
and repressed, as with the Stoics, where existence is awarded to it, there 
also is a religious power and significance already conceded to it, there 
also is it already exalted to that stage in which it can mirror and reflect 
itself, in which it can project its own image of God. God is the mirror of 
man.47 
Feuerbach alleges that God is the projected limits of human consciousness, 
mirrored back as the Other. The idea of human consciousness/self-consciousness as that 
44 
op. cit., lrigaray, Sexes and Genealogies, p. 67. 
45 In lrigaray and the Divine (Local Consumption, Sydney, 1986) > p. 12, Grosz (formerly 'Gross') 
consistently emphasises the projected nature of the feminine divine. "lrigaray's God is neither 
naturalistic, nor personal, neither forgiving nor judgemental; it is not the totality, unity, origin or 
purpose of the world. It is the principle of the ideal, the projection the (sexed) subject onto the figure 
of the perfection, an e.g. - ideal specific to that subject ... ". 
46 That is to say, the God of the Fathers and the God who is Father. 
47 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (trans. Marian Evans) (John Chapman, London, 
1854), p. 62. Feuerbach develops this mirror/projection theory at length. See in particular Part 1, 
ch. 11, "The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion", but his claims are clearly set out 
throughout his book. 
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which constructs all human experience, its pervasive presence and action as the very 
constituter of human being itself, subtends Feuerbach's theological anthropology. For 
him, the possession of reflective consciousness distinguishes man from all other 
creatures. Note his debt to Aristotle who, as we saw in chapter 1, regarded the 
possession of deliberative capacity, which I read as analogous to the idea of reflective 
consciousness, as present only in men (of a certain class). Also note that experience is 
that which is constructed, not that which constructs. One could read this in the light of 
Scott's analysis of experience . 
In the Introduction to The Essence of Christianity. Feuerbach argues that religion 
is "identical with the distinctive characteristic of man, is then identical with self-
consciousness - with the consciousness man has of his nature."48 He claims that: 
. . . consciousness is essentially infinite in its nature. The consciousness 
of the infinite is nothing else than the infinity of the consciousness; or, in 
the consciousness of the infinite, the conscious subject has for his object 
the infinity of his own nature. 49 
In being the mirror of man, God is the mirror of man's infinity: God is the ultimate 
expression of human limitlessness. The problem with traditional theology as Feuerbach 
sees it, is that man has mistakenly construed God as an existence separate, distinct, 
other than human consciousness, an independent existent. Hence, man has conceived 
of God as a perfected, mirror image of himself, but also as a reversal of, and separation 
from, his own consciousness. In other words man has reified his infinite consciousness: 
he has made of God a distinct, different being. 
Religion is the disuniting of man from himself: he sets God before him as 
the antithesis of himself. God is not what man is - man is not what God is. 
God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; 
God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man 
sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolute positive, the sum 
of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all 
negations. 50 
48 ibid., P-2· 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid., p. 32. One wonders if the God/man relation might be seen analogously as the 
Man/Woman relation where Man is God and Woman is man. 
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Feuerbach insists, however, that it is not the case that God does not exist. If man 
were to deny the existence of God, man must deny the existence of his consciousness, 
and must also deny the existence of feeling, or any other human attribute, quality, 
disposition.51 
The existence of God is therefore "guaranteed" by the existence of infinite 
human consciousness which itself projects the infinite; and by the existence of 
the range of human attributes and potentialities which consciousness 
manifests. 52 A consequence of Feuerbach's position is that "man cannot get beyond his 
true nature".53 But God exists as the idealised projection of consciousness. This is the 
point at which lrigaray enters into the debate. 
Feuerbach maintains that qualities, what we predicate of something, constitute 
that something as a subject. 54 God, therefore, is not an 'empty' subject (if such be 
possible}, for God's attributes constitute him as a subject.55 On this basis the via negativa 
is an untenable theological position for Feuerbach, for one cannot conceive of a subject 
whose predicates are not known.56 This might be compared with Schussler Fiorenza's 
claim about the analogical nature of God-talk. All the subject-constituting-predicates of 
God are predicates of man: they cannot be any other. Human consciousness can 
comprehend only what it is capable of producing from itself. This leads Feuerbach to 
51 ibid., p. 10. 
52 In the context of what she perceives as the god/man schism, Deutscher takes up the idea of 
god as guarantor in lrigaray's texts. Deutscher's argument involves the idea that the nature of the 
god/man relation explicitly assumes a severing of the Divine and man. See op. cit., Deutscher, 
"'The Only diabolic thing about women ... ", pp. 93 - 94. 
53 
op. cit., Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p. 11. 
54 ibid., §2, ''The Essence of Religion considered generally'', pp. 12-42. He acknowledges his debt 
to Aristotle earlier on. 
55 ibid., p. 24. 
56 ibid., p. 34. The irony of this position is that Feuerbach, by saying what God is not (a distinct and 
separate being), holds a version of negative theology. 
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argue that Divine activity, Divine being, because it is comprehensible by consciousness, 
cannot be essentially different from human consciousness. 57 
For Feuerbach then, consciousness, although infinite, is (metaphorically 
speaking), closed in the sense that it limits what is humanly conceivable. Outside 
consciousness, there is nothing. God as an ontologically distinct being is impossible. 
Feuerbach holds that ontological difference is precluded by the nature of human 
consciousness. 58 
By asserting that the symbolic is masculine and that it might be possible to 
construct a feminine symbolic, lrigaray challenges this 'closed' view of consciousness. 
She does not hesitate in positing a relationship between bodily experience and 
consciousness and its symbolic structures and contents. Sexed embodiment is primary 
in the constitution of sexed subjectivity and in the formation of consciousness. 59 Female 
embodiment is represented through a male symbolic which, in psychoanalytic terms, 
figures the female body as an atrophied male body (which lacks a penis in other words). 
Since the symbolic is masculine, a product of male experience and male understanding, 
consciousness cannot/does not stand outside this understanding. In this sense 
consciousness is itself 'masculine'. So lrigaray, in contesting the validity of the male 
symbolic for women and proposing the possibility of a feminine symbolic, disputes the 
notion of a sex neutral consciousness. But she also challenges the possibility of 
ontological difference. 
Feuerbach works within a framework of a philosophy of the Same: all that there 
is, belongs to one symbolic, one consciousness. lrigaray posits a sexed difference with 
symbolic and ontological repercussions in which a potentially female-sexed subject 
informs a female-sexed consciousness. 
57 ibid., p. 29. 
58 For a discussion of ontological difference see Rosi Braidotti, "The Politics of Ontological 
difference", in Teresa Brennan (ed:), Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis (Routledge, London 
& New York, 1989). 
59 For a discussion of this point see Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal 
Feminism (Allen & Unwin, St. Leonard's, 1994). 
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I remarked earlier that according to lrigaray, creating a feminine and creating a 
feminine Divine must be the same undertaking. Feuerbach's mirror imagery is an 
important metaphor here. The mirror that women need in order to become women is not 
something which simply produces or projects an idealised image. The mirror itself, the 
means by which an image can be produced, is an issue for lrigaray. 
We look at ourselves in the mirror to please someone, rarely to interrogate 
the state of our body or our spirit, rarely for ourselves and in search of our 
own becoming. The mirror almost always serves to reduce us to a pure 
exteriority - of a particular kind. It functions as a possible way to constitute 
screens between the Other and myself. In a way quite different from the 
mucous membranes or the skin that serve as living, porous, fluid media 
to achieve communion as well as difference, the mirror is a frozen - and 
polemical - weapon to keep us apart .... The mirror and the gaze are 
frequently used as weapons or tools that ward off touching and hold back 
fluidity, even the liquid embrace of the gaze .... Although necessary at 
times as a separating tool, the mirror - and the gaze when it acts as a 
mirror - ought to remain a means and not an end that forces my 
obedience. The mirror should support, not undermine my incarnation ... 60 
Within this context, we might read lrigaray's talk about the mirror which women 
need, as condemnatory of the contents - the gaze by which women are regulated as 
objects ("pure exteriority'') - and as an appeal for the structure or form of the mirror to be 
. 
reconstituted. 61 While she obviously sympathises with Fauerbach, lrigaray's project to 
construct a feminine Divine takes on a dimension which his (to reinterpret religion as an 
anthropological concern) does not have. She reads Fauerbach literally and argues that 
if God is the mirror of man, and God is masculine, then a feminine God should be the 
mirror of woman. Her reading of Fauerbach bears directly on what she holds is the 
gendered nature of the Divine and the creation of sexual difference. The mirror reflects, 
projects and represents embodiment and the body is sexed. Sexual difference already 
contains the idea of embodiment. But it must be seen and represented under the gaze 
of a woman. Hence women's need of a mirror will be need of a mirror that is sexed in 
terms of its ability to re-present and re-figure. A symbolic which is a feminine feminine 
60 
op. cit., lrigaray, Sexes and Genealogies. p. 65. 
61 For a fuller discussion of the mirror trope see lrigaray's essay "Une mere de glace" in op. 
cit.,lrigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, pp. 168 - 179. 
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symbolic and through which the mirror will alter its own gaze is what will engender 
feminine incarnation. 
At the moment however, women are the Other, different from men, symbolically 
mutilated or lacking. But that Otherness and difference is constructed such that they are 
not ontologically different from men. lrigaray uses the difference of women as constructed 
by the masculine symbolic as a means to subvert the symbolic itself. Using the 
masculine feminine as her starting point, lrigaray manipulates the symbolic 
representation of women to examine the possibility of a feminine symbolic, a feminine 
feminine. 
Mimesis: the becoming of the feminine 
So far in this thesis, I have argued that using women's experience as a theological 
category is not as straight forward as it might seem. With the introduction of lrigaray's 
perspective, the argument takes a different turn. Since women's experience is situated 
within a masculine symbolic, the problematic of women's experience as a foundational 
category becomes even more perilous. The very possibility of there being a feminine 
feminine, hence a female symbolic in which women can become their own genre, (and 
be their own experience) appears to be precluded from consideration because of the 
totalising effect of the male symbolic. But put simply, it is all that women have got. Recall 
that I made this point in connection with Daly in chapter 2, when I argued that she is 
dependent upon the philosophical systems which she has inherited. 
If the male symbolic is the totality of the symbolic within which women are defined 
in terms of lack, then women are granted no ontological independence. As the Other of 
the Same, women, represented negatively, are so atrophied that they have been rendered 
incapable of figuring their difference. Within the Lacanian scheme however, the 
masculine symbolic does not totally exhaust possible representation of the feminine. 
Lacan alleges: 
Her being not all in the phallic function does not mean that she is not in 
it at all. She is in it not not at all. She is right in it. But there is something 
more .... There is a jouissance, since we are dealing with jouissance, a 
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jouissance of the body which is, if the expression be allowed, beyond the 
phallus ... A jouissance beyond the phallus ... 62 
Lacan had also argued that "woman knows nothing of this jouissance'63 (and 
interestingly enough compared it with the mystical).64 It is in this way that we might think 
of women's inability to represent herself symbolically.65 While the male symbolic imposes 
limits on the feminine, it realises that its limitations are not exhaustive. In constituting and 
symbolising the feminine, the masculine does not quite take her all unto itself: the 
embodied feminine remains yet elusive. She is the unconsumed, the unexhausted, the 
Other which overflows. Symbolising the feminine as the two lips always touching, is 
lrigaray's rejoinder: female embodiment is symbolised as always too much, in the explicit, 
constant contact of the two lips.66 
So lrigaray argues that "one sex is not entirely consumed by the Other. There is 
always a remainder."67 The remainder is the excess of the Other of the Same. The role 
of jouissance or feminine excess which is beyond the Other of the Same, the masculine 
feminine, is critical to the discussion of difference. lrigaray defies Lacan and claims 
jouissance (feminine excess) for feminine consciousness. Her ploy is to challenge the 
assertion that women know nothing of jouissance and to acknowledge feminine excess. 
Since this must be an excess that is generated (but not contained) by the male symbolic -
for the feminine is yet a masculine feminine - what can be said of jouissance, its 
acknowledgement (and ultimately its symbolisation) cannot be contained by the masculine 
62 Jacques Lacan, Feminine Sexuality: Jacgues Lacan and the Ecole Feudienne (Juliet Mitchell 
& Jacqueline Rose, eds.) (trans. Jacqueline Rose) (Macmillan, London, 1982), p. 145. 
63 ibid., p. 146. 
64 
"b'd I I . 
65 See Jane Gallop, Feminism and Psychoanalysis: The Daughter's Seduction (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, NY, 1982). 
66 
op. cit., Luce lrigaray. This Sex Which Is Not One. 
67 Luce lrigaray, "Sexual Difference", in An Ethics of Sexual Difference (trans. Carolyn Burke & 
Gillian Gill) (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1993), p. 14. 
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symbolic.68 The male symbolic cannot speak for what it cannot symbolise: jouissance. If 
that excess were to be symbolised within the masculine symbolic, it no longer would be 
excess. In other words, the logic of the masculine symbolic precludes the possibility of 
symbolising feminine excess, precludes the possibility of going beyond the phallus. But 
how does lrigaray claim jouissance for feminine consciousness? 
In ''The Power of Discourse", Luce lrigaray argued that women must work towards 
destroying discursive mechanisms, 'the operation of the "grammar" of each figure of 
discourse, its syntactic laws or requirements, its imaginary configurations, its metaphoric 
networks, and also of course, what it does not articulate at the level of utterance: its 
silences' [her italics].69 Discursive mechanisms, the structures of discourse, are contained 
within the male symbolic. Since there is no alternative to the male symbolic, it might seem 
that it is not possible to construct anything quite different from it. No matter where women 
turn, they will always be faced by the symbolic which has bound them as women. lrigaray 
contests this assumption by thinking the possibility of women's discourse: ecriture 
feminine "women's writing or sometimes 'writing the body"'70 and in the complementary 
development of a possible female genealogy. One is reminded of Daly's language play: 
subverting the male paradigm in which women are defined by manipulating its own 
semiotics and semantics. 
For lrigaray, feminine genealogy is one of the silences of the masculine symbolic 
which women must work to destroy71 • She has suggested that one way in which women 
can begin to explore the possibility of women's own symbolic is "through subjective 
relations between mothers and daughters."72 I take her here to be talking about 
68 In Luce lrigaray, Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution (trans. Karin Montin) 
(Routledge, New York, 1994). 
69 
op. cit., lrigaray, ''The Power of Discourse", in This Sex Which Is Not One, p. 75. 
70 
op. cit., Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine, p. 1 o. 
71 For another account of genealogy see Kathy E. Ferguson, "Interpretation and Genealogy" in 
The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1993), ch. 1. 
72 Luce trigaray, Je, tu, nous: Towards a Culture of Difference (trans. Alison Martin) (Routledge, 
London & New York, 1993), p. 47. 
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symbolising this relationship through the creating of a female genealogy and in terms of 
ecriture feminine. 
''The Forgotten Mystery of Female Ancestry", the text of a lecture which appears 
in thinking the difference, is lrigaray's exploration and condemnation of the banishment 
of female genealogy from our mythic cultures.73 In that lecture lrigaray points out that both 
the mother/daughter relationship and the primal mother do not exist in Western 
cultural/mythic consciousness and/or they have been obliterated. For lrigaray this 
represents the destruction of female ancestry "especially in its Divine aspect". 74 She 
argues that women now exist through an undifferentiated masculine/neuter chaos. 
Dreams of unity cannot be realised whilst this chaos dominates, suggests lrigaray, 
because there can only be unity where there is difference.75 This undifferentiated chaos 
is precisely where she situates what she calls our hom(m)osexual economy, the economy 
of the Same and her claims about the representation of the male subject.76 
Throughout the lecture lrigaray is clear in her denunciation of the undifferentiated 
(the male symbolic), and equally, she is clear that feminine difference needs to be found 
outside the male symbolic in order for men and women to come together as lovers, "both 
carnal and spiritual." She cites Aphrodite as the embodiment of a deity "who manifests 
the possible spiritualization of blind drives or instincts through tenderness and affection 
... In Greek, Aphrodite's specific attribute is called philotes: tenderness" [her italics].77 
73 
op. cit., lrigaray, Thinking the Difference. pp. 91 - 113. This is also a theme which is dominant 
in op. cit., Feuerbach, "The Mystery of Mysticism", in Essence of Christianity. pp. 90 - 92. 
74 
op. cit., Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p. 1 oo. 
75 I take lrigaray's comment, "We have become unisex in our drives ... We are supposedly 
neither man nor woman because we are not yet men and women; we are still in the abyss of 
undifferentiated human being, the male pole of the most primeval Eros", op. cit., lrigaray. Thinking 
the Difference. p. 92, to be interpretable in the light of Galatians 3:28: "There can be neither Jew 
nor Greek, there can be neither slave or free man, there can be neither male nor female - for you 
are all one in Christ Jesus",Galatians 3:28 in The New Jerusalem Bible (Doubleday, New York, 
1985). 
76 
op. cit., lrigaray, ''The Power of Discourse", in This Sex Which Is Not One, p. 74. 
n op. cit., lrigaray, Thinking the Difference, p. 94. 
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But lrigaray also argues for a kind of separatism that will remove women from the 
bartering/exchange arrangements within which women presently exist and are 
represented: 
All these codes are beyond the little girl. She may make a mistake but she 
does not decide to do so. She is caught up in the dealings, contractual or 
otherwise, between men, between men and male gods. According to their 
agreements, she should refuse everything from men and gods so that she 
will not be seduced through a mistake on her part. She should keep well 
away from mankind, men's contracts, men's relationships, until her 
virginity is no longer a subject of negotiations between men. She should 
remember that virginity signifies her relationship to her physical and moral 
integrity, and not the price of a deal between men. She should learn to 
keep herself to herself ... 78 
For lrigaray then, female genealogy, the honouring of the mother/daughter 
relationship and the honouring of the mother per se are essential in the development of 
a feminine symbolic79 but they also have what I shall call a redemptive potential, for 
through them, lrigaray believes, awareness of the importance of social justice and 
ecology can evolve.80 Difference will emanate through the ungrounding of the male 
symbolic, as a female genealogy is created. Re-reading women's mythic traditions is 
integral to this process.81 The re-reading, retrieval and refiguring of that fradition will be 
part of the process of making a feminine Divine.82 
78 ibid., p. 108. 
79 lrigaray points out that Mary the mother of Jesus, does not appear to have a mother and that 
the Greek goddesses are all motherless as they emerge from primal chaos which is 
masculine/neutral. See ibid., Thinking the Difference. See also op. cit., "Divine Women" where 
lrigaray discusses the necessity of female genealogy to a feminine symbolic. 
80 
op. cit., lrigaray, Thinking the Difference, p. 112. 
81 I see much of lrigaray's work in this context ranging from mythic through psychoanalytic and 
philosophical tradition. It is arguable that these traditions exist as part of the masculine feminine 
symbolic. The importance of mimesis, of miming the masculine feminine comes into play here. So 
I see the acknowledgement of the feminine tradition here as integral to the overall project and to 
mimesis. 
82 
cf op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, lo Memory of Her, and op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She 
Said, whose views also propose re-reading and retrieving women's traditions of the Christian 
Church, but within what I read as quite an orthodox context in that she retains unquestioningly, 
elements of orthodox Christian thinking for example the importance and centrality of Jesus. 
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I remarked before that masculine feminine experience is all that women have got. 
The re-reading of women's mythic traditions, where they do exist, will be a re-reading of 
the traditions as they are symbolised by the male symbolic. Compare this with Daly's 
enterprise in the Wickedary where she emphasises women's mythic origins. In both 
cases, women's experience(s) (even if constituted by the masculine symbolic) underpins 
those traditions. Where they are not symbolised, the discursive mechanisms which 
prevent their articulation must be challenged and destroyed. lrigaray chooses mimesis 
as the strategy which will enable their destruction and propose a feminine symbolic. 
lrigaray contends that within the male symbolic, the role of mimicry has been 
historically assigned to the feminine. She argues that "one must assume the feminine role 
deliberately. Which means already to convert a form of subordination into an affirmation, 
and thus to begin to thwart it."83 Hence lrigaray recognises that women's position in 
relation to creating a feminine symbolic is not irrevocable and argues that what women 
must do is to exploit and to transform the feminine, by deliberately assuming what it says 
that women are.84 In other words, lrigaray suggests that women should use the 
masculine feminine as a mimetic strategy to exploit their specification within phallocratic, 
male discourse.85 How one is to understand her project here, however, is contentious. 
83 
op. cit., lrigaray. This Sex Which Is Not One, p. 76. 
84 This is the context of the substantial controversy over whether or not Luce lrigaray is 
essentialist, which I mentioned earlier in relation to Schussler Fiorenza. See for example op. cit., 
Toril Moi, "Patriarchal reflections" in Sexual aextual Politics, pp. 127-147; op. cit., Plaza, 
"'Phallomorphic Power"; op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, But She Said; Diana Fuss "'Essentially 
Speaking": Luce lrigaray's Language of Essence' in Nancy Fraser & Sandra Lee Bartky (eds.) 
Revaluing French Feminism: Critical Essays on Difference. Agency. and Culture (Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington, 1992). 
85 Judith Butler, in Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge, London 
& New York, 1990), discusses parody as a political and social tactic which has the ability to displace 
identities which have no origin, which are in fact imitative. Butler argues this in relation to drag and 
comments, "In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself - as 
well as its contingency" [her italics], pp. 136 -37. The question which seems to arise here is whether 
or not lrigaray intends women to imitate gender (viz. sexual behaviour). Given that she is quite 
explictt in articulating women as sexed subjects, I do not think this is the case. The relation between 
the sexed subject and her female body is both fundamental and historically contingent. I think 
lrigaraywants women to take this very seriously. The point of her mimetic strategy seems then to 
be subversive and transformational to claim, create, identity rather than a strategy for deferring 
identity, which if I read Butler at all well is what she is speaking about. 
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To evoke her idea that women are without a gender, lrigaray has argued that they 
are in a state of dereliction.86 That dereliction suffuses them not because women lose 
their identity within a patriarchal system but because they have never had any identity 
except within the system: all symbols, signs and so on are alien; they are not theirs. This 
is partially the sense in which women do not have essence, the point I made in discussing 
Aristotle. In their Otherness, defined by patriarchy, then, they have failed to realise any 
symbolic which articulates their specificity as sexed feminine subjects; failed that is, to 
constitute a feminine symbolic of their own. As we have seen, the implication is that 
women presently are masculine feminine subjects. That is to say, women as subjects, 
are produced through the operation of a masculine symbolic which dictates what it means 
to be both a subject and a feminine subject. In that sense, women are not subjects at all 
but objects within the masculine symbolic.87 
By self-consciously miming the masculine feminine, lrigaray believes it might be 
possible to begin to fabricate a feminine feminine. A fundamental constituent of this 
process will be the establishment of a female genealogy, in which women will represent 
the (presently) unsymbolised mother/daughter relationship. 
As a strategy, mimesis - the self-conscious appropriation of the masculine 
feminine within the masculine symbolic - provides the means for moving into the fluidity, 
openness, fecundity and multiplicity of the feminine. It involves acknowledging one's 
dereliction - one's abandonment in the void of the unsymbolised. 
The idea of mimesis is alluring, in that mimesis embraces, rather than rejects, the 
Otherness of woman, of the feminine. It does that by acknowledging feminine excess, 
jouissance, as an incorporative ingredient of potentially feminine being. In taking seriously 
the notion of the masculine feminine, in drawing out its implications, but nonetheless 
denying its eternal veracity, one can explore the risk proposed through strategically 
miming the feminine in all its masculine representations: Other, jouissance and the 
silences amongst which one will find genealogy. 
86 
op. cit., Luce lrigaray, "An Ethics of Sexual Difference" in An Ethics of Sexual Difference. p. 126. 
87 
op. cit., lrigaray, This Sex Which is not One, passim. 
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But what does/will all of this mean in practical and theoretical terms? A number 
of issues come to mind: 
1. Although lrigaray suggests that women should mime the masculine feminine 
she takes for granted that her connotations of "mimesis" are understood. For what 
does she actually mean by mimesis? Mere copying or parody or imitation? To 
what end? 
2. If not mere copying, if deliberate mime for example, how is the mime, in the 
end, different from being/living the masculine feminine? 
3. Who/what is doing the miming, as an actress acts? In other words, does 
being aware that one is miming change what one is doing? Would women not 
simply be playing a role as any actress plays a role? Is this not a kind of grand 
self-delusion? 
4. What are the consequences, practical and theoretical, of engaging in the 
activity/pursuit of mimesis? Would it mean that women would, in the end, 
establish their own symbolic structure with its own language significations and 
terms; develop a new value system in which an emerging genealogy based on the 
mother daughter relationship is prized; develop a new or deeper understanding 
of Divinity with the former as its symbolic constituents, as lrigaray implies it 
would? 
5. Or would women be caught up in a world of pretense where there is nothing 
meaningful but the role women play and the context in which it arises: patriarchy? 
6. Would it mean that women should no longer participate in the enduring 
political practices of patriarchy? How would the female symbolic relate to the 
male? 
7. And what of moral and political questions? Would women selectively engage 
in mimesis, make choices about what women would privilege in, and practice out, 
of the (masculine) feminine? 
8. On what basis would such choices be made? 
I have suggested that mimesis is contentious, so in the light of these multifarious 
questions, how is one to respond to, and understand, lrigaray's project? lrigaray's 
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comment that women should "assume the feminine role" is ambiguous. She recommends 
either a project in which women mime the masculine feminine, or one in which women 
mime the excess, jouissance, the remainder to which I earlier referred, or even that 
women do both. Her writing suggests the former, viz. women mime the masculine 
feminine. 
Yet in articulating woman in the role of Other (as has been the tradition), lrigaray 
surely cannot just be asserting that the Other is the masculine feminine. Given that she 
believes that there is only one sex, the feminine of the masculine seems to be not Other 
in terms of the unknowable, but Other in terms of knowable. It is knowable because the 
masculine actually defines the feminine, says what the feminine means. Hence the 
argument might go: the feminine is a construction by the masculine, that which says what 
one is as a woman, as feminine/female. But the consequence of this 'knowable that 
women are' is that since their terms are imprecise (fluid, ever changing, multiple, 
unpredictable), an excess, overflow, remainder, a further Other, is created. 
'Other' thus becomes a two-pronged term, with a meaning generated from within 
the male symbolic (immanent? or 'inside Other') and a meaning which is outside that 
symbolic (transcendent? or 'outside Other'). So there are two senses in which, I think, one 
should understand the Other. The Other is both the known symbolised, the 
contents/structure of the male symbolic, including the masculine feminine; and the 
unsymbolised, what flows out of and cannot be captured by the male symbolic: the 
(unknown) feminine feminine (the nothing to which I referred earlier). 
If this is the case, the two possible readings of lrigaray I have proposed seem to 
be mutually dependent: miming the masculine feminine and jouissance which only 
women can symbolise. The masculine symbolic gives clues for a possible feminine 
symbolic. In miming the masculine feminine, women would implicitly approach the Other 
of the unsymbolised by arrogating her characteristics. In other words, if women 
deliberately adopt the position and attributes of the feminine in the male symbolic, the 
position of the masculine feminine, women cannot but begin to mime the possibilities of 
a feminine symbolic. 
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The masculine feminine, understood as a fixed and knowable category, defined 
through the negation or contrariety of the masculine, embodies positive symbolic 
attribution: problematic, fluid, completely open, multiple and unpredictable. This Other, 
however, points beyond itself to the unsymbolised, the excess, the unknown Other of the 
feminine. The ambiguity of mimesis allows it to be transformational/alternative in terms 
of symbolic structure and Utopian, or at least optimistic, in terms of hope for a better, 
integrated future for women. 
Hence, that lrigaray does not explicitly say what mimesis is, could indeed be 
thought of as part of the mimetic strategy itself: the masculine feminine is irrational, 
boundless and polymorphous.88 Its expression involves articulating it within the terms of 
male defined femininity. But this expression, the strategic project of miming the 
masculine feminine, immediately engages the project of miming the position of the 
feminine: the feminine as Other within and without the masculine symbolic. Hence the 
feminine is both the known and the unknown. 
Thought of in these terms, the problematic 'women's experience' develops a 
dimension which will acknowledge its constitution within the existing (masculine) symbolic 
structures, its situatedness. By acknowledging that there might be a feminine which is 
unsymbolised, its Otherness which is engendered by the male symbolic provides the 
impetus for a feminine symbolic, the place in which dereliction will be overcome. 
But the questions I raised concerning mimesis are cause for concern. In the 
remaining sections of this chapter, I attempt to respond to them. 
The feminine symbolic and the via negativa 
Earlier in this chapter I asserted that the context for the meaningfulness of 
Hebrew-based religious experience and belief is the male symbolic. I have suggested that 
women need to develop their own symbolic and that lrigaray's mimetic strategy, even with 
the questions and problems it poses, is pertinent to that enterprise. If women can develop 
88 Compare this with the Pythagorean Table of Opposites which, you will remember, associates 
the feminine with infinity, plurality and motion. 
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their own symbolic, a revisioning of the Divine must have taken place.89 Since all 
concepts and constructs are understood within the male symbolic, the Divine itself 
'belongs' within that symbolic. 
I would not want to argue that just because the meaning context for woman and 
the feminine is the male symbolic, then that is the only place in which it could be 
understood and is meaningful. It must be possible for women to move beyond the 
masculine place of understanding and meaning, if one is to accept that the masculine 
symbolic is masculine and therefore but one possible constructing and interpretational 
horizon. Because there presently is no alternative to the male symbolic, it does not follow 
that there can be no alternative. Mimesis, tor example, has the potential to open up a 
conceptual space which might provide new semantic contexts. 
In miming the feminine women must, therefore, take up a new position in relation 
to the Divine. The mimetic strategy will entail that women take up the position of the Other 
as a deliberate project or choice, which is itself a repositioning. (One consciously takes 
up the feminine and its boundlessness, rather than unconsciously being the feminine as 
dictated by the male symbolic.) Once this repositioning occurs, women's relation to all 
that is within and potentially without the male symbolic must change, both in terms of 
place and content. 
Within the male symbolic, the feminine, the known and characterisable, occupies 
a similar place to that of the Divine. In Western theologies, the Divine has been 
apprehended and appropriated through the via positiva, what one can say about God: that 
for example, God is all good, powerful, omnipresent, love.00 In other words, God is 
symbolised positively or is capable of affirmative attribution of characteristics, the very 
point made by Feuerbach. Given what I have been arguing, what can be said is 
engendered by the masculine symbolic. But there is also a tradition of negative theology: 
the via negativa is the unsymbolised, the ineffable, what lies outside the male symbolic 
89 This is lrigaray's contention and intention in op. cit., "Divine Women" in Sexes and Genealogies. 
passim. 
90 Recall that Schussler Fiorenza notes that such language is analogical. See, chapter 3, p. 123, 
of this thesis. 
154 
and cannot be said. I referred to this distinction (between via negativa and via positiva) 
in chapter 3, in my discussion of Schussler Fiorenza's conceptualisation of G*d. 
The via negativa, like the feminine, is also Other within and to the male symbolic. 
Just as one can give two mutually dependent senses to 'Other' as it is used in relation to 
the feminine, so can one in relation to the Divine: the contrast between the via positiva 
and the via negativa is the contrast between the two senses of Other one can give to the 
feminine. The via positiva creates an overflow, a 'too muchness' which cannot be 
represented and therefore constitutes an unknowable Other which forces itself outside 
the male symbolic. 
What women should mime in miming the feminine, is both the Other within the 
male symbolic and the Other, the excess, created through symbolising the masculine 
feminine. The excess, the unsymbolised feminine, brings them to inhabit the unknown, 
and presently unknowable, the very position in which one encounters the dark night of the 
soul, the via negativa. 
Some of the characteristics (analogically) attributed to the male symbolic Divine, 
infinity for example, are characteristics analogously assigned to the feminine, within the 
male symbolic (unlimited, formless, boundless). The unsymbolised feminine and the 
unsymbolised Divine might then be thought of as co-inhabitants of the Other. So that by 
analogy, at least, in miming the feminine, women begin to mime the Other that is the 
Divine. Whether women mime the unlimited and boundless as feminine excess or 
encounter it as Divine excess, that it is unsymbolised and boundless, means that it must 
fail to admit of discrimination. The infinite, the unlimited are unbounded and therefore 
undifferentiated. Mimesis, in other words, becomes a process of creating a feminine 
symbolic which potentially embodies a new understanding of, and clues to, the Divine. 
Hence mimesis can be understood as a transformative strategy91 which, in proposing 
a possible feminine symbolic, also proposes a possible reinterpretation, indeed, remaking 
of the Divine. 
91 See Morny Joy, "Hermeneutics and mimesis" in Studies io Religion, 19 (1) (Winter 1990), pp. 
73 - 86, for a discussion of transformation and mimesis. 
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Thus far I have argued that the symbolic is masculine, that the Divine projected 
as it is from the masculine symbolic is masculine, and that in mimesis there is an avenue 
to the difference which lrigaray believes is possible in the constituting of a feminine 
symbolic, integral to which is female genealogy. I want now to explain how it might be 
possible to move beyond the masculine symbolic. While my exposition of the Other has 
been developed out of certain understandings of its place within the masculine symbolic, 
I have not yet explicated its relationship to difference as an ontological concern, a point 
I raised earlier in relation to Feuerbach. In the next section then, I offer a brief reading of 
difference, mimesis and feminine ontological possibility. 
The Other, Difference and Mimesis 
Earlier on, I argued that there are two senses in which one might understand the 
term 'Other' within and without the male symbolic ('inside Other' or the Lacanian Other 
and 'outside Other' the Lacanian impossible Other of the Other). I asserted that within the 
male symbolic, the feminine is constructed as Other, the not of the masculine. I also said 
that the construction of a feminine feminine will result in the making of a symbolic which 
is indeed outside the male symbolic, and hence an Other (the Other of the Other) (which 
one might associate with the via negativa). These two senses of Other share a common 
characteristic: they are Other because they represent difference. But how is one to 
articulate this difference? 
In her book on Luce lrigaray, Philosophy in the Feminine, Margaret Whitford 
argues that in "Divine Women" the hypothesis lrigaray is proposing "is that the projection 
of a woman divinity could introduce sexual difference into the symbolic". 92 As I have been 
arguing, lrigaray alleges that there is only one symbolic, the masculine symbolic. Hence 
to speak of the symbolic is to speak of the masculine symbolic. My assertion is that 
lrigaray does not want to introduce sexual difference into the (masculine) symbolic at all, 
but that she wants to use the (masculine) symbolic to create a feminine symbolic, a 
symbolic other than, different from the masculine symbolic. In other words, there is no 
92 
op. cit., Margaret Whitford, Philosophy io the Feminine , p. 141 . 
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neutral symbolic93 which could be ruptured by the introduction of feminine difference. For 
Whitford to claim then, that the introduction of sexual difference into the symbolic is one 
of lrigaray's hypotheses, misses the point about 'a feminine Divine' and fails to articulate 
what I see as a peculiarity of lrigarayan difference. 
But Whitford's contention is understandable given that a certain kind of feminine 
difference already exists within the symbolic. That difference arises out of what lrigaray 
refers to as the economy or the logic of the Same, the operation of a reductionist logic in 
which oneness is not only privileged, but appropriates the very possibility of difference.94 
I referred before to what Fauerbach called ontological difference, and that is what is of 
interest here. I argued that lrigaray parted from Fauerbach because she suggests that 
sexed difference is an ontological possibility. In other words, the creation of an alternative 
to the masculine symbolic, in this case a feminine symbolic, suggests a difference in 
being for women. On lrigaray's understanding, difference in being has its origins in the 
subversion and dissipation of the logic/economy of the Same. 
In lrigaray's work, two related traditions in the polemic over difference converge: 
the psychoanalytic and the metaphysical. The psychoanalytic tradition emerges with 
Freud's discussion and hypothesising of feminine sexuality. In this context, difference is 
sexual difference and it involves interpretation of the castration complex, penis envy and 
the construction of feminine sexuality in terms of lack.95 What I am calling the 
metaphysical tradition has its origins in the debate, about universals and the 
accommodation of difference under terms of identity.96 There, the emphasis was on how 
to account for difference as part of an overarching metaphysic of the Same: the search 
for identity and unity. In the past hundred and fifty years, difference has been analysed 
93 And no neutral or ungendered subject. 
94 
op. cit., lrigaray. This Sex Which Is Not One. p. 74. 
95 See op. cit., Lacan, Feminine Sexuality. 
96 For example, see "Heraclitus" in Jonathan Barnes (trans. & ed.) Early Greek Philosophy (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1987); See also, ''Theaetetus", 179c - 186e, in Francis 
Macdonald Cornford (trans. & commentary) Plato's Theory of Knowledge (Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner, New York, 1935). 
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and interpreted (or its meaning assumed) by thinkers ranging from Feuerbach through 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and of course, Derrida. 
Emerging from the two traditions comes a perspective which is lrigaray's attempt 
to refigure difference in light of the notion of sexed symbolic(s). Firstly, the sexual 
difference which originates in Freud's and Lacan's works depends upon a phallogocentric 
assessment of the role of the phallus in the development of feminine sexuality. In the 
second place, it is a contained difference, inside the masculine symbolic, a difference 
which does not allow of an Other of the Other. I have also been arguing that lrigaray's 
acknowledgement of feminine excess and multiplicity is central to the eventual 
undermining of the masculine symbolic and the possibility of an Other of the Other. 
In The Adventure of Difference, Gianni Vattimo uses what I consider to be a 
particularly enlightening expression, 'ungrounding', in his discussion of the metaphysics 
of presence.97 I am going to borrow this term from Vattimo and suggest that lrigaray's 
proposal that women should mime the feminine is a proposal for ungrounding: in other 
words, the devalorising of the masculine and the establishing of a feminine symbolic, 
problematises the uniqueness of the masculine symbolic as the sole horizon in which 
feminine experience could be understood. To unground is to subvert the assumptions of 
the metaphysics of the Same. That being the case, the possibility of opening a gap in, 
and getting outside, the masculine symbolic arises. What will follow from that is an 
acknowledgement of sexed difference, and the possibility of an alternative sexed 
(feminine) symbolic. If the male symbolic can be ungrounded, destabilised by the 
assertion of feminine difference, its hold on the feminine will crumble. 
Ungrounding through mimesis should, therefore, be thought of as an avenue to 
outside difference, the Other of the Other. But ungrounding itself depends upon the 
existence of what I have called inside difference, the Other of the masculine symbolic. So 
there is an explicit relationship between the Other - difference found in the masculine 
symbolic - and ungrounding. That relationship is parasitic, as ungrounding will eventually 
dissolve the power of the symbolic which has given it birth. Ungrounding, therefore, 
97 Gianni Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference: Philosophy after Nietzsche and Heidegger (trans. 
Cyprian Blamires & Thomas Harrison) (Polity Press, Cambridge UK, 1993),, p. 4. 
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undermines inside difference by challenging the ontological assumptions implicit in the 
masculine symbolic.98 The point is that there is a possibility of moving beyond the 
construction of the Other, by insisting that difference itself can be re-formed by acting 
from within the masculine symbolic (through mimesis), to come to a creation and some 
articulatable understanding of the Other of the Other. There is a chance for ontological 
independence for the feminine through the construction of a feminine symbolic. 
This does not mean that ungrounding enables women to stand outside history, or 
that the becoming of the feminine is ahistorical. Because the subject is already situated, 
she already carries with her a history, a culture in which she is embedded and embodied. 
But because she is situated, it does not follow that the subject cannot take a stance, 
subvert her situation, her embeddedness. Schussler Fiorenza's claim that lrigaray is 
essentialist because she uses a universalising, ahistorical notion of the feminine and 
women which reinscribes and revalorises patriarchal distinctions, should be abandoned 
on these grounds alone. 
lrigaray's thesis makes no claims about the essentialising origins of the term 
'woman'. It simply assents to the temporal situatedness of the subject but then disclaims 
that the masculine symbolic is not logically, temporally or culturally binding. It allows for 
the possibility of a feminine symbolic ontologically independent of the masculine symbolic, 
which can engender and refigure the Divine as a feminine Divine . . 
The remaining questions about mimesis which I raised above, have yet to be 
answered and so I now turn to them. The question "Why mimesis?" has in part been 
answered through my insistence that it is a subversive strategy. As a subversive strategy 
mimesis is employed first and foremost in lrigaray's writing style, her literary genre, and 
is a term which is deliberately ambiguous. It is the feminine genre ( as constituted by the 
male symbolic): weaving magical pictures of possibility; poetry; apparent disorganisation; 
interpretation and connection; suggestion of the female body (the cave analogy) that 
infuses the whole of lrigaray's writing.99 
98 I have in mind assumptions such as that the One should be privileged over the many, that the 
symbolic within which we work is neutral, that the feminine cannot be symbolised outside the 
symbolic because there is no other symbolic possible apart from that which we already inhabit. 
99 See "Plato's Hystera" in op. cit.,lrigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman. 
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To consider that lrigaray is herself a 'gendered subject' we can say that she is 
always the feminine, but that she also deliberately seeks to escape that identity. The 
appropriateness of using mimesis seems obvious in this context. Effectively, lrigaray is 
saying to the world: 'You have called me woman; you have said thus and thus of the 
feminine which I embody. Here it is in literary text, in your psychoanalysis, in your 
philosophy'. 
Secondly, and equally importantly, lrigaray displays a preference for the feminine, 
albeit the masculine feminine (there is no Other). Again, her texts are witness to this. In 
this way, lrigaray unbalances the privileging which is manifest in the a/not-a dichotomy, 100 
the Pythagorean Table of Opposites, the construction of the feminine as lack, as not. This 
unbalancing is necessary as a foundational ingredient in ungrounding, the disruption and 
rupture of the masculine symbolic. 
Thirdly, mimesis is a transformative as well as a subversive strategy, as I 
submitted above. Morny Joy has argued that Paul Ricoeur has portrayed the 
transformative power of refiguring reality "as the prerogative of fiction". 101 She goes on 
to say that: 
In his latest works Ricoeur has introduced the term mimesis as a 
refinement of his earlier ideas of re-figuration and implies that other 
varieties of narrative texts have this same potential to disturb the status 
quo.102 
We might think of lrigaray's writings as those which either come under the heading 
of 'other narrative texts' (for example Marine Lover) or we might disclaim lrigaray as a 
writer of narrative texts at all, but one who nonetheless disturbs the status quo. In any 
case, it is precisely this disruptive use of mimesis that lrigaray employs. Furthermore, she 
100 Nancy Jay, "Gender and Dichotomy", in Sneja Gunew (ed.), A Reader in Feminist Knowledge 
(Routledge, London & New York, 1991 ), pp. 89 - 106. 
101 
op. cit., Joy, "Hermeneutics and mimesis", p. 76. 
102 .b.d I I . 
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is urging that we move beyond the text, so to speak, and that we practice mimesis in 
political, cultural, religious contexts.103 
Lastly, there are questions which concern the instrumentality of mimesis. I asked 
which aspects of the masculine feminine are we to mimic? All? Some? How are we to 
choose, to decide? In opting for a female genealogy, in recovering women's mythic 
inheritance, lrigaray suggests that philotes (tenderness) is a specific quality of Aphrodite's 
which should be appropriated. That, together with wonder, seems to be the yardstick by 
which we ought to embrace the masculine feminine in order to transform it. Tenderness 
bridges the gap between agape and eros. This, as I see it, is the sign of the sensible 
transcendent, the integration of the immanent and the transcendent:104 
It therefore is not a matter of agape without eros, but the two combined 
in a love that is both carnal and spiritual.105 
Therefore, whatever promotes tenderness, the moral disposition to care and 
wonder, is what should be preferred from the masculine feminine. In other words, the 
promotion of tenderness, in order to realise the sensible transcendent, is, if you like, the 
'moral' guide for feminist praxis. Hence mimesis is not a vacuous and mindless process 
of. mere copying. It is a self conscious choice towards the ideal of becoming the feminine, 
of sexual difference, of manifesting the Divine feminine and of creating a feminine sexed 
subject. The point is that there is a direct relation between mimesis and the projection of 
a female divinity. What is projected is an ideal, and this is why a feminine Divine is the 
condition for the development of a feminine symbolic. Miming the ideal projection is 
derived from both the male symbolic and jouissance. 
Here I should like to say something more about the relation of women to the via 
negativa. In becoming, women enter into the mystery of the Divine, the via negativa, the 
103 See, for example, lrigaray's suggestion that practical steps (such as having pictures of mothers 
and daughters prominently displayed) should be taken. See, lrigaray in op. cit., Thinking the 
Difference; op. cit., Je. tu, nous; and Elemental Passions (trans. Joanne Collie & Judith Still) (Routledge New York, 1992). 
104 For an excellent discussion of the sensible transcendent see op. cit., Deutscher,"'The Only 
diabolic thing about women ... ", and op. cit., Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine. pp. 47 - 49. 
105 
op. cit., lrigaray, Thinking the Difference. p. 94. 
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darkness which they have inherited as the Other of the male symbolic. Their existence 
in that place of unknowing, will not provide epistemological certainties any more than 
does their existence in the male symbolic. For the feminine symbolic will also have an 
Other: the masculine symbolic. In their meeting place, in the love made possible by the 
construction of the female symbolic, will be a space which remains unknown and where 
the via negativa persists. Women may find the Divine in all of these spaces. 
The success of lrigaray's mimetic strategy depends upon accepting that the 
symbolic is masculine and that women actually do need a feminine symbolic of their own. 
But which women, one might ask? All women? If 'all women', how is one to characterise 
the class of all women and its members? Is there anything which can be said of all 
women? If so, has not one fallen into the essentialist trap of positing universal ahistorical 
essence which defines women? Even with the mimetic strategy, it might be argued, 
lrigaray does not go beyond the bondage of women within the masculine symbolic. On 
one reading - and this is so in Schussler Fiorenza's case - mimesis would simply 
revalorise and reinscribe the feminine and traditional conceptions of woman. But this is 
to miss the point of the subversive nature of mimesis and its appeal to multiplicity and 
difference which diffuses universality and sameness. I suggested earlier in this chapter 
that lrigaray views the Divine as the site of resolution of opposites. I also argued that the 
sensible transcendent is a manifestat1on of the Divine. Now I want to argue that the notion 
of the sensible transcendent is particularly useful for elaborating the relationship between 
discourse and the body. 
Recall that throughout this thesis I have been examining the tension between 
nominal and real essence and the way in which the body is implicated in this tension. I 
argued that Daly operates across this apparent binary opposition but that for her, 
language is inextricably tied to ontology such that language and ontology become one. 
This ontological-linguistic strategy of hers overlies an implicit acceptance of the body 
which is never critically evaluated. On the other hand, Schussler Fiorenza rejects talk of 
the body as natural but has little to say about the processes which might be involved in 
its social construction, although her stand is patently social constructionist. 
Both Daly and Schussler Fiorenza privilege language. That is to say, each sees 
language in practice (discourse) as a primary producer of reality. Their differences could 
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be summed up by saying that whereas Daly believes discourse is a producer of reality, 
Schussler Fiorenza is ambivalent about the degree to which discourse can be thought of 
as the only producer of reality. So for Daly, there is something independent of language, 
and for Schussler Fiorenza that which we take to be natural is in language, is discursively 
produced. Schussler Fiorenza's thesis that we can have more or less adequate access 
to reality and that G*d is independent of language problematises the degree to which she 
is committed to her thesis that discourse produces our major classes and categories. But 
for both Daly and Schussler Fiorenza, women's experience is caught up in discursive 
practice. This being the case, women's experience as a foundation for feminist theologies 
captures in some way, the Divine. 
In the work of Schussler Fiorenza, I have argued, the Divine, G*d, remains 
independent of language while simultaneously being the projection of the community of 
believers, the ekklesia. It is plausible then, that G*d is an idealised projection of a 
perfectly working democracy, the discipleship of equals. It is worth noting that this 
rendering of Schussler Fiorenza's work bears strong resemblance to Feuerbach's 
theological anthropology, as I earlier detailed it. Along side this though, the concept of a 
transcendent G*d also operates. 
In chapter 2, I read Daly's onto-linguistic strategy as having many characteristics 
of Schussler Fiorenza's constructionism. Daly's onto-linguistics construct women's 
experience and again, there is nothing stable, unchanging and timeless. For Daly, as for 
Schussler Fiorenza, process and progress towards the Divine are critical. So on one 
level, the similarity of discursive positions is apparent. I have maintained that Daly's 
implicit acceptance of the female body as the ground for her onto-linguistics suggests that 
her position could be described as real essentialist with respect to the body. In this sense, 
Daly is dualist not because she seems to operate within two domains (the corporeal and 
the linguistic) but because language is always privileged in her discussions, over an 
unproblematic natural embodiment. 
lrigaray, it could be argued, has much in common with both Daly and Schussler 
Fiorenza. Certainly, the role of discourse is enormously important, and both Daly and 
lr~aray share the insight that discourse is sexed/gendered. Schussler Fiorenza believes 
that this is not the case, that discourse is sex/gender neutral. In an endnote she remarks: 
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Marjorie Proctor-Smith has pointed out that some feminists might consider 
my mode of critical discussion "male." It should by now be clear that I do 
not believe that there are "male" and "female" modes of research or 
"masculine" and "feminine" methods. However, in order to prevent such 
a misunderstanding, I would like to insist again that I am interested not in 
devaluation, but in a further development of feminist hermeneutics. 
Feminist theology needs critical clarification and discussion in order to 
come into its own.106 
One wonders if Schussler Fiorenza thinks the same of class and race: that her 
mode of critical discussion does not bear the hallmarks of race and class. One wonders 
why discourse, represented here by 'critical discussion', 'research' and 'methods' should 
escape the sex/gender, class and race constructionist overtones that exist elsewhere 
within the kyriarchal pyramid. It is worth noting that she may believe that discourse is 
neutral with respect to all of these factors. One should be surprised at this when she 
maintains that sex/gender, class, and race are all discursively produced through socio-
political practice. So herein lies a major disagreement between Daly and lrigaray on the 
one hand, and Schussler Fiorenza on the other. 
Yet it is difficult to judge lrigaray's place in the nominalist/realist debate, for on my 
reading, she neither privileges language nor ~parently excludes what Schussler Fiorenza 
calls naturalism. Her use of the category, the sensible transcendent, appears to me to 
place her firmly in both camps: that of realism and that of nominalisrn. Hence for lrigaray, 
it is arguable that de Lauretis' assertion about real and nominal essence finds, as it did 
with Daly, a possible interpretation which respects the possibility of both, true to Locke's 
metaphor. But lrigaray's concept of the sensible transcendent disclaims the dualism of 
the conjunction, for she privileges neither the constructed nor the essential. In my final 
chapter I will elucidate this position using some recent work of American philosopher, 
Sally Haslanger, as the springboard for the discussion. 
106 
op. cit., Schussler Fiorenza, "Towards a Critical Feminist Hermeneutics", in lo Memory of Her, 
endnote 65, p. 39. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ESSENTIALISM, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM, AND THE DIVINE 
The Ambiguity of Social Constructionism 
Throughout this thesis, I have discussed the meaning and questioned the 
implications of essentialism. I have argued that feminist theologians reject essentialist 
accounts of 'woman' and 'woman's experience' because such accounts attribute to 
women a timeless, ahistorical and unchanging essence. Critics of essentialism argue that 
real essence is actually constructed through discursive practice and therefore does not 
reflect anything independently 'real'. According to them, essentialist conceptions cannot 
and do not take account of the substantial differences amongst women. Schussler 
Fiorenza argued, following Spelman, that 'woman' is not simply a sex/gender term but 
also socio-political, and that feminist essentialist theory, in positing sex/gender as the 
primary analytic category, ignores complex cultural factors in how the terms 
'woman'iwomen' are conceptualised. This is a serious omission because feminist theory 
in general has taken the case of privileged white women to be representative of all 
women. 
have also argued that female embodiment has been ignored by feminist 
theologians such as Daly and Schussler Fiorenza.1 In part this is because the question 
of embodiment has been perceived to be part of the problem of essentialism. Given that 
there might be something essential about women, that women might have real essence, 
then the unquestioned assumption is that certain normative or prescriptive implications 
will follow from whatever it is that is essential, the body for example. Hence it is taken to 
be the case that the proposition that women are natural child bearers, implies the 
proposition that women are natural carers. Rather than denying this implication, Elisabeth 
Schussler Fiorenza has denied that there is anything essential, in terms of Locke's real 
essence, in the first place. I have argued that Daly and Schussler Fiorenza use social 
1 Although, as I have also noted, the question of embodiment per se has of course been relevant 
to Christian Incarnation doctrines and the question of the corporeality of the Divine. See above 
chapter 4, footnote 8. 
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constructionism as a way of resolving the difficulties surrounding essentialism conceived 
of in this way. 
To reiterate, I suggested that in line with traditional interpretations and critiques 
of essence like Aristotle's and Locke's, one could think about the question of essentialism 
as a dispute about the claim that there is something timeless, universal and unchanging 
(language dependent or independent of language) which makes a woman a woman. The 
claim of social constructionists like Daly and Schussler Fiorenza is that women are 
socially constructed through complicated socio-political discursive practices. I also argued 
that claims about essentialism and social constructionism can be roughly mapped onto 
claims about real essence and nominal essence: either that there is some 'reality'2 
independent of language (real essence) or that 'reality' is constructed through various 
discursive practices (possibly nominal essence). 
The view that language somehow 'opposes' essence, that essence should be 
thought of as a 'reality' independent of language, needs to be reviewed, as does what 
might be meant by 'social construction ism'. Recall again that Elizabeth Grosz asserts 
that the opposition between social constructionism and essentialism is false. 3 She argues 
that ultimately social constructionism must depend upon essentialism because the 
materials of constructionism "cannot themselves be constructed without the assumption 
of an infinite regress".4 On this view, social constructionism needs to declare what its raw 
materials are. If this were to happen, then the relation between social construction and 
essentialism would prove not to be oppositional as is assumed. As I read Grosz, she is 
arguing that social constructionism must depend upon something other than language, 
the primary 'tool' of its elaboration. But the central question here is how the argument is 
to be set up and understood. If, for example, one refuses terms which separate the body 
and discourse, and one refuses terms which accept and valorise the binary opposition of 
embodiment and discourse, then quite a different conceptual model might emerge. In 
2 Throughout my discussion I indicate that the term 'reality' is contested either by speaking of 'the 
idea of reality' (or similar construction) or using single inverted commas, 'reality'. 
3 See above, chapter 3. 
4 Elizabeth Grosz. Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Fem ioism (Allen & Unwin, St. Leonard's, 1994), p. 213, endnote 20. 
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part, constituting another model is just what Schussler Fiorenza attempts to do. How one 
conceptualises social constructionism is critical, then. 
What Grosz points out is extremely important because both Daly and Schussler 
Fiorenza concentrate on the construction of sex/gender through language practice. Most 
definitely, Daly's work exemplifies Grosz's diagnosis of constructionism. Schussler 
Fiorenza, on the other hand, attempts to argue - unsuccessfully - for a view of 
constructionism which does not pre-suppose an independently real body. I argued in 
chapter 3, that on one level Schussler Fiorenza appears to maintain that everything is in 
language, but that she fails to apply this theory consistently. For her, women's 
experience(s) is constructed through socio-political discourses. Discursive construction 
constitutes women in multiple terms of a sex/gender, class, and racial background. 
Women's experience is to be explained in the context of socio-political structures of 
oppression, particularly the kyriarchal pyramid, and not to be seen as an explanation. 
However, Schussler Fiorenza uses social constructionist theory unproblematically, in 
terms of both taking a critical distance and elaborating it. 'Social constructionism' seems 
to mean for Schussler Fiorenza, that somehow we 'make' the systems, objects/things and 
categories, which constitute our worlds. 
I also cited Grosz's argument that many constructionists articulate constructionism 
in binary terms which reiterate the nature/nurture, sex/gender dichotomies. For Grosz, 
constructionism depends upon essentialism because the body remains the raw material 
of constructionism. In other words, the idea of the body remains intact, while language 
practices, which interpret and represent, are called into question. 
The American philosopher Sally Haslanger has developed a taxonomy for thinking 
about social constructionism specifically in relation to feminist theory. Haslanger's work 
posits some useful ways of understanding social constructionism which elaborate the 
formulations I have been using so far. 
Haslanger acknowledges the complexity of social constructionism in relation to 
'reality'. She explores the ontological and epistemic commitments one might be required 
to make should one decide in favour of positing a 'reality' independent of language. Her 
conclusion, that although it might be the case that "our point of view on the world is 
always socially conditioned; ... there is no reason to believe that the world we have a 
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point of view on is likewise socially conditioned",5 is contentious.6 There is no reason to 
suppose that there is a genuine distinction between 'the world' and 'the world we have a 
point of view on'. For example, what would it mean to speak of 'women' and 'women we 
have a point of view on' or the 'Divine' and 'the Divine we have a point of view on'? In my 
view to speak of 'women' and 'women we have a point of view on' is immediately to 
invoke a distinction which assumes the conceptual separability of the 'two'.7 I shall have 
more to say about this shortly. 
Within the context of deliberating about models of justice, knowledge and reality 
and their relation to social constructionism, Haslanger notes that '(o)n occasion it is 
possible to find the claim that "everything" is socially constructed or socially constructed 
"all the way down"'.8 Haslanger does not elaborate the meaning of this expression, but 
suggests 'It is a short step to the conclusion that there is no reality independent of our 
practices or of our language, and that "truth" and "reality" are only fictions employed by 
the dominant to mask their power'.9 This is the position taken by Elisabeth Schussler 
Fiorenza, as I noted in chapter 3. But it should be reiterated that although the meaning 
of the phrase constructed "all the way down" is vague, what is not meant by either 
5 Sally Haslanger, "Ontology and Social Construction" (unpublished manuscript), p. 34. 
Forthcoming in Philosophical Topics, 23 (2) (Fall 1995). (Still unpublished at May 1996). 
6 Com pare this with the idea of making the leap from 'one cannot give a theory independent 
description of things' to 'there are no theory independent objects' to which I alluded in chapter 3. 
7 Haslanger seeks to explore the distinction between the epistemological and the ontological, 
examining the claim "that because knowledge is socially constructed, there is no objective (and so 
no independent) reality". op. cit., Haslanger, "Ontology and Social Construction", p. 3. I have not 
been concerned with the epistemological questions related to articulating the idea of reality: 
woman, the Divine and so on in this thesis. But her concern is related to my claim above that it may 
not be possible to distinguish between our point of view of the Divine/woman and the Divine/woman. 
Some might argue as Haslanger suggests later on in this article, that epistemology and ontology 
are related and of course they are. But this is a peripheral issue for me. 
8 
op. cit., Haslanger, "Ontology and Social Construction", p.1. This is a phrase Haslanger 
borrows from Nancy Fraser. See Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power. Discourse. and Gender 
in Contemporary Social Theory (Polity Press, Cambridge UK, 1989), p.19 and p.60, where Fraser is discussing the idea of the body in Foucault's work). 
9 
op. cit.., Haslanger, "Ontology and Social Construction", p. 2. 
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Foucault, to whom Fraser attributes the phrase, or Schussler Fiorenza, is that there is 
only language because neither of these theorists is a linguistic idealist.10 
Haslanger's mention of "a reality independent of our practices" is worth attending 
to here. When, as I argued in chapter 3, Schussler Fiorenza implicitly rejects the idea of 
reality, thought of as the 'facts of the matter' or that to which language refers, she means 
a 'reality' independent of our language practices. She believes that when one speaks of 
the natural, then one means this idea of 'reality' independent of language. According to 
her, discursive practices do not reflect or mirror 'reality' and there is no reality independent 
of our practices. Implicit in this is Schussler Fiorenza's rejection of the 'natural' conceived 
of in this way. She holds that the 'natural' is discursively constructed. Recall also that 
Schussler Fiorenza's work argues that 'truth' and 'reality' are fictions which mask the 
power of the dominant: white privilege, and Euro-centrism fit this viewpoint. But 
throughout her discussion, Schussler Fiorenza does not make the meaning of social 
construction clear. 
Haslanger, however, suggests several ways of interpreting 'socially constructed' 
and its cognates. These interpretations are both relevant to, and helpful for, 
understanding the essentialist debate. On bi9logistic readings of essentialism for example 
(which Schussler Fiorenza denies in her secondary sex characteristics discussion), the 
concept of objective and independent 'reality' looms large. Such readings would hold that 
biology is prescriptive. Biology stands outside time, history and culture and while it may 
be interpreted, it remains independent of its interpretation. A direct link is, however, 
posited between biology and its interpretation. That link takes the form of an inference: 
given this biology, then certain prescriptive rules follow. The claim that all women are 
nurturers because all women have two x chromosomes, exemplifies prescriptive 
inference which is not questioned. Haslanger's investigation of social constructionism 
therefore has implications for essentialist understandings. 
Generic social construction, Haslanger proposes, involves thinking of something 
in terms of being an "intended or unintended product of a social practice". 11 Professors 
10 See Michel Foucault, "The Body of the Condemned" and "Docile Bodies" in The Foucault Reader (ed. Paul Rabinow) (Penguin Books, London, 1991 ). 
11 
op. cit., Haslanger, "Ontology and Social Construction", p. 3. 
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and wives are generically constructed because in order to be a professor or a wife one 
must include the social properties and relations which render one eligible for being a 
professor or a wife . Social practices produce institutions such as marriage which provide 
the social conditions for being a wife. 
Haslanger further differentiates generic construction into causal construction and 
constitutive construction. The former suggests that "something (an object, kind of object 
or property, or concept) is causally constructed iff social factors play a causal role in 
bringing it into existence"12 and the latter suggests "something (an object, kind of object, 
property, or concept) is constitutively constructed iff in defining it we must make reference 
to social factors". 13 Her examples of these two different kinds of construction is gender. 
Sometimes one might think of the social construction of gender as a product of social 
causes. On other occasions one might think of gender as constitutive when for example 
one talks of gender as a system of categorising. In that case "gender should be 
understood as a social category whose definition makes reference to a broad network of 
social relations ... gender is introduced as an analytic tool to explain a range of social 
phenomena" .14 
When one categorises or classifies, notes Haslanger, one uses language to make 
attributions which have "the power to _both establish and reinforce groupings which may 
eventually come to "fit" the classifications".15 Then she identifies 'discursive construction', 
a kind of causal construction, and says that "something is discursively constructed just 
in case it is the way it is, at least in part, because of what is attributed (and/or self-
attributed) to it" .16 
Having made these distinctions in relation to things, Haslanger also proposes that 
the classificatory schemes one uses - how one classifies those things - are themselves 
socially constructed. It is within this context that it is possible to think of discursive 
12 ibid., p. 5· 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid., p. 4· 
15 ibid., p. 5· 
16 ibid. 
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construction in the first place. One's classificatory schemes are "determined not by the 
"intrinsic" or "objective" features of the scheme to which (they are) applied, but by social 
factors". 17 This being the case, Haslanger argues that one should further distinguish 
pragmatic construction, weakly and strongly. Pragmatic construction is the notion that "a 
classificatory apparatus (be it a full blown classification scheme, or just a conceptual 
distinction or a descriptive term) is socially constructed just in case its use is determined, 
at least in part, by social factors". 18 Weakly pragmatic constructed distinctions are those 
in which social factors partially determine use of the distinction; strongly pragmatic 
distinctions are those in which social factors fully determine use of the distinction and the 
distinction 'fails to represent accurately any "fact of the matter"'.19 Why Haslanger 
chooses to describe her distinction as 'pragmatic' is left unsaid. Presumably her use has 
something to do with the role social factors play, in part, in socially constructing 
classificatory apparatus "as much due to contingent historical and cultural factors as 
anything else".20 But this does not tell us very much since social factors play some role 
in all constructionist positions. What historical and social factors are not contingent? 
Note the similarities between Haslanger's strong pragmatic constructionism 
analysis of classificatory schemes, conceptual distinctions and descriptive terms21 and 
Locke's position on nominal essences and general terms. Recall that Locke's analysis of 
nominal essence argued that general terms are that which give 'things' their essence. For 
him nominal essences are abstract ideas which we use to classify substances into 
general categories. When I maintained at the beginning of this thesis that there is a 
connection between Locke's nominal essence and social constructionism, this is exactly 
the kind of influence I envisaged. Haslanger's paper is, I think, an excellent example of 
this. 
17 ibid., p. 6-
18 ibid., p. ?. 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid. 
21 By "descriptive term", I take Haslanger to mean terms which denominate and also those which 
describe. Hence "woman" can be thought of as either a descriptive term (I am a woman) or 
denominative (The woman over there is the one). 
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The models of constructionism which emerge in Haslanger's analysis, elucidate 
the ideas that language constitutes 'reality' (strong pragmatic constructionism) and that 
the world is separable from language (weak pragmatic constructionism). In the case of 
strong pragmatic constructionism, gender, for instance, might be thought of as that which 
is constituted completely through the discursive socio-political practices of a society. 
There is nothing 'real' about gender apart from discourse, language in practice. Language 
produces gendered positions which people learn and play out or perform. On the other 
hand, weak pragmatic constructionists might argue that although discourse plays an 
important role in the production of gender, there is something quite separate from 
language, independently 'real', sexed bodies for example, upon which language depends; 
a 'reality' apart from language. This is Grosz's description of social construction in which 
the sex/gender distinction is reproduced. Together, language and what is separable from 
it, produce 'reality'. In fact, there are two concepts of reality operating in the weak 
pragmatic stance: one which says there is 'reality' independent of language and one 
which indicates that 'reality' is a product of language conjoined with that which is 
independent of language. On this reading, the Divine for example, would be not just the 
product of socio-political discursive practice, but a reflection of an independent 'reality', 
whose existence is not dependent upon language but which, together with language, 
produces the 'reality' of the Divine. Schussler Fiorenza's idea of G*d, I would argue, falls 
under this umbrella. 
Moira Gatens, as well as Elizabeth Grosz, has remarked that one should be 
careful of reproducing in the sex/gender distinction, the dualistic idea of nature/nurture.22 
In other words, we should not think of sex and nature as a given on the one hand; and 
gender and nurture as socially constructed, on the other. Haslanger's distinction between 
these two ways of construing social constructionism is very important in this context. It 
is arguable that weak pragmatic constructionism might reproduce just this dichotomy. 
But critical to Haslanger's account is the idea that there might be some 'reality' 
which is 'independent of language'. This raises the question of how one is to spell out the 
relationship of independence between language and the concept of reality. What would 
22 Moira Gatens, "A Critique of the Sex Gender Distinction" in Sneja Gunew (ed.) A Reader io 
Feminist Knowledge (Routledge, London & New York, 1991 ), passim. 
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it mean for feminist theologies to say that there is a 'reality' independent of language in 
terms of the concept of woman and the concept of the Divine? Would the assumption of 
a reality independent of language inevitably lead to essentialist positions which feminist 
theologians have fought to reject? These are substantial issues with which I will be 
concerned in the rest of this chapter. The point is that raising and solving these kinds of 
issues in secular feminist theory has repercussions for religious feminist theory. Their 
resolution will have a major impact on the question of women's experiences and 
theorising women's relation to the Divine because, as I have been arguing, the questions 
are the same for both 'kinds' of theorising, religious and secular. 
A consequence of consistently linking secular and religious feminist theories, of 
claiming the work of secular theorists for religious theorists (and perhaps vice-versa as 
in the case of Mary Daly}, is that the boundaries between the two might become blurred. 
In my Introduction, I noted that feminist theologian Carol Christ had argued for a 
dissolution of dualism in feminist theology. She maintained that "women's quest seeks 
a wholeness that unites the dualisms of spirit and body, rational and irrational ... "23 If it 
is possible to refigure concepts like language and reality, essential ism and social-
constructionism, without implicitly assuming dualism in their relation, then the idea that 
language and reality are separable, take on quite a different meaning. For example, if the 
relationship between language (the symbolic) and reality (the material) could be 
elaborated in a non-dualistic manner, then it is arguable that there would be no schism 
between woman and the Divine in lrigaray's refiguring of the Divine. A case in point is 
commentator Penelope Deutscher's argument that lrigaray's position is one that proposes 
a model for a non-schismatic analysis of women and the Divine. 24 I read into this 
argument that the idea that language and 'reality' are ontologically separable - that 
language and 'reality' belong to two different and separate realms - needs to be 
challenged at the outset because it is a model which is theoretically flawed. 
23 See Carol P. Christ, Diving Deep and Surfacing: Women Writers on Spiritual Quest, (Beacon 
Press, Boston, 1980), p. 8. 
24 Penelope Deutscher, "'The Only Diabolical Thing About Women ... ": Luce lrigaray on Divinity', 
in Hypatja, Special Issue: "Feminist Philosophy of Religion" [Nancy Frankenberry & Marilyn Thie (eds.)] 9 (4) (Fall 1994), pp. 88 - 111. 
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On my reading, Haslanger's discussion fails to avoid the implications of 
ontological separability and is therefore dualistic. It will be recalled that Daly also seems 
to work within a dualistic framework which implies the existence of an independently real 
body. In terms of Haslanger's critique Daly would emerge as weakly pragmatic: social 
factors largely determine the use of categories and descriptors like 'woman', but the 
underlying 'reality' of the body already partly determines the attribution of the terms. The 
idea of the female body in other words, is a condition for attributing women's 
characteristics like biophilia and lust. 
As I have been reading Schussler Fiorenza, it would seem that her use of 
classificatory terms is strongly pragmatic. For her, reality is fully constituted by discursive 
practices. As I noted, she certainly argues that social factors completely determine use 
of gender, class and race terms, just as she denies that there are any facts of the matter 
like secondary sexual characteristics which 'match' the attribution of such terms. Yet she 
also retains notions of 'reality' (G*d and that to which one has more or less adequate 
access through language). This suggests she is a weak pragmatist. Haslanger implies 
that one can move between these positions, depending on what one is speaking about: 
individuals, universals, operative concepts, distinctions.25 But Schussler Fiorenza's 
declared intention to de-naturalise sex/gender and her implication that ideas of reality are 
a product of discursive practices, problematise and appeal to 'reality' independent of 
language, thus to weak pragmatic constructionism. Her argument that biology, for 
example, is already in language, is obvious. The removal of G*d from such a theoretical 
model is understandable given her theological context, but inconsistent given her 
metaphysical disposition. 
Haslanger also argues that the construction of gender is discursive (and therefore 
causal) as well as strongly pragmatic. Given her ontological commitments, Schussler 
Fiorenza, no doubt, would agree with her. Undoubtedly she would also agree with 
Haslanger that "strongly pragmatic constructions are, in an important sense - illusions 
projected onto the world; their use might nevertheless track - without accurately 
25 
op. cit., Haslanger, "Ontology and Social Construction", p. 12. 
174 
representing - a genuine distinction" [her italics].26 Since Schussler Fiorenza argues that 
language does not function to reflect any 'reality', that 'reality' is produced through socio-
political discursive practices: there are no genuine distinctions in the world which 
language represents or reflects. The point is not that we never make genuine distinctions. 
We do, but they reflect our social arrangements and our socio-political biases and not 
some underlying, independent, 'reality'. 
An interesting repercussion of Haslanger's analysis of social constructionism and 
her positing weak pragmatic constructionism is that it proposes the opposition of (real) 
essentialism and (nominal essentialist) social constructionism. Recall that de Lauretis 
followed Locke in setting up real and nominal essence as (apparently) oppositional. My 
reading of Haslanger suggests that there is room in her weak pragmatism for the idea that 
real and nominal essence can operate as parallel ontologies. But the question remains: 
how is one to explicate the relation between language and reality, between real and 
nominal essence? 
Haslanger pursues the notion of objective reality, arguing that it might be possible 
to retain 'it', elaborated not in terms· of what is objectively knowable, a strategy adopted 
by some theorists, but using instead "soci·ally loaded criteria"27 which "correspond to a 
distinction in how things are related to us ... some relevant social factor, e.g. our finding 
them useful, or perhaps, politically expedient'. 28 She maintains the 'vacuity of the idea of 
the objectively real, analysed in terms of the objectively known, by arguing that "the whole 
point of speaking of an independent reality is to emphasize that there is no necessary 
connection between what's real and what human beings know or can (in practice) know" 
[her italics].29 Efforts to elaborate the independently 'real' in terms of objective knowledge 
in other words, overlook that there are no requirements for reality to be tied to knowledge 
at all. 'Reality' may well exist even if there were no knowledge of that 'reality'. Haslanger 
argues: 
26 ibid., p.a. 
27 ibid., p. 31. 
2a ibid., p. 29-
29 ibid., p. 31. 
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I see no good reason in the arguments we've considered so far to 
collapse the epistemology-ontology distinction. When I say that something 
is real, my assertion is true just in case the thing in question exists; this 
is so even if the criteria I employ in making the judgement are socially 
loaded, and even if my utterance also expresses the value it has in my 
conception of things. 30 
Apart from Haslanger's denying that epistemic considerations should be relevant 
in deciding how to characterise independent reality, the latter remains a dilemma for her. 
Wanting neither an objectivist (and limiting) account of 'reality' nor perspectivist or social 
constructionist accounts, she maintains that "the task before us is to construct alternative, 
modestly realist, ontologies that enable us to come to more adequate and just visions of 
what is, what might be, and what should be".31 Where should one go from here? 
This lengthy excursion into Haslanger's paper highlights de Lauretis' folly in 
rejecting real essence. To reiterate, de Lauretis rejects the proposition that feminists 
might be talking about real essence when they talk about essence: they are actually 
talking about nominal essence. One might think 'that women are made' as a claim about 
social practice and language and 'that there is something essential about women' as a 
claim about real essence. Recall also that de Lauretis used Locke's distinction between 
real and nominal essence to help her ~ort out the essentialist problem. Suppose that one 
were to admit weak pragmatic constructionism to one's conceptual scheme. What 
happens then to de Lauretis' claim that feminists cannot really mean real essence when 
they talk about essence? On a weak pragmatic analysis of constructionism, it is obviously 
false. As Grosz has argued the point, for many feminists who speak about social 
construction, this weak pragmatism is precisely that about which they are talking. Bodies 
and language are ontologically separable. How do they relate to each other on such an 
account? 
In order to sort out this relation, I will persist momentarily with Haslanger's 
distinction between weak and strong pragmatic construction, and as an initial move, I will 
introduce a distinction between what I shall call the descriptive and the normative. Let us 
assume the sex/gender (nature/nurture) distinction. Let us also assume an utterance 
30 'b'd p 33. I I ., · 
31 'b'd p 34 I I ., · · 
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such as 'Australian women are of the female sex because they have two x chromosomes' 
(although trivially true) is minimally descriptive and different from the utterance 'Australian 
women are of the female gender' which one could think of as normative, or saying 
something about social practice. Here we are confronted by two utterances which 
seemingly contain 'facts' about Australian women. But the second 'fact' is conditioned by 
social practice whereas the first is not: Australian women would be of the female sex 
even if there were no social practices which say that women are of the female gender. 
On Haslanger's account, the first is a weak pragmatic classification and the second, 
strongly pragmatic. Thus the second 'fact' is true in virtue of social practices; the first 'fact' 
is true in virtue of certain biological characteristics which are not determined by social 
practice. In this sense, there is a 'reality' which is independent of discourse: women all 
over the world are of the female sex. That they are of the female gender is determined 
by social practice (that is to say, it is causally and discursively constructed). 
Given this distinction between the descriptive and the normative, it does not follow 
that there is a necessary relation between the two. While it is the case that women are 
of the female sex, it does not (logically) follow that one need be a woman to be of the 
female gender (consider cross dressers). ('If you are of the female gender, then you are 
a woman' is not necessarily true on this account.) That is to say, as in the gender 
example, the social practices which surround many biological characteristics and 
occurrences, are only contingently related to them. Hence one might think of an essential 
- and here I mean 'real' rather than 'necessary' - characteristic of women as sexed 
independent of discursive practices. 
This is one way in which one can think about the idea of the independently 'real'. 
It is to claim that 'reality' can be both discursively constructed out of socially constructed 
facts and that some social constructions do reflect a 'reality' independent of the 
constructions. This invokes the several meanings of 'reality' to which I alluded above. 
Tentatively then my move is to align weak pragmatic construction with the 
descriptive and the normative. On this rendering, 'that men grow hair as a secondary sex 
characteristic' (Schussler Fiorenza's example) is descriptive; and this phenomenon 
occurs regardless of social practice. What people say about this secondary characteristic 
(that they ought/ought not shave; that it is a sign of manhood; that women should not look 
like men and therefore remove all facial hair, that it is a secondary sexual characteristic) 
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becomes normative. The descriptive reflects 'reality' independent of language. Hence 
weak pragmatic construction seen in terms of the descriptive and the normative both 
reflects and constructs. Language is confined neither to the domain of completely 
constituting 'reality', nor completely reflecting 'reality'. 
Further, if it can be maintained that the descriptive reflects 'reality' independent 
of language, this may indicate a place for discovering the raw materials or building blocks 
of social constructionism in weak pragmatic terms. Instead of thinking of essentialism in 
normative terms (that since women have this kind of body they should behave in this kind 
of way: have babies and be carers for instance) which consequently requires the rejection 
of essentialist assumptions, one could refigure essentialism in terms of the descriptive. 
An essentialist account would contain only minimal, and perhaps only, (brute) biological 
description which would not imply any social factors. For example it would contain 
descriptors like: 'Women have breasts' and 'Women have two ovaries', but it would not 
be the case that these descriptors imply normative or prescriptive behaviour. 
On this account, weak pragmatic constructionism together with the distinction 
between the descriptive and the normative looks like a possible contender for sorting out 
the tension between essentialism and social constructionism. But one would have to be 
prepared to accept the distinction between the descriptive and the normative in the first 
place, and this would entail accepting the distinction between sex/gender, nature/nurture. 
As I have interpreted the distinction, theorists like Schussler Fiorenza who hold that 
language and 'reality' should not be so conceived, would demur, as would Grosz and 
Gatens. Interestingly, though, Judith Plaskow employs the distinction and it is also one 
Schussler Fiorenza uses in her early work. Plaskow argues: 
Indeed feminist historians have come to recognize that religious, literary, 
and philosophical works setting forth women's nature or tasks are often 
prescriptive rather than descriptive of reality. So far from giving the world 
"as it is," "normative" texts may reflect the tensions within patriarchal 
culture, seeking to maintain a particular view of the world over against 
social, political, or religious change. 32 
32 Judith Plaskow, "Jewish Memory" in Judith Plaskow and Carol P. Christ (eds.), Weaving the 
Visions: New Patterns in Feminist Spirituality (Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1989)., p. 45. 
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Speaking about Mishnah33, Schussler Fiorenza notes that Jewish historian Jacob 
Neusner had argued that "Mishnah is not a description of Jewish life, but is prescriptive 
and imaginative".34 She endorses this distinction when she later argues "especially 
normative texts often maintain that something is a historical fact and a given reality 
although the opposite is the case"35• Since lo Memory of Her was published in 1983, one 
can only assume that she has moved from this position, to her more recent view that the 
natural is a construction of language practice. This is the view that many of our 
categories and common sense assumptions are already in language. 
The alternative to holding the descriptive/normative distinction with its implied 
acceptance of a 'reality' independent of language, would be to retain the idea of strong 
pragmatic constructionism with its attendant problems: relativism and the possibility of 
invalid inference. But need this be the only alternative? 
Given these distinctions, let me review the discussion about essentialism and 
social constructionism. The problem with essentialism is that its adherents posit an 
unchanging, ahistoric essence. These adherents (for instance Aristotelians like Getrud 
von le Fort whom Daly cites36} assume that there is a necessary connection between 
woman's essence and her social role. Instead of denying that connection, _feminists have 
denied that there is an essence in the first place. Claiming either that women are products 
of discursive practices which attribute to them a nominal essence, or that women have 
no essence whatsoever, the tactic of many feminists has been to declare that social 
constructionism 'makes women'. This has meant that women's experiences can no longer 
explain what it means to be a woman, for strictly speaking, women do not have 
experiences; they are their experiences. Women are constructed through their 
experiences. If women are their experiences, then because all women's experiences are 
different, all women must be different. If all women are different, then there would seem 
33 Jewish oral Law. 
34 Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, lo Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of 
Christian Origins (SCM Press, London, 1983), p. 58. 
35 ibid., p.60. 
36 See Mary Daly, The Church and the Second Sex (with a new Feminist Post Christian 
Introduction by the Author) (Harper & Row, New York, 1975), passim, but especially p. 148 ff. 
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to be nothing which is essential to them which 'makes' them women apart from the 
multiplicity of experiences, all of which are different. 
The claim of feminist theologians is that women's experience is foundational to 
feminist theologies. If women's experience should be read in the plural ('women's 
experiences'), the foundation for feminist theologies is women's experiences. If that is 
the case, then one might posit as many feminist theologies as there are women. Thus 
one should think of feminist theology as 'feminist theologies'. Just as there are many 
women's experiences which embody differences between women as well as making them 
different from men, so one could argue, there will be a plethora of feminist theologies. 
Mary Daly, Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza are two feminist theologians and Luce 
lrigaray is a feminist theorist all of whom are interested in divinity. The former are united 
in their condemnation of essentialism and their acceptance of social constructionism. The 
latter does not explicitly engage in the essentialist issue but both she and Daly 
supposedly represent essentialist stands in relation to the Divine. 
For Daly theology becomes the articulation of women's being as she participates 
in Be-ing, a form of onto-theology which celebrates what it means to be a woman. For 
Schussler Fiorenza, the feminist theological task is to reconstruct the prototypical past of 
Christian women and radically reinterpret the meanings of woman in terms of class and 
race as well as gender, all of which are socially constructed. And for lrigaray, the task is to 
produce a feminine symbolic through women finding their own Divine. For all three, 
women's experiences remain foundational but are tempered by the emphases each 
theorist gives to the role of language as that which constructs and/or reflects 'reality' . 
Regardless, Daly, lrigaray and Schussler Fiorenza give discourse a primary place in the 
construction of the idea of woman. 
However, social constructionism, it turns out, is a complicated notion. Following 
Grosz's intuition that constructionism needs to be clear about "what are the raw materials 
of its processes of construction".37 Using Haslanger's distinction between weak and 
strong pragmatic constructionism, it transpires that in her terms Schussler Fiorenza is at 
least a strong pragmatic constructionist and, along with Daly, looks like also being a weak 
37 See op. cit., Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p. 213, endnote 20. 
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pragmatic constructionist. The feminist rejection of essentialism seems then, to be in 
need of some review. 
Now Grosz, as I noted in chapter 1, speaks of, but does not endorse, oppressive 
practices which arise out of essentialising positions (women's social subordination and 
secondary place beside men). I agree that such practices are a result of essentialism 
(biologism, naturalism and universalism), conceived of as arising from a normative 
context. If articulating positions like these can be shown to be aberrant, shown to be 
normative rather than descriptive, then it might be possible to retain a notion of 
essentialism which is descriptive and therefore not pejorative. 
In relation to Schussler Fiorenza's problems with 'the natural', for example, it 
would appear that on the account I have been developing, 'the natural' is a problem only 
if one believes two things: that in speaking of 'the natural', one is speaking of 'an 
independently real world'; and that normative ascriptions which follow from the descriptive 
are in some way necessary. (That is to say, if one were to agree that all women are of the 
female sex, then one need not agree that being of the female gender makes one a 
woman). For argument's sake then, one might argue that independent of discourse, 
women are of the female sex. That they are of the female gender is a 'result' of complex 
social practices which allocate roles ~nd dispositions which women play out. 
At this stage, one might think of weak pragmatic constructionism around the idea 
of 'reality' independent of language and in terms of the distinction between the descriptive 
and the normative. That gives one a general idea of how one could conceive of Daly's 
project. It also gives one a way of thinking about de Lauretis' real, as opposed to nominal, 
essence. What is (real) essence is the domain of the descriptive; what is socially 
constructed is the domain of the normative (nominal essence). So I tentatively argue for 
a notion of 'the natural' that does not entail any 'common sense' normative claims. Those 
normative claims, are always claims about how we think about the world. And how we 
think about the world leads us to construct the concepts with which we then operate in 
that world. 
The point in recounting this in such great detail is that women's experience is held 
by feminist theologians to be foundational to feminist theology, as was noted by Valerie 
Saiving and Judith Plaskow. Feminist theologies, founded on women's experience(s) will 
reflect a different view of the Divine, for women are different from men ( and from each 
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other). But unless one can sort out what is meant by 'women's experience' it is not 
possible to say either what the relation of women to the Divine is, or what women might 
mean by the concept of the Divine/God/G*d. The claims and counter claims of feminist 
theologians like Daly and Schussler Fiorenza indicate that social constructionism can be 
variously interpreted. That being so, it is possible to think of the Divine as not merely a 
product of social practice, discursively constructed 'all the way down', the stand that 
Schussler Fiorenza makes. 
However, I have argued that Schussler Fiorenza's position is ambiguous in terms 
of its views of 'reality' and that Daly's position is dualistic. I have also offered a model from 
Sally Haslanger which I have presented as one way of not construing essentialism and 
social constructionism as either/or stances. I modified Haslanger's qualification of social 
constructionism even further by making the distinction between the descriptive and the 
normative. But in the end, this would only beg the question for theorists like Schussler 
Fiorenza who would not accept the dichotomous way of thinking in the first place. How 
can this be resolved? 
Questions like: 'Is the relation between physical characteristics/features such as 
genitals, skin colour, and oppressive structures, arbitrary?' should be answered in the 
affirmative. 'Yes, the relation is arbitrary. Genitals, skin colour and normative practices 
are not necessarily linked, even though they are thought to be.' This is not to deny that 
there is a causal link between genitals and skin colour skin, and oppressive practices. It 
is instead, to admit that the setting up of oppressive systems is arbitrary (there is, for 
example, a perceived connection between child bearing and nurturing which then binds 
women to the private sphere; and a perceived connection between being black and 
having a lower intelligence than one who is white). Once oppressive systems are in place, 
social practice determines that certain people should be treated in certain kinds of ways. 
Hence social practice develops a tendency to treat individuals as if there is a social 
necessity operating to mediate relations between an individual and what she is like and 
the system in which she exists. 38 
Speaking about characteristics of bodies in this way, however, leaves another 
major unsettling question. Even if we talk extensively about language practices and what 
38 I thank Dominic Hyde for his helpful discussions with me on this point. 
182 
we 'do' with the descriptive, how is one to spell out the concept of the independent? For 
what does 'independent of language' mean? Ontologically independent? Conceptually 
independent? Is there the distinction between the idea of the language dependent and 
the idea of the language independent that Haslanger has led us to believe? And if there 
is not, can the distinction between the descriptive and the normative be accepted? What 
is it to say that there is a 'reality' independent of language which underpins the 
descriptive? 
In a move that signals a change of direction for my discussion of language and 
'reality', I suggest that analyses like Haslanger's and mine, although helpful, serve more 
to separate language and 'reality' independent of language and reinforce their separability, 
than to explain their perplexing relationship. That is to say, the terms in which Haslanger 
has set out her analysis of weak pragmatic constructionism, and my distinction between 
the descriptive and normative are inadequate for an explication of the relation 
'independent of' because they impose an implicit dichotomy on language and its 
supposedly independent partner. This is not to say that Has I anger and I are wrong in 
arguing as we do. Rather it is to say that what is needed now is an analysis of the relation 
she intimates, which is not constrained by epistemic factors for the reasons to which 
Haslanger alluded.39 My starting point is very different from the analytic stance which 
informs Haslanger's work. 
Rosi Braidotti, alluding to the divergence between "the feminist and the 
psychoanalytic situations",40 notes that a stumbling block for the debate in which she is 
engaged is "how to rethink the body in terms that are neither biological nor sociological". 41 
This is analogous to my project here: how to rethink the dichotomising relation between 
language and 'reality'. Just as Braidotti uses lrigaray's notion of the body to do this re-
thinking, so I appeal to lrigaray's idea of the sensible transcendent which directly 
implicates the body as neither constituted solely by language, nor independent of 
language. Braidotti comments that "lrigaray's strategy consists in refusing to separate the 
39 
op. cit., Haslanger, "Ontology and Social Construction", pp. 27 - 28. 
40 Rosi Braidotti, "The Politics of Ontological difference" in Teresa Brennan (ed.) Between 
Feminism and Psychoanalysis (Routledge, London & New York, 1989), p. 98. 
41 ibid., pp. 98 & 99. 
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symbolic, discursive dimension from the empirical, material, or historical one".42 
Underlying lrigaray's refusal of separation, is her conviction that language prefigures what 
we encounter as bodies, as materiality. So instead of remaining within the Anglo-
American analytic tradition, I turn to lrigaray's idea of the sensible transcendent, which 
I mentioned towards the end of chapter 4. The sensible transcendent is an ideal 
interpretative device for reading weak pragmatic constructionism. That is because the 
sensible transcendent transgresses the boundaries between language and 'reality' as they 
have been articulated so far in Haslanger's and my discussions. 
So, in the next section, I propose using the idea of the sensible transcendent 
(what lrigaray describes as the integration of the immanent and the transcendent), as a 
way of interpreting language and the idea of 'reality'. This retains their integrity as 
categories, but insists on their interdependence. The sensible transcendent represents 
a radical departure from dualistic notions which are set up as oppositional. A discussion 
of weak pragmatism could be interpreted as persisting with dualistic thinking, on the 
grounds that a sharp line is drawn between language and what is purportedly independent 
of language. Haslanger's admission, for example, that "there is no reason to conclude 
that the world we have a point of view on is likewise socially condition~d" retains this 
dualistic focus. Perhaps it is not possible to posit the world we have a point of view on 
unless we assume that it is in some way, likewise socially conditioned. How could we go 
about explaining this without becoming relativistic and perspectivalist? Ultimately, the idea 
that there is only language and discursive practice maintained in the interests of those 
with power is, to paraphrase Haslanger, counter-intuitive. It seems impossible to explain 
for example malnutrition, hunger and war in such terms. 
The sensible transcendent is an example of an alternative way of conceptualising 
and resolving the problems associated with essentialism, constructionism, 'reality', 
language and dualism. It neither reduces everything to language/discourse, nor does it 
rely on dualistic categories for its articulation. While the idea of the sensible transcendent 
is not a concept found in the analytic discourse I have so far been using, it serves the 
purpose of crossing the boundaries between the 'analytic' and the 'continental' traditions 
in philosophy. In this, it is also in keeping with the spirit of Carol Christ's sentiment that 
42 'b'd p 99. I I ., · 
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feminist theory be 'whole', rather than dualistic. The idea of the sensible transcendent 
represents a different starting point for discussion of essentialism because it proposes 
a refiguring of what we might previously have read as oppositional categories. This was 
the case with de Lauretis' rejection of real, in favour of nominal essence, as that which 
feminists mean when they talk about essence. 
The sensible transcendent also represents a disintegration of the distinction 
between secular and religious theory. It is a concept that inserts women in the Divine, 
rather than splitting them from divinity, as man has done with his God, a point which is 
raised by Penelope Deutscher.43 This is because the idea of the sensible transcendent 
explicitly recognises female embodiment (the sensible, the material) as a condition of the 
transcendent; and language (the transcendent), as a condition of female embodiment (the 
sensible, the material). I will explain this more as my analysis proceeds. The sensible 
transcendent repudiates dualistic conceptualisation and is the ground, along with 
mimesis, upon which lrigaray can be defended against essentialist charges. Concurrently, 
it provides a way of reading female embodiment which does not fall back on essentialism. 
And because of this, the Divine becomes interpretable as difference, the Other, the point 
of wonder. 
Weak Pragmatic Constructionism and the Sensible Transcendent 
A recurring problem to which I have alluded in this thesis is that of female 
embodiment. The main problem with essentialism as I have refigured the notion, is not 
the claim that women are embodied at all (Schussler Fiorenza's 'natural' category) or that 
they have ahistorical, immutable timeless essence. What creates the problem is the claim 
that women's embodiment is thought necessarily to engender normative understandings 
and practices. Using the descriptive/normative distinction as I have outlined it above, it 
is possible to eliminate that problem but a serious residual worry remains. How is one to 
characterise the relation that must subsist between the description and what it 
describes?44 One way of construing this question is in terms of essence and language: 
43 
op. cit., Deutscher, ''The Only Diabolical Thing About Women ... ", p. 94. 
44 I acknowledge the complexity of this question. In philosophical history it has been discussed 
as a question of representation, of sense data, of realism and anti-realism, of fact and truth and 
correspondence. Although I have asked the question at this point in my thesis, it would be another 
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for example, as it is played out in the relation between Daly's social constructionism and 
the underlying body to which she seems to be committed. In other words, the opposing 
perspectives, real and nominal essence, might return once more, this time in the form of 
a dispute about language, conceived of as discursive practice; and what is not language, 
the so called independently 'real'. It is tempting to read 'language' and 'real' independent 
of language as a binary opposition, which makes the problem of sorting out the relation 
between the two enormously difficult. Such a conceptionalisation is bound always to 
reinforce their separateness. But language and 'reality' need not be conceived of in this 
oppositional way. 
In a glossary note, Grosz argues that lrigaray reclaims "a notion of the body which 
refuses traditional binary oppositions and places it firmly within a socio-historical 
context".45 Grosz argues that for lrigaray: 
... not only is subjectivity structured with reference to the symbolic 
meaning of the body but the body itself is the product and effect of 
symbolic inscriptions which produce it as a particular, socially appropriate 
type of body .... Dominant systems of discourse and representation are 
active ingredients of this social inscription of the sexed body .... The 
body is thus the site of the intersection of psychical projections; and of 
social inscriptions. understood in this way, it can no longer be considered 
pre- or acultural. 46 
Grosz adds that a reading such as this disallows charges of essentialism to be 
made against lrigaray. While women are oppressed, it is not their anatomy or physiology, 
directly, unproblematically that causes this, but "social meaning and value accorded to 
women's bodies by misogynist culture".47 In citing Grosz I do not mean to imply here (nor 
does Grosz) that women's bodies are separable from language. Rather, I want to stress 
thesis altogether if I were to discuss it fully. So what follows is a specific approach which attempts 
to break down the idea of the language/independent of language dichotomy. For a good discussion 
of metaphor, realism, science and religion, see Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious 
Language (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992). 
45 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists (Allen & Unwin, St. Leonard's, 
1989) I p. xv. 
46 'b'd I I . 
47 'b'd I I ., p. XX. 
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the idea that women's bodies are never without social meaning and social value. Their 
very biology is always interpreted biology. 
Implicit to this interpretation is the acceptance of discourse and embodiment as 
interpreted. In effect, the view says that the body is not a 'reality' independent of 
language. The view promotes the idea that bodies are always already given symbolic 
meanings, represented in cultural practices, but that one cannot separate the body from 
its social meanings. This does not mean that language produces bodies in the sense that 
language causes bodies to come into existence. What it does mean is that bodies as 
interpreted depend upon language for their symbolic, hence their social significance. And 
bodies always have social significance: they are theorised, conceptualized and talked 
about within a framework which prefigures them as significant. Hence embodiment is 
always meaning laden. Recall that this was Schussler Fiorenza's view of sex/gender 
which seemed to be inconsistent with her claim that 'reality' is open to more or less 
adequate accounts. 
Further, the view does not disallow the possibility of the concepts of anatomy and 
physiology. Anatomy and physiology, though, are always already interpreted. But, the 
emphasis is on the interpretation, the attribution of social signification already implicit in 
the interpretation. Language is not opposed to an independently real body which it either 
reflects or constructs. Rather language brings about the conditions in which the body is 
theorised and understood. Language is the symbolic framework which situates the body 
as always sexed; and the separability of the body from the symbolic becomes a 
misleading abstraction. 
'Morphology', the "term used by lrigaray to refer to the ways in which the body and 
anatomy of each sex is lived by the subject and represented in culture"48 thus provides 
a reading of 'language' and 'reality' independent of language which denies the 'gap', the 
dualism apparent in the terminology. On this interpretation, Schussler Fiorenza's 
attributing an essentialist stance to lrigaray is misplaced. Both agree that the body is 
48 ibid., p. xix. See also Luce lrigaray, Speculum Of The Other Woman (trans. Gillian C. Gill) 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1992), passim; Luce lrigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One 
(trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke) (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1985), passim; 
Margaret Whitford, Luce lrigaray: Philosophy io the Feminine (Routledge, London & New York 
1991 ), pp. 58-60 and p. 150. 
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always already interpreted. But lrigaray does not then argue that there is a 'reality', of any 
kind, G*d for example, independent of language. lrigaray's idea of embodiment is 
grounded in both anatomy and physiology, and language already interpreted; but it is not 
simply a body or a complex discursive product. U is discursive and it is material. 
The notion of the material is an important aspect of lrigaray's schema. 'The 
material' is presupposed by the idea of morphology. But underlying this use of morphology 
is lrigaray's notion of the sensible transcendent. The American lrigaray scholar Kathryn 
Bond Stockton calls lrigaray a "mystic opaque essentialist"(if she can be called an 
essentialist at all) a "theologian of lack". 49 She maintains that lrigaray deals with the 
perplexing questions of the material and the mystical. lrigaray, for her, is a "spiritual 
materialist", someone who "unambiguously exposes how spiritual discourse engenders 
discourse on materialities that dominant constructions fail to capture". 50 My argument has 
suggested that Schussler Fiorenza is a good example of someone who constructs 
spiritual and materialist discourse as oppositional. The concept of morphology insists that 
the supposed oppositional and irreducible tension between the material and the 
transcendent does not exist. Indeed they depend on and reflect each other. Bond 
Stockton conjectures that Carlyle's 'view of the body as "the mystic unfathomable 
Visibility" ... points in two directions simultaneously toward concealment and toward 
revelation'. 51 
On such an account the body is not transparent, that which language unveils in 
a complete act of revelation. The body, although visible, is beyond the reach of language 
because the body is more than the 'simply material'. It is shrouded in the mystery of social 
signification, wrapped in meanings bestowed by culture. Language, in conferring these 
meanings, in producing the idea of the body, hides what is already there through previous 
significations, previous layers of meaning. Hence the body is opaque, it is hidden and the 
more it is revealed by language, the more language conceals the body. Language, on this 
49 Kathryn Bond Stockton, God Between Their Lips: Desire Between Women in lrigaray, Bronte 
and Eliot (Stanford University Press, California, 1994), p. 27. 
50 "b"d I I . 
51 .b.d I I ., p. 24. 
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account, is analogous to the Hebrew God who both reveals and conceals, who is 
immanent and transcendent. 
This is the view of the body in post-structuralist conceptions like lrigaray's. Note 
that this is a very different view of language from that which I haveappealed to in the early 
parts of this thesis. The idea of language I have been using, has constituted 'it' as either 
that which refers, or that which constructs, or both. The emphasis in this kind of 
conception is on transparency rather than opacity: language makes clear, or articulates 
facts or states, which reflect a transparent world. For example, in analysing the concept 
of woman, the function of language is either to identify what the term 'woman' refers to, 
or to make clear that, and how, the term is socially constructed, or both. 
But the present conception suggests the complexity of language: its ability not only 
to reveal but to conceal. The idea that language might be opaque is implicit. When I 
argue that language reveals and conceals, I propose that it is within language that one 
conceives of 'reality' independent of language; and that without language one cannot so 
conceive. On this view, language does not only reflect and/or construct: language 
reflects, constructs, reveals and conceals. Language is always already there as a 
condition of that which is reflected, constructed, revealed and concealed. T_his conception 
renders language transcendent, as it implies that language is not only immanent, not just 
what it presents. Rather language also represents lack, inadequacy, what it cannot do, 
what it cannot present. In this sense, language is beyond itself, and hidden in the 
material, in embodiment. There is always more to be revealed and more to be concealed. 
Mystical overtones like these, reminiscent of the via negativa, run through lrigaray's 
writing, especially when she speaks about human love as transcendent. 52 What I would 
like to stress in this, is the dawning of the idea that 'language' and 'the body' are 
interdependent ideas which are not exhausted by each other: they contain their own 
explicit jouissance. The idea of embodiment modifies the idea of language, and the idea 
of language modifies embodiment. 
The move from the analytic idea of language which I have used so far, to this 
richer concept, represents a shift in ground. It suggests that an implicit presupposition of 
52 See especially Luce lrigaray, Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche (trans. Gillian C. Gill) 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1991 ); lrigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference; op. cit., 
trigaray "La Mysterique" in op. cit., Speculum Of The Other Woman. 
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dualism can be avoided in the 'language'/reality' debate because the relation between 
'language' and 'reality' is posed differently and not problematically. But it also means that 
distinctions I have made like that between the descriptive and the normative will have to 
be abandoned except for their use in making conceptual distinctions. Such conceptions, 
in other words, should not be regarded as pointing to an ontological difference between 
language and 'reality' - to what there is, and what is said about what there is. 
Further to this, that language has limits, revealing while concealing, suggests the 
inadequacy, as well as the potency, of discourse. The concept I have been previously 
using does not allow for this contingency. This reformulation of the function of language 
expresses the immanence of the body, while constantly moving the horizon in which the 
body can be theorised. Yet the transcendence of the body, that which is concealed in 
language, is hidden in the opacity of discourse. Language, itself transcendent, cannot 
capture the transcendent because it only barely captures the immanent, 'tumbling' what 
it fails to entrap, into the "material texture of beauty . . . the fabrication of the 
transcendent".53 Indeed, as I just suggested, language itself is viewed as transcendent, 
reaching beyond itself. 
I observed earlier that the sensible transcendent is 'the integration of the 
immanent and the transcendent'. Language mediates this integration because the 
imprecision of the idea of the sensible transcendent is borne by the symbolic and its 
discursive structures. The possibility of a feminine symbolic is, therefore, predicated on 
the notions of morphology and the sensible transcendent which already embody women 
symbolically. The strategic use of mimesis, as I argued earlier, is what enables this 
possibility. According to lrigaray as I noted, mimicry has been assigned to women in the 
male symbolic. By strategically using mimesis, lrigaray argues, women may be able to 
develop their own symbolic. Women are symbolised as the immanent (the flesh , the body, 
the material), and simultaneously as the transcendent, that which the male symbolic 
cannot symbolise because of the idea of (female) jouissance or too muchness. The 
feminine symbolic would evolve from women's claiming their immanence and their 
transcendence, strategically, mimetically. In claiming their immanence and their 
transcendence women 'respond' to the idea of the sensible transcendent. They 
53 
op. cit., Bond Stockton, God Between Their Lips, p. 32. 
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acknowledge their embodiment and their symbolic construction in a system which is not 
theirs, but from which they can be liberated by pushing the boundaries which constitute 
their being. 54 
The imprecision of the idea of the sensible transcendent is already allocated to 
women in the symbolic.55 For example, the Pythagorean Table of Opposites which I have 
used as an example of the symbolic representation of women, allocates imprecision 
through association with the idea of the female. The female is associated with infinity, 
motion, plurality and darkness. I suggest that this very imprecision reflects lrigaray's 
commitment to mimesis. In other words, imprecision mimes the feminine already 
symbolised by the male symbolic. 
Margaret Whitford notes that "the sensible transcendent is not a precise concept; 
it is a condensed way of referring to all the conditions of women's collective access to 
subjectivity. And so we find that the sensible transcendental is also referred to as god". 56 
The conjoining of the ideas of imprecision, the sensible transcendent and god is, 
therefore, quite deliberate. If lrigaray seeks to find a Divine for women, that Divine should 
have its basis in how women have been symbolised. The Divine for women should mirror 
women, just as God is the mirror of man: women need a Divine of their own. That is what 
I argued in chapter 4. The imprecision ~f the concept of the sensible transcendent mimics 
the imprecision of women's lives: turning around the overflow, the jouissance of the male 
symbolic. Of all concepts, 'god' is perhaps the most imprecise. 57 
I read lrigaray as holding that the sensible transcendent encompasses and 
surpasses the materialit/8 of women. For her, the sensible transcendent is possibility for 
54 
op. cit., lrigaray, "Volume-Fluidity" in op. cit., Speculum Of The Other Woman, p. 227. 
55 ibid., p.229. 
56 
op. cit., Margaret Whitford, Luce lrigaray Philosophy in the Feminine, p. 47. 
57 Notwithstanding lrigaray's discussion of the masculine paternal God in "Plato's Hystera" in op. 
cit., Speculum Of The Other Woman, p. 322 ff. 
58 For discussions of materiality, see: op. cit., Stockton, God Between Their Lips; op. cit. , 
Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine; Elizabeth Gross, lrigaray and the Divine (Local 
Consumption Publications, April 1986); Naomi Schor, "This Essentialism Which Is Not One: 
Coming to Grips With lrigaray", Naomi Schor & Elizabeth Weed (eds.), The Essential 
Difference, Books from Differences Series (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994); 
Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros (Routledge, London and New York, 1995). 
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women, because women need to construct their own symbolic in which their materiality 
is not read as male lack.59 What is vital to the understanding of the sensible transcendent 
however, is that although its meanings might never be transparent, its overall construction 
suggests lrigaray's refusal of dualism. Neither language nor materiality, in the present 
case, woman as embodied, should be privileged in the development of a symbolic or of 
a feminine Divine. 
Given lrigaray's refusal of dualism in the idea of the sensible transcendent, I am 
marking the sensible transcendent as an interpretive focus for weak pragmatic 
constructionism. If the danger with weak pragmatic constructionism is that it separates 
the linguistic from the non-linguistic, the sensible transcendent bridges this separation. 
The concept of the sensible transcendent disavows the idea that there is 'reality' 
independent of language without asserting that everything is socially constructed all the 
way down, read in terms of linguistic idealism. The idea of the sensible transcendent 
relies on more than discourse, yet is not separable from discourse. The idea of the 
sensible transcendent implies both discourse and the material together, already 
interpreted and signified. In other words, 'independent of language' does not mean 
'ontologically independent'. Instead, it means that what might plausibly be thought of as 
separable from language (the material), conceptually depends on the transcendence of 
language. Language in its multifarious functions points to both itself and the material in 
its immanence, when it reveals; and away from itself in its transcendence, when it 
conceals. In turn language/discourse requires the sensible - the material - as a condition 
for its possibility. Because the material is always already interpreted, language is 
constructed around materiality and materiality is constructed through language. Language 
and the material are conceptually interdependent. 
This means that language and materiality cannot be conceived of, one without the 
other. The idea that there might be 'reality' independent of language is foreclosed. In other 
words, this throws out a challenge to Haslanger's claim "that there is no reason to 
conclude that the world we have a point of view on is likewise socially conditioned".60 On 
59 For a discussion of the concept of lack, see op. cit., Deutscher, "The Only Diabolical Thing 
About Women ... "; op. cit., Bond Stockton, God Between Their Lips. 
60 
op. cit., Hasslanger, "Ontology and Social Construction", p. 34. 
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the reading of the sensible transcendent which I have just proposed, there can only be 
the world on which we have a point of view. Language exposes the materiality of that 
world because without language there can be no concept of the material: the world of 
necessity is socially conditioned. The epistemic conditions for theorising what is real, 
properly rejected by Haslanger, are replaced by conceptual conditions arising from the 
transcendence of language. 
The body, as material, is retained and should not be reduced to a construction of 
language practice an ideal, linguistic entity. The material cannot be reduced to a 
construction of language practice, because without the material, language cannot function 
and the material cannot be. Bond Stockton points out that French philosopher Roland 
Barthes had distinguished between those who "posit a reality which is entirely permeable 
to history" (constructionists) and those who "posit a reality which is ultimately 
impenetrable, irreducible" (essentialists}.61 The transcendence of language suggests that 
'reality' is both permeable to history and ultimately impenetrable, irreducible. What is 
permeable can be termed 'sensible', what would be ultimately impenetrable can be 
termed 'transcendent'. And language moves between the impenetrability of itself and the 
material, at times transparent and at other times, opaque. 
The ideas of the sensible transcendent and morphology express a different 
relation - neither total reflection nor total construction - between 'language' and 'reality'. 
Since the body, for instance, is already symbolised as material and cultural, its 'reality' is 
seen as mediated from the first by language, the symbolic. 
The idea of the sensible transcendent embodies the opposing tensions of dualism: 
adequacy/inadequacy; language/reality'; the material/the spiritual. The idea of the 
sensible transcendent allows the concurrent concepts of the material's structuring 
language and language's structuring the material. The sensible transcendent mediates 
the ideas of language and 'reality'. Hence lrigaray's concept of the sensible transcendent 
is an example of one way which might resolve problems with essentialism, social 
constructionism, dualism 'the real' and 'language'. My appeal to lrigaray's work is in terms 
of her insistence that dualism can be blocked at the outset, that one need not 
contemplate some distinctions in ways that separate ontologically. The sensible 
61 
op. cit., Bond Stockton. God Between Their Lips. p. 14. 
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transcendent does this work for lrigaray. It also inserts the idea of the Divine immediately 
into the conceptual framework, because divinity is not conceived as it has been 
traditionally: male, transcendent, omniscient, omnipotent. 
But it is important to realise that the idea of a feminine symbolic must be excluded 
from the project of denying ontological separability. Remember that lrigaray is arguing for 
an ontologically separate feminine symbolic. For her, since women have been conceived 
in lack, as the negative Other to men, it is vitally important that women make their own 
symbolic, and their own feminine. The idea of the sensible transcendent therefore 
becomes an idea peculiar to the possibility of a feminine genre. Paradoxically, sexual 
specificity must be employed, through mimesis, in acknowledging the sensible 
transcendent. Women's materiality, reconceptualised under their own (potential) gaze and 
within their own (potential) discourse, is a requirement of the elaboration of the sensible 
transcendent. Again, I stress the importance of mimesis in the process. 
The idea of the sensible transcendent also does the work that Carol Christ wanted 
of a feminist theology in terms of eroding dualistic structures and concepts which 
permeate theological conceptions of the Divine, to which I referred in my Introduction. 
Recall as well that I pointed out that Carol Christ believes "women's spir!tual and social 
quests are two dimensions of a single struggle ... 62 The sensible transcendent satisfies 
Christ's desire to dispense with dualism because it represents the denial of ontological 
separability between language and 'reality'. 
Hence, by reading weak pragmatism in the light of the sensible transcendent as 
I have done, we can see why Bond Stockton refers to lrigaray as an opaque essentialist. 
lrigaray acknowledges the importance of the material and simultaneously, rejects the 
transparency of discourse. This does not concede Schussler Fiorenza's point against 
lrigaray. What it means is that essentialism, initially refigured in terms of the descriptive 
and then modified; and weak social construction ism, read through the sensible 
transcendent, reinforces the idea that everything is constructed "all the way down". This 
view neither promotes linguistic monism, nor dualism. The material and language are 
read as interactive and interdependent aspects in the conceptualising of women. 
62 Carol P. Christ, DMng Deep and Surfacing: Women Writers on Spiritual Quest (Beacon Press, 
Boston, 1980), pp. 8 & 9. 
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Considering this approach, how are we to understand women's experience and the 
Divine? 
Encore: Women's Experience 
I argued that Mary Daly can be considered within a dualistic framework because 
she seems to posit an independently 'real' body which underpins her ontological-linguistic 
strategy. It is arguable, however, that there are strong similarities between Daly's position 
and lrigaray's in terms of their implicit, albeit different, theorising of embodiment. Further, 
Deutscher remarks that "lrigaray affirms the notion of the infinite as always in a state of 
becoming."63 In this way, with the emphasis on 'becoming', Daly and lrigaray are also 
analogous. A persistent use of metaphor by both theorists pushes the similarities even 
further. Even the mocking tone, the irony of their work bears some comparison. What 
delineates their positions perhaps, is lrigaray's insistence that women need to develop 
their own symbolic, their own Divine. My interpretations have suggested however, that 
Daly's project is in keeping with this declaration of lrigaray's even if the origins and 
outcomes appear dissimilar. 
But in terms of the Divine project itself, Daly's work, like Schussler Fiorenza's is 
retrospective. It is in the history of women that one can uncover the authenticity of being 
a woman. Retracing and reconstructing women's past, appealing to bygone halcyon days, 
informs the work of both Daly and Schussler Fiorenza. In this way, their work is situated 
in a nostalgia for the possibilities expressed in women's histories.64 lrigaray's references 
to Greek mythology do not have the hallmarks of historical reclamation. Rather, the 
stories provide a psychic moral for women: Aphrodite, for example, is cast by lrigaray as 
a Goddess who "holds a special place between nature, gods and human manifestation. 
She represents the embodiment of love ... "65 
63 
op. cit., Deutscher, ''The Only Diabolical Thing About Women ... ", p. 102. 
64 I refer in particular to Schussler Fiorenza's reconstruction of Christian women's origins in op. 
cit., Schussler Fiorenza, lo Memory of Her, and the implicit message in Mary Daly, in cahoots with 
Jane Caputi, Websters' First New Intergalactic Wickedary of the English Language (Beacon Press, 
Boston, 1987). 
65 See, Luce lrigaray, Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution (trans. Karin Montin) (Routledge, New York, 1994), p. 94. 
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Lastly, the role Schussler Fiorenza attributes to a community of believers lies 
outside the obvious concerns of lrigaray and Daly. For Schussler Fiorenza, there is an 
over-riding socio-political moral obligation towards justice and equality. Through such a 
commitment emerges the idea of the Divine, G*d. The site of the Divine is thus the polis, 
not the symbolic, as it is for lrigaray, or ontological-linguistics as it is for Daly. This is not 
to say that justice and equality are not concerns of Daly or lrigaray. Rather, their starting 
points are different. Regardless, for each theorist the idea of the Divine is projected by 
language which reflects their individual interests and commitments. 
I have now established that there is an intimate connection between language and 
women's experiences. Daly, Schussler Fiorenza and lrigaray are all convinced of the 
importance of language in relation to articulating both women's experiences and the 
Divine. Having argued the connections between language and experience and having 
refigured a concept of essentialism not dependent upon the normative, what remains is 
to draw out the connections between women's experience(s) and the Divine. 
Initially, I highlighted the claim that women's experience is foundational to feminist 
theologies. In developing the concept of women's experience, what became evident was 
that 'women's experience' should be read in the plural ('women's experiences') and that 
this plurality relied on the idea that women did not share a common essence which made 
them women. Indeed, the lack of a common essence suggested that women's experience 
should not be reified. Experience(s) constitute women and should not be interpreted as 
that which is constituted by women. 
An elaboration of the idea of social constructionism led to a modification of this 
position. I argued that weak pragmatic constructionism, interpreted through the concept 
of the sensible transcendent, is a view which gives the body a place as the material of 
social constructionism. Underlying this argument, was the assumption that women's 
experiences should both explain and be an explanation of the idea 'women'. 
As a basis for feminist theologies, women's experiences offer an alternative vision 
to men's because of the manner in which language and socio-political practice play 
themselves out. The ideas of the material and language inform the idea 'woman'. 
Language, conceived of as transcendent, together with the female body as always 
already interpreted, suggest women's difference from men. Women are always already 
interpreted as women because their materiality is always already depicted as 'real'. A 
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feminine Divine would therefore mirror women's materiality - their sexed bodies - as well 
as their cultural origins in language. I argued in my Introductory chapter that if women's 
experiences constitute women, and if the Divine should mirror women in feminist 
theologies as it has men in men's theology, then since women are socially constructed, 
so the Divine mirrors that constructedness. This position should however, be modified in 
light of the idea of the sensible transcendent. 
I have argued that the material and language are not separable and that the idea 
of woman cannot be simply either the idea of the material (female body) or discursive 
(social construction of gender). It must be always already both. The idea of women's 
experiences, acknowledged in its multiplicity, is the idea of both that which constructs, 
and that which is constructed. The body and discourse symbolically construct, and are 
constructed by, each other. Hence if women's experiences are to inform feminist 
theologies, they must do so on the basis of both the material and the discursive, the 
constructed and that which constructs. On this reading, the Divine is socially constructed 
in virtue of its being the mirror of women, thought of as both embodied and discursively 
constituted. This, in effect, means that the concept of difference is implicit in the idea of 
women: not only are women's bodies different from each other, they are differently 
constituted, represented and interpreted across cultures, across racial and class contexts. 
I noted that Schussler Fiorenza's argument denied that there was any basis upon 
which one could speak of women as women, because the very idea of sex/gender is a 
socio-political construction. Daly and lrigaray, I suggested, can be read as arguing that 
one can speak of women as women: that sex/gender is the primary significatory category 
for articulating the idea of 'woman'. For them, what I have now called women's materiality 
- female embodiment - is a condition of their being women. But this apparently apolitical 
stance needs to be interpreted on different levels. 
My current discussion suggests that as always already interpreted, women's 
bodies do not have biological essence in the ways which I outlined at the beginning of this 
thesis: the timeless, unchanging, ahistorical, from which normative or prescriptive dictates 
supposedly follow. Rather, the idea of embodiment is opaque, revealed and concealed 
in language, which is itself always socio-political. Women are women on account of their 
materiality, but not only women on account of their materiality. Their cultural 
interpretations ensure their differences amongst and between each other, in terms of 
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class and race for example. But the common bond of women remains their 
sexed/gendered female embodiment, even if that is figured and interpreted differently in 
different cultures. Thus culture, socio-politics, expressed in discursive practices, shares 
with female embodiment, the constitution of women. 
Schussler Fiorenza's rejection of Daly and lrigaray is based upon their use of 
language which she regards as revalorising essentialist feminist notions. The introduction 
of the concept of the sensible transcendent signals an alternative reading of such usage. 
Instead of figuring sex/gender as irredeemably essentialist, the body becomes the already 
interpreted material of language, the co-requisite for discursive practices. Ontologically, 
the body cannot be a 'reality' independent of discourse. Discourse requires the body, just 
as the body requires discourse, as I have been arguing. 
This means that one could speak of women as women because women's bodies 
always inform and are a condition of, the articulation of 'woman'. But this does not mean 
that women's bodies always are, or must be, interpreted, signified and represented in the 
same ways across cultures, classes and racial groups. That bodies are always already 
interpreted does not mean that embodiment should be understood as only discursively 
constructed. In short, it means that women's materiality, their embodiment, is always 
interpreted differently. Thus women are different, and essentially so. But, as I argued 
earlier, bodies resist language because language with respect to bodies, is not a closed 
system. Language can never completely reveal: language conceals also. Language is 
multi-layered and multi-functional, an infinity of possibilities which discloses itself and the 
material, while simultaneously enforcing closure and silence on itself and the material. 
That bodies are always already interpreted, points to their resistance of ultimate truth 
claims: where there is revelation or disclosure, there is also concealment and closure. 
Women's experiences, on this basis, are neither completely socially constructed 
nor determined by a body about which normative claims should be made. The claim that 
women's experiences are foundational to feminist theologies, feminist theorising about 
the Divine, can be understood as a coherent position for women to adopt, especially in 
light of the projection theory it employs. Recall Nancy Frankenberry's reference to the 
"conspicuous reliance of many feminist critiques in Feuerbachian projection theories" 
which I noted in my Introductory chapter. As I have already indicated, lrigaray is explicit 
in her acknowledgement of Feuerbach, in her idea that women need their own divinity, 
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just as men have their own. My discussion of Fauerbach in chapter 4 elaborated the idea 
of God as the mirror of Man. There, I argued that lrigaray claims that women need their 
own Divine just as men have theirs. 
The concept of the Divine/the Goddess/G*d as mirror of women and wo/men is 
implicit, but its Feuerbachian source is unacknowledged, in Daly's and Schussler 
Fiorenza's works. Either way, the implication of insisting that women's experience(s) 
should be used as the foundation for feminist theologies, is that the concept of the Divine 
is embedded in, and projected from, women's experiences. The Divine is the mirror of 
women because women project the Divine. And for Schussler Fiorenza, the Ekklesia is 
the projection of G*d. 
As I have described her project, lrigaray's intuition that women need a Divine of 
their own, requires that the idea of women's experiences be elaborated in terms both 
material and linguistic/discursive. The Divine, on such an account, is both material and 
linguistic/discursive. The idea of the sensible transcendent is constituted by the polarising 
tensions between the material and the spiritual. On this account the Divine, god, is 
integrated in the immanent and the transcendent; holding both together, yet apart. Here, 
lrigaray's notion of the Divine mimics the masculine paternal God's dual 'nature' -
transcendent and immanent - while subverting the idea of the Divine's embodiment in the 
man Jesus. What counts for lrigaray is female embodiment as the locus of a feminine 
Divine. 
I have been developing an argument which proposes that the idea of women's 
experiences points to the transcendence of language and the material. Neither language 
nor the material completely captures, or is captured by, the Other. Yet they remain 
interdependent because in their interdependence the very possibility of the material and 
language are realised. 
Remember that one of my concerns about Schussler Fiorenza's project to 
denaturalise sex/gender, was that it implied an ambiguous understanding of 'reality'. G*d 
remains independent of language, yet is the mirror of the ekklesia. That is to say, I 
suggested that G*d is a social construction, while I also acknowledged that according to 
Schussler Fiorenza, G*d is independent of language because talk of G*d is necessarily 
analogical. The notion 'G*d' would, however, still depend for its elaboration upon the 
ekklesia in which it is articulated. G*d becomes a projection of the ekklesia: rather than 
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G*d being the mirror of Man, to recall the Feuerbachian terminology, G*d is the mirror of 
the ekklesia whose members are wo/men. The notion 'G*d' is relational on this reading, 
because it would emanate from the just and equitable relations forming the ekklesia and 
enunciated in its socio-political discourse. In other words, the possibility of construing G*d 
as a 'reality' independent of language, is disallowed: nothing can be independent of 
language. 
My account of lrigaray's sensible transcendent is able to embrace the difficulty of 
an objectively 'real' G*d beside a projected G*d. As I have argued the case, the female 
body is the 'raw material' out of which the Divine emerges. When women project the 
Divine, they project not only language, but language situated in their embodiment, and 
their embodiment situated in language. But it is not a 'pure', a 'brute', female body, nor 
'pure', 'brute', language. It is a body already culturally interpreted and which embodies 
difference. Certainly the idea of the Divine is dependent on discourse, but not dependent 
on discourse alone. Language and the material, intersecting in the sensible transcendent, 
constitute the projection which is the Divine: divinity is both material and discursive, 
immanent and transcendent. This allows for the possibility of analogical and metaphorical 
language, poetics. The Divine, on this account, is intrinsically mystery, while 
simultaneously Utopian, the possibility of a feminine ideal. But, there is no 'brute' divinity, 
no G*d independent of discourse, just as there is no 'brute' biology. 
My proposal is that the idea of the sensible transcendent gives us a way of 
thinking about social constructionism in relation to women and also in relation to the 
Divine. Social constructionism is grounded in both the material (female embodiment) and 
language (discursive practice). As the mirror of women, the Divine is also grounded in the 
material and language. On this account women's experiences are necessarily implicated 
in feminist theologies and elucidations of the Divine. 
I remarked earlier that Whitford and Deutscher have noted the multiplicity of 
meanings for the 'Divine' in lrigaray's work. The Divine is the projection of an ideal for 
women, the point at which lovers meet, the sensible transcendent. Hence the Divine is 
always here and always beyond. The Divine is lack and the Divine is concealment. These 
formulations of the Divine for women invite multiplicity, mimicking the symbolism of the 
200 
....... 
Pythagorean Table of Opposites.66 Women may mimic their multiplicity, but in so doing, 
they project the complexity of the Divine. 
If the primary reason for Schussler Fiorenza's rejection of the 'natural' is that she 
perceives a necessary link between what I have called the descriptive and the normative, 
then to disavow that link, is to remove the reason for its rejection. In its place, the 
sensible transcendent, subtending morphology, reinscribes the body as the material 
condition for discourse, and discourse as the condition of the possibility for the material. 
'Women's experiences' can be thought of as the way in which culture circumscribes 
women's lived experiences through its inscription and interpretation of women's bodies. 
Hence women's experiences are both material (reliant on their sexed/gendered 
embodiment) and discursive (reliant on language). Women's experiences are of their 
bodies and in their bodies, always already interpreted. The sensible transcendent situates 
a woman in her body, while discourse removes her beyond her body into language and 
beyond language, illustrating her lack, her need of divinity. 
The idea of the Divine is deliberately ambiguous: that towards which women set 
themselves, an ideal of transcendence; the point of contact between two lovers where 
the 'not' they are, is expressed; the ground for the development of a feminine symbolic; 
the sensible transcendent, the meeting of the material, language and its beyond.67 
Consider Bond Stockton's rendering of lrigaray's Divine, her 'God': 
'God', in lrigaray's theories, plays a vital role ... God ... is figured as the 
material resistance of women's bodies to the cultural constructions that 
have barred women's pleasure. More daring yet, because lrigaray locates 
this material resistance (this opacity) in 'women's' hole (where she is said 
to lack), 'God', not 'woman' is a crack, a gap. a lack - the fracture we need 
for conceiving new pleasures .... 'God' also figures the body of a lover 
who, while coming close to 'woman' nurtures the fracture that keeps "him" 
from possessing "her" ... 68 
The relation between women's experiences and the Divine can therefore be spelt 
out in terms of women's self-understandings as embodied and beyond their bodies. 
66 See chapter 1 of this thesis. 
67 See op. cit., Whitford , Philosophy io the Feminine; op. cit., Deutscher, "The Only Diabolical 
Thing About Women ... "; and op. cit., Stockton, God Between Their Lips. 
68 
op. cit., Stockton, God Between Their Ups, p. so. 
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Women's experiences should be thought of as foundational to feminist theologies on this 
reading, because the Divine which is 'captured' by feminist theologies is the mirror of 
women. I am arguing for a concept of divinity which manifests women's differences, 
women's complexities, women's urges towards transcendence and which emerges from 
women's experiences, constantly elusive in its materiality, yet always already interpreted 
in its becoming. Women's bodies: black, yellow, poor, rich, lesbian, straight, project the 
Divine: the Divine is the mirror of women. lrigaray's mimetic strategy is the key to a 
feminine divinity. 
One of Schussler Fiorenza's underlying aims was, as I pointed out in chapter 3, 
to accentuate the instability of the term 'G*d'. I argued there that the sign 'G*d' is meant 
to convey this instability. Considering the tradition in which she situates herself and her 
on-going, deliberate use of Christian sources, it is difficult to ignore its patriarchal 
(kyriarchal) overtones. Daly's emphasis on the Goddess as the verb of verbs, and the 
becoming of women in their differences, resists this paternalism, although her 'debt' to 
onto-theology is great. lrigaray's conscientious dialogue with the male symbolic in search 
of a feminine symbolic relies on exploiting male representations of women's bodies. In 
this her Divine is defiant, challenging the dominance of the masculine paternal God (G*d). 
If women are to use their own experiences as a foundation for feminist theologies, then 
women may indeed find their own Divine. 
lrigaray and Hampson, as I indicated in my Introductory chapter, had implied that 
there is some peculiarity in associating ideas about women's experiences which are 
constructed almost totally in sociological terms, with formulations of the Divine. As my 
work has evolved, it has become clear that the ideas of essentialism and social 
constructionism can be refigured in terms which do not render them oppositional, thus 
taking the edge off this peculiarity. In exploring feminist theologies, I have interrogated 
some feminist theologians' unquestioning acceptance of social constructionist theory. The 
result of that interrogation has been the development of a concept of the Divine which 
depends upon acceptance of social constructionist theory modified in terms of the 
sensible transcendent. As refigured, the idea of the Divine incorporates difference and 
plurality, embodiment and discourse, the transcendent and the immanent. 
The resolution of the essentialist /social constructionist debate in relation to 
women's experiences and female embodiment, provides insights into the problem of how 
202 
r, 
I! 
,, 
11. 
!' 
~ 
I· 
11 
LI 
~ 
one is to construe the relation between women's experiences and the feminine Divine. 
I have developed a strong thesis which maintains that the Divine is the mirror of women 
and as such, necessarily mirrors women's materiality, notably their female embodiment. 
But as I pointed out, 'women's embodiment' is not a 'pure' concept, but always already 
interpreted by and through language. Hence the feminine Divine as the mirror of women 
mirrors the 'fact' that women are socially constructed. 
As the mirror of women, the Divine is not disconnected from women's everyday 
lived experiences. The Divine mirrors class, race and sex/gender differences with which 
feminist theory has grappled. The Divine signifies and embodies difference. 
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CONCLUSION 
The dominant concern of some feminist theologians has been to include women's 
experiences as part of the conceptualising of the Divine in feminist theologies. I have 
argued that the ideas of essentialism and social constructionism are complex and can be 
construed as dependent upon dualistic conceptions like nature and nurture, reality and 
language. In this sense the argument has attempted to elucidate the feminist commitment 
to fracturing dualism in feminist theologies. 
My view is that feminist theologies are concerned with two inter-related matters: 
re-figuring the idea of divinity, and inscribing feminist theologies as explicitly political. The 
work of Daly, Schussler Fiorenza and lrigaray typifies this twin engagement, as I have 
shown. They are all committed to explicating the idea that women are socially 
constructed. Each theorist acknowledges the fundamental importance of discourse in the 
process, and each theorist denies that one should think of women in a (real) essentialist 
manner which disavows the role of cultural factors in 'making' women. ~ence, each 
theorist affirms the adage that women are made and not born. Daly also denounces 
nominalism, and Schussler Fiorenza denounces the idea of nominal essence because 
she believes that subscribing to any essence, revalorises concepts we take to be natural 
and commonsense, such as sex/gender. In doing this, they fail to realise that social 
constructionist theory, which they uncritically deploy, owes its origins to the work of John 
Locke. His distinction between real and nominal essence has provided to feminists the 
inspiration for an analysis of the idea of woman in terms of discursive practice. Femin7st 
theologians, using the distinction between real essence and discursive practice which 
constitutes women as subjects, have challenged the essentialist paradigm. However, as 
I have argued, they revalorise its implicit oppositional nature and therefore remain within 
the paradigm. I have also argued that lrigaray does not work within the essentialist 
paradigm, refusing its theoretical formulating from the beginning and stressing instead the 
conceptual and ontological inter-relatedness of language and the material. 
Mary Daly refutes the idea that there is a universal, ahistorical, atemporal essence 
which all women share and which makes all women basically the same. We saw in 
chapter 2 that Daly extensively criticises the concept of the essential woman, which she 
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calls the Eternal Feminine. Daly's contention is that if women are the same, it is language 
practice and culture which render them so. Daly seems to assume that women are 
basically the same, that one could speak of 'women as women' without countenancing 
other social factors like race and class, contrary to Spelman's concerns raised in chapter 
1. I have argued that this is not the case. Daly alleges that by transforming discursive 
practices, one's ontology and one's ontological commitments will also change. So for 
Daly, the site of radical metamorphosis is discourse. Women must interrogate and 
abandon androcentric discursive practices and begin naming for themselves. From and 
through new naming, will emerge the Goddess, the Verb of Verbs. Daly's comprehensive 
deployment of metaphor insinuates meanings which enable her to capture the 
elusiveness of the Divine, the Goddess, which can never be captured by noun naming. 
Schussler Fiorenza also refutes the idea that there is a universal, ahistorical, 
atemporal essence which all women share, and which make women the same across 
class and race boundaries. Hence, for Schussler Fiorenza, one can never speak of 
women as women: wo/men are different from each other. Yet even on Schussler 
Fiorenza's account one can speak of wo/men's experiences as a foundation to feminist 
theologies, because wo/men have been, and continue to be, oppressed. Further, 
Schussler Fiorenza thinks that there is no reality which language reflects, that our 
concepts of truth, reality, gender and class, for example, are socially constructed. Socio-
political discourse is responsible for producing all kinds of ideas which we have assumed 
to be natural. Race, gender and class, according to Schussler Fiorenza, are not 'natural' 
at all. The language in which we talk about these ideas constructs, rather than reflects. 
We saw, however, that Schussler Fiorenza thinks that although discourse is the 
site of oppression, this is not because 'it' is gendered. Rather, discourse oppresses 
because of the naturalising assumptions which underpin its use. In 'naturalising', as 
Schussler Fiorenza employs the term, we take certain concepts to be commonsense and 
given, revealing that we actually think of them in essentialist ways. One is in constant 
danger of revalorising the concepts and conceptual frameworks in which one operates, 
thinking for example in terms of what she calls the logic of identity which assumes the 
superiority of Euro-centric culture. 
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In a bold move, lrigaray adopts a mimetic strategy which concedes that discourse, 
indeed the whole of the symbolic, is gendered and which sets out to destabilise the 
supposed neutrality of the symbolic. Hence, lrigaray is also concerned with language, the 
production of women and the conceptual terminology which binds them. Her constant 
references to the trope of female embodiment read either literally, mimetically, or 
metaphorically impose the judgement, however, that she is essentialist. I have suggested 
that she neither has a dualistic ontological-linguistic strategy which assumes an 
independently real female body, as does Daly, nor does she appear to believe, like 
Schussler Fiorenza does, that discursive practices in terms of socio-politics uniquely 
construct reality. 
In reading these theorists closely, I have maintained that their arguments share 
common origins with the discussions of other theorists. The work of de Lauretis, Fuss and 
Spelman explores the essentialist debate expanding its horizons and questioning some 
of its assumptions. Spelman, for example, argues that sex/gender is an oppressive 
category amongst race. On my reading, there is a strong connection between the 
concerns of secular theorists and those interested in interrogating the idea of divinity. 
In spite of the differences between Daly, Schussler Fiorenza, and lrigaray, the 
details of their arguments show that each theorist has an abiding interest in the relation 
between women and the Divine. Throughout this thesis I have claimed that for feminists 
interested in the Divine, the nature of this relationship can be settled only if a satisfactory 
understanding of 'woman' can be achieved. Overwhelmingly, social constructionism has 
gained ascendancy as the explanation for 'woman', but how it is to be understood needs 
careful consideration. What seems certain is that Daly, Schussler Fiorenza and lrigaray 
are each committed to some version of Feuerbachian projection theory, which holds that 
the Divine is constructed in terms of idealised and Utopian projection theory. 
I argued ·that Daly retains a dualistic metaphysic because of the primacy she gives 
to language, while she simultaneously assumes the existence of an independently real 
female body. Discursive practices of women are what constitutes their Ultimate Being, 
hence their association with the Goddess. By contrast, Schussler Fiorenza scorns the 
idea of 'reality' independent of language, while simultaneously implying that language has 
access to what appears to be some 'reality' independent of language. G*d, for her, 
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remains a 'reality' independent of language. Her renunciation of psychoanalytic theory 
which, she maintains, revalorises the maternal feminine, is based upon her distrust of a 
totalising logic of the Same or logic of identity. lrigaray also denounces the logic of the 
Same and holds that the ideas of woman and Divinity are conceived within language. 
However, because she does not work within the essentialist paradigm, there is no 
question of her maintaining an idea of 'reality' independent of language. 
Regardless, both Daly and Schussler Fiorenza have a commitment to social 
constructionism. They appeal to this theoretical category in terms of seeing it as a 
solution to the problems of essentialism. One of the problems of 
essentialist/constructionist debate is how to theorise the female body without deferring 
to essentialist notions. So, I have argued, what is missing from both of their theories is 
an account of how embodiment should be theorised in relation to the divine. 
In my concluding chapter, I argued that lrigaray's sensible transcendent 
represents a way of theorising the language/body dilemma that is not offered by either 
Daly or Schussler Fiorenza. I argued that because of this, a Divine that might be 
envisioned as the feminine Divine, embraces the categories of language dependence and 
the independently 'real'. 
lrigaray's sensible transcendent posits the body and discourse, but privileges 
neither. The body and discourse are mutually interdependent. Lastly, I argued that 
lrigaray's conception of the sensible transcendent allows for 'women's experience' to be 
both explanans and explanandum. I accept Scott's analysis that it is experience which 
needs to be explained, but I also argued that sometimes experience can be an 
explanation. Thus, when one sets out to articulate 'women' and 'women's experience' one 
should immediately recognise the ambiguity of the term, not just as Spelman 
acknowledged it, but in both a materialist and a linguistic sense. What is important here 
is that language, and 'reality' independent of language, collapse as ontologically 
separable categories: they are interdependent. On this reading, Schussler Fiorenza's 
claim that language never mirrors reality, but only constructs it, should be reassessed. 
The idea of sensible transcendent embodies two apparently oppositional 
categories, the body and language. lrigaray's argument that women need a Divine of their 
own, needs to be read as a suggestion that the term 'woman' is ambiguous, invoking both 
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the linguistic and the material. The construction of a feminine divinity would, therefore, 
incorporate the idea that women are materially and discursively produced. 
The overall argument of this thesis suggests the potentially radical nature of 
feminist theologies within secular, as well as religious, contexts - feminist theologies' 
'double dare'. If feminist theologies are to be thought of as theological both in terms of 
refiguring concepts of divinity; and political, in terms of incorporating categories like class, 
race, and gender, then their critical, deconstructive nature needs to be highlighted. While 
the theological-political context of feminist theologies is not a new idea in relation to 
theologies generally, the feminist challenge to theorising the Divine from the perspective 
of sectional interests, which include and emphasise sex/gender, is particularly subversive. 
lrigaray's concept of the sensible transcendent offers one way of interpreting this 
'double dare' present in the feminist theologies of Daly and Schussler Fiorenza. The 
articulation of theology and politics, language and reality, which does not make them the 
Same, but which recognises their theoretical separability, is a significant moment for 
feminist theories. This is especially important in trying to come to terms with the idea of 
social constructionism. Theoretically, language and reality seems always to be in tension 
with each other. The idea of the sensible transcendent does not resolve this tension. 
Rather, the sensible transcendent embraces this tension, working with mimesis to 
articulate a possible feminine divinity and a possible feminine symbolic. Through this 
might emerge women as ontologically distinct. 
It is worth remarking that the feminist dependence on Feuerbachian projection 
theory which has emerged in Daly's, Schussler Fiorenza's and lrigaray's work makes 
women guarantor of the Divine. I noted that Deutscher argued that God is man's 
guarantor even if man is 'severed' from the Divine. 1 Women however, are the would-be 
guarantors of the Divine precisely because they would not be severed from a divinity 
which embodies the sensible transcendent. Mimesis ensures not only the ontological 
distinguishability of women, but identifies women with their own symbolic structures of 
which a feminine divine is the foundation. 
1 See footnote 52, Chapter 4. 
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It is in this sense that the Divine is in language. Language, which I argued reveals 
and conceals as well as reflects and constructs, operates in much the same way as 
Hebrew conceptions of the Divine. The revelatory and concealing dispositions of the 
Divine manifest God's immanence and transcendence, just as language operates to 
mediate and constitute the sensible transcendent. 
What is clear in this conceptualisation, is that the proclivity of Fauerbach to situate 
God in human consciousness is consistent with lrigaray's belief that everything is already 
in language. But the idea that everything is already in language does not set boundaries 
which are fixed and determined. On the contrary, the very concept that language itself, 
as part of a symbolic system, creates its own overflow, provides for the possibility of 
constant movement towards, and beyond, pre-existing boundaries, the possibility of 
endless becoming. Schussler Fiorenza's impulse to situate G*d as 'real' outside language, 
is driven, I think, by her unarticulated assumption that language is finite. Contrary to 
Schussler Fiorenza's perspective, and in keeping with lrigaray's intuition, G*d cannot be 
independent of language, for the idea of such a 'reality' would be vacuous. On lrigaray's 
view, only within language can we conceive of anything. 
The task is now to develop ways in which a feminine symbolic - or feminine 
symbolics - might proceed. The use of mimesis is a starting point which plays on the 
entrenched male metaphors expressed in, for example, the Pythagorean Table of 
Opposites. Mimesis itself is necessarily political, as this study has shown. The risk of 
essentialism should be taken seriously as Teresa de Lauretis pointed out. What women 
need to decide is how to work best amongst themselves, for themselves, to promote their 
own divinity, their own ontological separability, their own politics of difference. This will 
not be an easy task. Recognition of women's entrapment in an atrophying system which 
denies their difference(s) and promotes their (apparent) sameness, is primary. On that, 
Daly, Schussler Fiorenza and lrigaray agree. It is the responsibility of feminist theologies 
to promote that awareness and develop political strategies for change. 
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